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This dissertation addresses the role of business politics in the context of 
Chinese state-owned multinationals by analyzing the emergence and 
consolidation of a state-owned energy company and its internationalisation to 
Brazil. The single case study traces the corporate evolution from its initial 
emergence in 2002 as a consequence of China's power sector reforms to its 
operations in Brazil in 2016. The findings build on more than three years of field 
research - including interviews in electricity supply sectors in Brazil and China 
- as well as extensive analysis of archival and government documents. Using 
an institutionalist approach, the dissertation identifies that business politics is 
an important resource to help the company gain competitive advantage. 
 
In China, where the company's institutional embeddedness was strong, the 
company developed the ability to pursue its industrial and internationalisation 
agenda with relative autonomy, albeit confined to the state-business relations. 
In Brazil, where its institutional embeddedness was weak, it depended on 
comparative economic advantage, such as low-cost bidding, technology 
knowledge transfer, and comparative political advantage, such as diplomatic 
support. As a result, the case study shows that the firm is able to incrementally 
build on existing strengths and industrial capabilities to participate in the 
Brazilian energy sector, while simultaneously consolidating its domestic 
position in China. In addition to contributing to the literature on the relationship 
between state-owned enterprises and the state, the study contributes to 
broader debates about the differences in state-business relations, the political 





Die vorliegende Arbeit befasst sich mit der Rolle der Unternehmenspolitik von 
chinesischen Unternehmen am Beispiel eines staatlichen 
Energieunternehmens und dessen Expansion nach Brasilien. Im Mittelpunkt 
der Analyse steht die Unternehmensentwicklung seit der Gründung im Jahr 
2002 bis zur Aufnahme der Tätigkeiten in Brasilien. Dabei wird 
herausgearbeitet, dass Unternehmenspolitik ein bedeutendes, dem 
Unternehmen Wettbewerbsvorteile verschaffendes Mittel ist und in Prozessen 
der Internationalisierung von verschiedenen Handlungslogiken beeinflusst wird. 
 
In China ist das untersuchte Unternehmen bereits historisch stark institutionell 
eingebettet, was es dazu befähigt hat, seine industrielle und internationale 
Agenda in relativer Autonomie zu verfolgen. In Brasilien, wo das Unternehmen 
institutionell vergleichsweise eine schwächere Einbettung erfahren hat, stellte 
sich hingegen eine Abhängigkeit von seinen wirtschaftlichen und politischen 
Vorteilen heraus. Hierzu zählten unter anderem die kostengünstigen Angebote 
chinesischer Anbieter bei Projekten im Ausland, die Vergabe von günstigen 
Krediten seitens staatlicher Banken, subventionierte Faktorkosten, 
technologischer Wissenstransfer sowie letztlich der diplomatische Rückhalt. 
 
Die Fallstudie zeigt auf, wie sich das Unternehmen durch die Erweiterung 
seiner bestehenden Stärken und industriellen Kapazitäten in die Lage gebracht 
hat, sich sowohl international als auch national weiter zu konsolidieren. 
Einerseits wird so seine Teilhabe am brasilianischen Energiesektor möglich 
und andererseits wird seine innenpolitische sowie wirtschaftliche Position in 
China gefestigt. Die Dissertation versteht sich nicht nur als ein Beitrag zum 
aktuellen Forschungsstand im Bereich der Beziehungen zwischen Staat und 
staatlichen Unternehmen, sondern auch als eine Perspektive auf die politischen 
Ursprünge von Unternehmensentscheidungen im Kontext von 
Schwellenländern. 
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Things economic and social move by their own momentum and the ensuing 
situations compel individuals and groups to behave in certain ways whatever 
they may wish to do—not indeed by destroying their freedom of choice but by 
shaping the choosing mentalities and by narrowing the list of possibilities from 
which to choose (Joseph Schumpeter, 1962, p.139-130). 
 
 
One of the most intriguing dimensions of firm activities abroad is how companies deal 
with challenges affecting their immediate business interests. Analysing all channels by 
which political activities unfold is difficult to achieve. In this dissertation, I examine the 
dynamics of this unique variant of non-market firm strategy: business politics, defined 
as a way of directly or indirectly leveraging corporate interests. Business politics are 
not confined to national environments, rather, firm internationalisation places business 
politics as a process of learning as companies become more and more part of the 
international community. 
 
The viewpoint of companies as powerful actors has been adopted as a priori 
assumption in the analysis of policy processes and state-business relations or in the 
absence of empirical scrutiny. Unfortunately to date, systematic and qualitative data 
about the extent to which MNCs engage in corporate political actions in the context of 
their global market presence remains largely unavailable. In this study, I explore state- 
owned multinational companies by examining the emergence and consolidation of a 
Chinese energy sector company to Brazil from 2002-2016. Based on a single case 
study, the study is organized around three dimensions (firm-level, industry-level, and 
institutional-level), before then examining the case itself. Such a contribution is 
especially necessary considering the literature’s clear orientation to the domestic 
context at the expense of scrutinizing corporate political strategies across different 
contexts, specifically emerging countries. 
 
Over the last two decades, Chinese multinational companies have used their know- 
how and managerial resources to invest abroad. Understanding internationalisation as 
‘the crossing of national boundaries in the process of growth’ (BUCKLEY AND 
GHAURI, 1999, p. ix), most of China’s investment to advanced economies allowed 
firms to acquire knowledge, brands, technological capacity, and quick market access. 






‘developing friendship’ as described by Chinese President Xi Jinping during the 
opening ceremony of China-Latin America Media Leaders Summit at the headquarters 
of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in 
Santiago, will impact Latin American economies for at least the foreseeable future. 
 
Focusing on the relations between Brazil and China offers several unique opportunities 
to study the phenomenon of business politics in the context of internationalisation. My 
case focuses on the internationalisation of State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC). In 
Brazil, the company’s subsidiary State Grid Brazil Holding (SGBH) acquired a major 
stake in the Brazilian power distributor CPFL Energia and is a main operator of Brazil’s 
power transmission lines. Such investment in critical infrastructure meets the urgent 
needs of Brazil whose electricity demand until 2024 will require an addition of 79 GW 
of installed total generation capacity with an estimated investment of US$ 101.3 billion, 
as well as an additional 70,000 km of transmission lines with an estimated investment 
of US$ 40.8 billion (MINISTRY OF MINES AND ENERGY, 2016). 
 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, Brazil’s electricity sector has undergone significant 
institutional restructuring, which has resulted in changes to the competitive 
environment and the entry of foreign investment, including Chinese. The consequent 
changes in the state-business relations provide not only material for this industry case, 
but no less important raises attention to the question on how states perceive and treat 
the presence of foreign MNCs. Even though companies may possess resources to 
participate in policy-making or political systems, it does not automatically mean their 
efforts will be successful. 
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REVIEW OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
 
Empirical research on foreign direct investment (FDI) determinants has developed 
along both economic and political perspectives. The contribution FDI makes to 
development is pivotal to debates concerning socio-economic transformation in Latin 
America’s development. The challenges it poses and opportunities it opens are debated 
in terms of the structure, extent and nature of the FDI activities associated with a given 
location, the economic structure of that location and the local economic development 
(NARULA AND DUNNING, 2010). When it comes to the role of multinational companies 
(MNCs) and FDI, literature (e.g. NARULA AND DRIEFFIELD, 2012) debates firm- 
specific assets (technology, economies of scale, capital intensity and R&D, 
management techniques, organizational skills and the knowledge of markets, and the 
expertise to exploit them efficiently) that provide MNCs with a domestic advantage over 
domestic firms in the recipient context. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) definition for FDI is as follows: 
 
Direct investment enterprise is an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in 
which a single foreign investor either owns 10 per cent or more of the ordinary 
shares or voting power of an enterprise or owns less than 10 per cent of the 
ordinary shares or voting power of an enterprise, yet still maintains an effective 
voice in management. An effective voice in management only implies that direct 
investors are able to influence the management of an enterprise and does not 
imply that they have absolute control. The most important characteristic of FDI, 
which distinguishes it from foreign portfolio investment, is that it is undertaken 
with the intention of exercising control over an enterprise. 
 
 
The role of FDI, motivated either by the search for natural resources, markets, efficiency 
and strategic assets (DUNNING AND LUNDAN, 2008), for developing and emerging 
countries have been contemplated in terms of their potential effect on economic 
development in the host-country context, ushering technological spillovers, formation 
of human capital and trade integration. Technology transfer and its diffusion might be 
achieved through vertical relations with the suppliers on the host country level; horizontal 
relations with complementary or competing enterprises; migration of skilled labor and 
the internationalisation of research and development (R&D) (NAVARETTI AND 
VENABLES, 2006). Emerging countries are at the heart of current debates, debating 
benefits and pitfalls of FDI in the national economies and increasingly the growing 
impact of South-South relations (RAY ET AL, 2015). Here, emerging market emerging 
multinational companies emerge as key FDI sources directed into other emerging 
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economies, the developed world, and also the rest of the developing world 
(COLLINS, 2013). 
 
A growing strand of literature focuses on how firms from emerging countries are 
operating in different industries and have built global presence (RAMAMURTI AND 
CUERVO-CAZURRA, 2014) their institutional characteristics and investment 
patterns (ANDREFF AND BALCET, 2013). What is emphasized in the case of the 
emerging countries, such as China for instance is the particular role of the state 
capacities mobilized over time in developing the Chinese activities abroad, as for 
example in the case MNC investment. Several studies debated the 
internationalisation efforts, including the impacts on global growth (LATTEMANN 
AND ALON, 2015); and the differences of Chinese companies to MNCs from 
industrialized countries (LI, XIA AND LIN, 2017) 
 
With the 2015 FDI outflows from China having increased by 53% (to USD 188 billion) 
(OECD, 2016), China is the emerging country with the biggest FDI participation. This 
economic outlook rests on China economic transition and development trajectory and 
the foundation of this significant growth of Chinese FDI throughout the past decade lay 
in the economic reforms of the post-Mao era. Authors differ on the motivation of 
Chinese MNC expansions: Cai (1999) states the reason for Chinese outward FDI are 
generally similar to those for FDI from other developing and developed market 
economies’, even if the links with the stat are more visible. In this sense, the author 
listed the following motives for outward FDI: (i) ‘to seek, maintain or expand export 
markets’, (ii) ‘to acquire a stable supply of resources’, (iii) ‘to obtain foreign technology 
and management skills’, (iv) ‘to raise capital, primarily in Hong Kong, for domestic use’, 
and (v) for ‘political considerations’ (p. 867-874). Wong and Chan (2003) further 
discuss the saturation in the home market, and (the) avoidance of non-tariff barriers. 
Buckley et al. (2007) found that, on the one hand, the determinants of these FDI are 
market size, natural resource endowments, institutional environment, policy 
liberalisation/home country institutions and cultural proximity. 
 
Chinese FDI policies take their beginnings with economic liberalization. As Gransow 
(2015) analyses, the lack of foreign exchange in China during the 1980s implied that 






communication, energy, transport and raw-material associated sector. In the 1990s, 
domestic development was strategically targeted, through setting up special economic 
zones (SEZs); attracting FDI and infrastructure. At the same time, while maintaining 
the previously established priority areas, investment was further directed to agriculture 
and poverty reduction to promote social development. It was only in the beginning of 
the 2000s, that outward FDI became a central aspect of the Chinese development 
agenda. It was in this period that Chinese FDI is embedded in the development strategy 
called ‘Going Out` Policy ( and implemented a sophisticated regulatory 
framework for outward FDI. 
 
When it comes to the particular features of Chinese FDI, Nolan and Sauvant (2015) 
stress the role of the state in the outwards FDI flows and stocks. Alongside the SOEs, 
many non-SOEs are strongly linked to the Chinese government. Furthermore, the FDI 
regulate framework aimed at creating globally competitive companies whose FDI 
targeted the pivotal development targets of the Chinese economy, principally the 
technological development. Scholar debate emphasized the strong state promotion 
and backing of FDI, rooted in the domestic institutional structures of the country. 
Furthermore, the political backing the FDI makes these policies a prominent feature of 




THE ACADEMIC DEBATE ON STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONS 
 
The study of contemporary business politics is an exercise in reconciling recent 
developments of institutional approaches, business studies, and other perspectives. 
The key point to make to begin this examination of state-business relations is the 
dynamic relationship between the varied players in state and business. This is essential 
nt since there is a need to integrate economic structures, various degrees of 
development, and institutional arrangements across the north-south split of academic 
studies. According to Leftwich, (2009, p.8), state-business relations are ‘political 
processes, where politics is understood as all the activities of conflict, cooperation and 
negotiation involved in taking decisions over the ownership, production, use and 
distribution of resources.’ An examination of state-business relations from the 
perspective of the firm yields the conclusion that companies go into the political sphere 
for the benefits to business procedures (benefit from certain opportunities or leverage 
resources to their advantage) or as a reaction to governmental threats. 
 
In the case of Brazil, the debate on the relations between the state and business 
remains very relevant. Approaches from authors such as Schneider (2004) and Power 
and Doctor (2002) has attributed the political debility of the Brazilian business 
community to the fragmented state corporatist system of interest representation, which 
prevents effective collective action. This perspective, however, is contrasted by studies 
on the mobilisation capacity of national business. Mancuso (2004) has used empirical 
data on the process of laws in the National Congress between 1996 and 2003 to 
demonstrate the efficiency of corporate collective action in the implementation of an 
agenda that focuses on reducing ‘Brazil Cost’, reducing high taxation, and making 
labour laws more flexible, all in a manner that closely aligns with industry interests. 
 
In the same vein, Oliveira (2003) has highlighted the importance of business 
mobilisation for the negotiations of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in the 
1990s. Most notably, these mobilisations took place under the leadership of the 
National Confederation of Industry (CNI), which indicates the strength of the system of 
collective representation of corporate interests vis-a-vis parliament and in international 






and Eli Diniz have reinforced the idea of political strength of the national business 
community, which continued to skilfully defend their interests during the liberal reforms 
in the 1990s and the Lula administration, which heralded the re-emergence of state 
participation in the economy. These studies highlight the diversity of representation 
channels that are cultivated by entrepreneurs, which indicates strong political activism 
in the segment (DINIZ AND BOSCHI 2004; DINIZ 2010). 
 
As highlighted by Leftowich (2009), state-business relations are shaped by the way in 
which state and business organisations interact within institutional arrangements to 
create the institutions which dictate the form which state-business relations take. What 
exactly makes the ‘political’ in the state-business interactions is far subtler, as the same 
author has demonstrated (LEFTOWICH, 2009, p.8), since the institutions can be best 
assessed as outcomes of the political interaction between formal and informal 
organizations within formal or informal institutional arrangements. Institutionalism 
literature has long argued that firms are not neutral players (STREECK AND 
SCHMITTER, 1991). Studies on national systems of interest intermediations in the EU 
have identified the differences and similarities between different domestic settings 
(ROMMETVEDT ET AL, 2014). It is in this context that the institutional approach is 
based on the presumption that varying degrees of institutional (formal and informal) 
differences in state-business relations will result in different conditions. 
 
Nölke et al. (2014) have argued from the perspective of the comparative capitalism 
literature and identified the state-permeated market economy (SME) concept in 
countries such as Brazil, China and India. The authors have argued that these countries 
share similar characteristics which make them distinct from liberal economies. The 
features of these economies can include cooperation between state and domestic 
business at different levels of the state (national and state-level). In the case of these 
economies, the state acts as coordinator seeking to build cooperation between the 
different stakeholders, rather than being top-down. Trust, loyalty and informal relations 
define these competition-driven state-business coalitions. Coalitions are based on 
informal personal relations, family ties, and shared elite social elite backgrounds. In this 
common feature, SMEs differ not only from older and bureaucratic state capitalisms but 






and formal contracts, as in the liberal market economies (LMEs), and formalised 
networks and associations, as in the case of coordinated market economies (CMEs).1 
 
We are concerned with narrowing down the specifics of state-business relations in 
countries that have some aspects of state-permeated market economies. Hence, this 
section further narrows down defining elements of state-business relations that are 
relevant to the empirical context. This research will consider the dimensions of the 
embeddedness of the relationship between the public and private sector. We will 
consider ideology, interests and formal and informal mechanisms for consultation, 
coordination and reciprocity between the state and business. This is particularly 
relevant because the comparative political economy literature indicates an emphasis 
on how the actors within and outside the state draw on institutional dimensions and 
use individual or collective action to pursue their preferences. 
 
This case study adopts a Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) derived approach as a heuristic 
model to further operationalise the firm-level comparison between the different 
arrangements of the Brazilian and Chinese institutional contexts. This seeks to 
establish the conceptual discussion concerning the variations of the practices and 
institutional aspects impacting the firm. On the other hand, the firm may also seek to 
establish its comparative advantage. In this regard, the embeddedness of actors in the 
different economic and political institutions (CHEN AND DICKSON, 2010) is 
fundamental to understanding state-business relations. 
 
That understanding of embeddedness differs fundamentally from the notion of 
embedded autonomy that has been employed by Evans (1995). Evans has referred to 
embeddedness because the state capacities are not only linked to the rational-legal 
bureaucracies but also to their ability to relate to the private sector to develop the right 
strategies for development. However, the relation to the private sector and social 
groups is only beneficial if political autonomy - the ability of the state to act according 
to its own preferences - is guaranteed (SKOPCOL, 1985). In China, embeddedness is 
tied to close social relations between political and economic elites. China’s economic 
elites are closely linked to the party structures and reflect the interest of the party 
(Dickson, 2008). Hence, they are unlikely to demonstrate interest in opposing the 
 






system. It is in this regard that the rules of authority and hierarchy that result from the 
firm’s embeddedness can exercise different effects on state-business relations. 
 
Comparative political economy approaches to the variation of firm-level business 
politics across different national contexts are informed by institutions and the way 
interests are organised. These two factors impact the capabilities of the firms to 
translate preferences into outcomes. While the interests in the home and host contexts 
of China and Brazil may be similar, e.g. increasing the competitiveness of the energy 
sector, the outcomes were influenced by different ideas and ideologies of the diverging 
the political systems. In the context of state-business relations, studies such as 
McAdam et al. (2001) and Tarrow (2011) have emphasised the relation between 
framing processes and ideas. Other institutional approaches relate ideas and policy 
outcomes (RUESCHEMEYER AND EVANS, 1985). 
 
Furthermore, the economic ideology of the political regime and the presence of 
incentives for political elites to foster a collaborative rather than collusive relationship 
with the private sector are important factors for the emergence of effective state- 
business relations (LEFTWICH 2009). In post-2012 China, the role of the national 
narrative has sought to unify and mobilise different tiers of society including economic 
elites. The narrative has done so by using terms such as ‘China Path’ and ‘China 
Dream’ to express a narrative that consolidates China’s global aspirations and sells its 
economic model, thereby differing from liberal and market-led economic models (SHI- 
KUPFER ET AL, 2017). Other narratives include the ‘going global narrative that 
mobilises internationalisation efforts. For state-business relations, this implies a tighter 
relationship to the state and incentives for the elite and businesses to maintain a close 
relationship with the state. In Brazil, links to political decision-makers such as the 
Brazilian Workers Party (PT)’s link with unions and social movements 
(HOCHSTETLER, 2008) further demonstrate the link between ideational framing and 
policy outcomes in the context of state-business relations. 
 
Although interests may differ from sector to sector, the specific sector arrangements 
and needs are vital to understanding how a firm organises itself. While sectoral 
influence over policy is determined by state-business arrangements, the degree of 






can equally impact the quality of sectorial policies and outcomes. Interest mobilisation 
can be achieved through various ways such as close links with the government, the 
appointment of business representatives to government positions or state 
representatives’ migration into the business systems (FAIRFIELD, 2011). In the case 
of China, one example is the ties between private companies and the government 
throughout several industrial sectors. In the case of Brazil, the Lula administration 
appointed several people with close business ties to the administration. 
 
In terms of formal and informal mechanisms for state-business relations’ coordination, 
Brazil presents a fragmented and complex collective representation structure of 
corporate interests that is formed by pluralistic and corporatist entities that act in 
several areas of public policies (DINIZ, 2010). In China, the informality of the state- 
business relations is mediated through the state-party structure, which reflects state 
domination. Formal institutional linkages and visions such as guidelines and political 
macro orientations further shape coordination. Agendas can be set by agents of 
bureaucracy, parties, or individuals in different settings. 
 
 
THE RESEARCH PUZZLE 
 
On April 22 2016, the high-level signing ceremony of the United Nations’ Paris Climate 
Agreement was held in New York. Heads of more than 60 states and governments 
attended the signing ceremony. The head of the Global Energy Inter-Connection 
Development and Cooperation Organisation (GEIDCO) made a lasting impression by 
advocating for building a ‘Global Energy Interconnection’ – a global grid spanning 
continents and oceans that would be ‘jointly constructed and mutually beneficial to all’. 
This grid would draw on China’s domestic experience with transmission technology. 
The words of the chairman of GEIDCO, an organisation founded by the State Grid 
Corporation of China (SGCC), a state-owned enterprise (SOE) from China, were 
symbolic for the growing importance of the role of emerging countries in the global 
economy. 
 
Firms have manifold choices for entering the political arena Large firms from emerging 






as recognised actors across countries and in policy issues at the international scene. 
This poses a relatively new phenomenon and shows that these multinational 
corporations (MNCs) make their presence felt in more than just numbers. Schneider 
(2012) has assessed corporate political engagement options through the framework of 
a ‘political investment portfolio’, Companies select political engagement options and 
the prevalence of business politics in MNCs non-market engagement around the world 
begs the research question tackled by this dissertation: How do Chinese state-owned 
central SOEs rely on business politics at home and abroad in the context of 
internationalisation in countries of the global south? This question defines the direction 
and development of the structure of the dissertation. 
 
The main objective of this dissertation is to analyse the role of business politics from 
State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) in two different institutional settings in China 
and during its internationalisation to Brazil between 2010 and 2016. Further objectives 
are: 
 
• Contribute to the study of emerging market multinationals in state-permeated 
market economies with the case analysis of a large central-level state firm and 
its business endeavours in Brazil; 
• Understand the political agency power from large firms in the coordination 
between state and business; 
• Explain the processes that link the Chinese MNC state support that is provided 
through the domestic institutional structures to the institutional realities of the 
Brazilian context; 
• Analyse how the state-business relationships of the SGCC, a Chinese central 
SOE and an emerging market multinational in the electricity supply sector, 






This dissertation is a comparative cross-case longitudinal study and analyses business 
politics in China and Brazil. Case-oriented research is a strategy that permits in-depth 
investigation of a small number of phenomena (RAGIN, 2000). This strategy thus 
enables understanding of how mechanisms link and operate, which leads to 
conceptual validity (GEORGE AND BENNET, 2005). The time period chosen for this 
study is from 2002 to 2016, which broadly coincides with liberalisation and unbundling 
in China’s electricity sector; the ‘going out’ policy; and the restructuring efforts in 
Brazil’s electricity sector, which includes opening up to foreign capital in the 
transmission and generation sectors. 
 
Overall, the focus of this research are the distinct firm-specific and country-specific 
advantage configurations, internationalisation motives, and historical paths of firm- 
specific advantage development and international deployment (VERBEKE AND KANO, 
2016). This dissertation will analyse SGCC`s embeddedness, its efforts to overcome 
political obstacles, and its engagement with the countries of its investment. The analysis 
will cover corporate emergence and consolidation, integration into the state industry 
structure, impact of home country characteristics on firm innovation, and 
internationalisation efforts. This will trace the embeddedness of the formal and informal 
relationships that underlie state-business relations between institutional actors and 
business. 
 
The research also assesses how these relationships contribute to the organisational 
interplay of the internationalisation process across the home and the host context. 
According to Kennedy (2005, p.22), looking at firms’ economic characteristics or their 
economic interaction does not determine the extent of their business influence. Rather, 
business influence can be assessed by tracing the connections between companies 
and their representatives and role in the policy process. Other sources of influence, 
such as governments and experts, should also be taken into account when determining 
the impact, a firm has. This study uses case research approaches to assesses one 
industry in the Brazilian and the Chinese institutional settings, thereby demonstrating 







Thus, process tracing is matched by contextual knowledge. This research focuses on 
the electricity sector and foreign economic policy in terms of investment attraction and 
promotion as the two arenas in which political resources are vital to corporate success. 
The analysis requires examination of the actors and arenas for which corporate 
decision-making requires political resources. According to Kennedy (2005, p.23), 
different factors such as the form firms draw on associations to deal with the 
bureaucracy, the depth and quality of contact to government, regularity of interaction, 
rank of state officials engaged with, range of policy issues dealt with and forums of 






This dissertation is based on 30 months of fieldwork in mainland China and Brazil. The 
bulk of that time was divided between the cities of Beijing, Brasilia, Sao Paulo, and Rio 
de Janeiro. The majority of the material presented in this dissertation is based on 
fieldwork I conducted in Brazil and China between 2015 and 2018.This research 
conducted a qualitative analysis of the documents surrounding the case and focused 
on the policies proposed by the Brazilian state and sector. A range of documents was 
reviewed to assess the business politics. I collected published and unpublished 
materials. I also reviewed data from print and online media in Chinese, English, and 
Portuguese. Whenever necessary, aggregate data was drawn upon by OECD, and 
reports by state official departments such as MOFCOM. Chinese and Brazilian media 
publications were compiled and analysed. Government publications, notes, and policy 
recommendations were assessed to establish the temporal chronology of events. 
Chinese corporate documents, government reports, and policy documents were 
compiled. The dissertation also conducts a thorough literature review of relevant 
Chinese language publications on the subject. 
 
This dissertation also analyses Brazil’s electricity transmission industry’s corporate 
characteristics, company’s global profile, and level of concentration. It also assesses 
different aspects of the energy sector, including the macro-economic environment and 
its regulatory, competitive, and market characteristics, to further understand the 






information and reports, regulatory resolutions, reports of companies in the electricity 
sector that are relevant to the research questions, and reports and statistics released 






Over 30 interviews were conducted with energy sector experts, company employees, 
and government representatives to substantiate the process tracing. This involved 
expert interviews for tracing the developments over time, following literature such as 
Bogner et al. (2005). Interviews were explorative in terms of understanding the extent 
of the context and systematic in terms of capturing the exact chronological order of 
events and processes. In addition, contextual interviews were conducted for 
understanding certain elements that were relevant to the research question and the 
empirical reality, such as the formal policy and regulatory framework. These interviews 
were different from the expert interviews and focused on exploring the extent of certain 
elements of the research, such as organisational constellations, competences, and 
capturing the technical understanding of the electricity sector. The contextualising 
interviews were based on the sectorial composition of the energy sector including the 
macro-economic environment and regulatory, competitive and market characteristics; 
this choice sought to achieve greater understanding of the political manoeuvring of the 
company. 
 
The choice of interview partners was iterative: a base set of key persons were first 
identified, and more were gathered through the snowball technique and other 
recommendations. Also, whenever missing information was identified, further 
clarifications were sought. The interviews were conducted in Chinese, English, or 
Portuguese, in accordance with the work of Ihetveen (2009) concerning multi-lingual 
empirical research. Moreover, interviewees were categorised according to specific 
issues (foreign policy, electricity sector, business etc.) but were not formally coded. 
Detailed and non-standard discussions with senior staff members at the ministerial and 
political level provided insight into procedural steps (political intentions and power 
constellations) or follow-up on public discourses published in the media and other 






The fieldwork in China took place between 2016 and 2017 and consisted of document 
analysis and informal interviews. Most of these interviews were with government 
officials and energy sector professionals, including SOE employees. There were also 
other informal and formal interviews with university professors and other energy 
experts. Technical experts were contacted to attain understanding of how the 
technological and administrative concerns impacted the capacities, preferences, and 
strategies of actors in the supply sector and UHV technology. 
 
To further disentangle the complexities of this present case study, background 
knowledge on the state, policy making, and institutions was required. Strategies to 
obtain this knowledge included interviews with high-level officials in policy fields such 
as energy, technology, and foreign policy. For formal interviews with Chinese 
government officials, academics, and other professionals, I always arranged a meeting 
ahead of time and usually provided a list of questions. The interviews were conducted 
either at the interviewee’s workplace or at a tea or coffee shop. 
 
In Brazil, interviews were undertaken in 2015 and between 2017-2018. Interviews were 
undertaken in the field of foreign economic policy of the wider Brazil-China cooperation 
and included civil society entities such as the Brazilian-Chinese Business Council, the 
Brazil-China Chamber of Commerce, and think tank members. Other Brazilian entities 
that were interviewed included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of the 
Environment; Ministry of Planning; Ministry of Mines and Energy; Ministry of Science, 
Technology, Innovation and Communication; and the National Bank of Development. 
Interviews in Brazil focused on the impact of Chinese investment in the national 
electricity sector and the role and impact of companies on technological development. 
Thus, regulatory, political, and institutional agents were interviewed. Interviews were 
also conducted with R&D managers and government relations officials to assess 
alignment of the R&D projects with the company strategic policy, the capacity to 
disseminate an innovation culture in the companies, and the way innovation has been 
anchored as a general business strategy. 
 
Further formal and informal conversations with industry experts and academic centres 
enabled understanding of scientific production, investments in laboratory facilities, the 






The Brazilian electricity transmission industry’s characteristics, corporate 
characteristics, companies’ global profile, and the level of concentration are analysed. 
 
I drew on the field work to categorise the statements according to the extent to which 
they permitted contribution to the relevance of information and implications. This 
enabled me to reconstruct the sequencing of the strategy adopted, chronological 
interactions, and the relationships between the entities relevant to corporate 
engagement and advocacy. Finally, some parts of the dissertation such as Chapters 5 
and 6 are based more on the interview data than other parts. Other parts of the 
dissertation that relied more on secondary data sources included the chapter on Brazil- 
China relations or the chapters on the electricity sector in China and Brazil. Primary 




Data analysis and operationalisation 
 
The data analysis followed the steps described below: 
 
1. Country-level process tracing is conducted to understand the national institutional 
contexts. This included the wider federal political and institutional landscape of both 
China and Brazil. The analysis also considered the sectorial and regulatory 
environments relevant to electricity transmission. Cross-sectorial links were verified, 
such as in the case of China’s macro policy guidance concerning technology, 
regarding how they impacted the firm’s internationalisation strategy. 
2. The dissertation considers bilateral action and processes between the two 
countries in the wider context of economic foreign policy, diplomacy, and bilateral 
needs. Public and private actors are examined. It is also necessary to understand 
the wider regional anchoring of China’s strategy in Latin America. 







This dissertation`s data analysis strategy used process tracing of events and sources, 
including country-level policy guidance (China), policy changes, and other external 
events. Process tracing is understood as the ‘the cause-effect link that connects 
independent variable and outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then 
the investigator looks for observable evidence of each step.’ (VAN EVERA 1997, p.64). 
This study adopts a case-based approach to studying the underlying mechanisms and 
processes. The case study of the Chinese SOE in Brazil provides empirical evidence 
by focusing on its business politics and embeddedness in national state-business 
relations (Brazil and China). Thus, this dissertation draws on process tracing to focus 
on the causal mechanisms used by SGCC to consolidate and establish business 
politics. The following tools were applied in this dissertation: 
 
1. Qualitative content analysis of official documents, media, and academic and 
specialist publications; 
2. Analysis of the temporal sequencing of events and decisions; 
 
The tools allowed the determination of different sources for any evidence and the 
piecing together of sequences of events, causal chains, decision-making processes, 






The remainder of this dissertation unfolds as follows: Chapter 1 seeks to present the 
bilateral cooperation structures between Brazil and China. The chapter analyses the 
specificity of China-Latin America relations and the bilateral relations between China 
and Brazil. Chapter 2 elaborates on the role of business politics and provides a frame 
of how business politics in the context of internationalisation can be used by firms to 
gain wider impact in terms of their corporate political strategy. The chapter 
demonstrates the direct and indirect ways in which preferences and firm political likings 
can be pursued. Chapter 3 explains how the sectorial characteristics impact on 
corporate agenda-setting. This chapter describes the energy sectors in Brazil and 






mechanisms that firms can draw upon for influencing the implementation of sectoral 
policy in the electricity industry. 
 
Chapter 4 explores the necessary conditions and mechanisms for SOE 
internationalisation. This chapter focuses on central SOE internationalisation in China 
under the State Council’s ‘going global’/’going out’ engagement, which has the backing 
of ministries and agencies such as the NDRC, MOFCOM, and SASAC. Chapter 5 
examines the relationship between internationalisation and business politics in the 
home context. It assesses SGCC’s emergence, sectoral objectives, the logic of the 
SGCC’s pursuits as an SOE, and their search for a monopolising position in the 
electricity supply sector. Chapter 6 examines the relationship between 
internationalisation and business politics in the host context. It analyses the SOE’s 
internationalisation to Brazil by tracing the SOE’s business strategy and ties. Chapter 
7 concludes this dissertation by drawing together the findings of the empirical chapters 




1 THE TRAJECTORY OF BRAZIL - CHINA RELATIONS 
 
The rapid, all-round growth of China-Latin America and the Caribbean relations 
is the result of our enhanced agreement in the perceptions of the global trend, 
our greater confidence in the prospects of our relations, our clearer consensus 
on viewing each other as a development opportunity, and our stronger 
aspiration for a China-Latin America and the Caribbean community of shared 
destinies. (Speech of Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Opening Ceremony 
of the First Ministerial Meeting of The China-CELAC Forum, 08.01.2015) 
 
 
This chapter foregrounds and contextualises China’s political and economic presence 
on the continent, with a focus on relations between China and Brazil. Chinese investors 
have targeted Latin America due to market size, strategic assets, natural resources, 
while bilateral relations at the regional and national levels have experienced growth in 
relevance. This chapter provides a brief overview of Chinese state-driven foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and opening up of the country, followed by a portrayal of China’s 
engagement with Latin American countries. Subsequently, the development of Brazil- 




1.1 China’s FDI development and foreign policy structures 
 
 
Any attempt to trace China’s relationship with Brazil by identifying and delineating a 
specific sphere of Sino-Brazilian development must be contextualised within the 
broader development of China’s economy and its political transition since the late 
1970s, which were exercising a strong effect on the global economy by the beginning 
of the 2000s. As many scholars have argued, the domestic motivations for China’s 
international economic development efforts are at the core of understanding its 
outward development. Chinese FDI policies have their roots in economic liberalisation. 
As Gransow (2015) has illustrated, the lack of foreign exchange in China during the 
1980s meant that foreign aid to the country predominantly featured preferential loans 
directed to communication, energy, transport, and raw-material associated sectors. In 
the 1990s, domestic development was strategically targeted through setting up special 






At the same time, while maintaining the previously established priority areas, 
investment was further directed to agriculture and poverty reduction to promote social 
development. It was only in the beginning of the 2000s that outward FDI became a 
central aspect of the Chinese development agenda. It was in this period that Chinese 
FDI was embedded in a development strategy called the ‘Going Out’ policy and 
implemented a relatively sophisticated regulatory framework for outward FDI. China’s 
increasing economic liberalisation has been portrayed by a series of studies taking 
stock of the characteristics of these changes and their impact on the development of 
Chinese political economy. 
 
Broadly speaking, the phases of Chinese FDI development, both inward and outward, 
can be divided into the following stages: A re-orientation in the Chinese leadership 
surged with the end of the Cultural Revolution and after the 1978 Third Plenary Session 
of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP, economic reforms were launched. In 
the ‘Four modernizations’ 2 centrepiece, agriculture, industry science and technology 
were mentioned main objectives of the party with the aim to elevate the gross national 
product, creating the narrative for spurring economic growth. Challenges were all-over, 
capital, expertise and technology were vital to opening up and tackling the socio-
economic challenges the country faced. China sought to improve FDI inflows to bridge 
economic gaps, grow exports, income, skills and management. 
 
The inward FDI played an important role in the initial stage of China’s economic reform. 
Chinese firms successfully absorbed foreign capital, received advanced technology 
and learned management skills from their foreign counterparts. Following the stable 
economic development and the knowledge acquisition from MNCs, Chinese firms 
began to undertake overseas investment on a larger scale. At the same time, the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT, later MOFCOM or the 
Ministry of Commerce) released the ‘Provisional Regulations Governing the Control 
and the Approval Procedure for Opening Non-trade Enterprises Overseas’. The 
restrictive policies on OFDI eased and opened overseas production opportunities to 
SOEs in general rather than just to trading companies (Zhang, 2003). Though these 
 
2 The Four Modernization (  ) set forth by Deng Xiaoping aimed to overhaul the Chinese 






SOEs and trading firms still had to go through the formal administrative approval 
process, there were signs that the government was increasingly open-minded about 
OFDI and recognized its potential benefits for China and Chinese firms. In 1989 the 
first regulation on the usage of foreign exchange earnings was issued. This increased 
the transparency of the OFDI approval procedures. In 1991, the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued a document concerning the strengthening of 
the administration of overseas investment projects (Voss et al., 2008). Taking 
advantage of its similarities in culture, Hong Kong was used by most Chinese MNCs 
as the first stop on their path to internationalisation. 
 
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s Southern tour and the 14th Party Congress gave new 
momentum to overseas investments. The Congress officially ‘brought to an end the 
political and ideological controversies with regard to the direction of China’s reform’ 
(Hong and Sun, 2006). The official policy now explicitly encouraged Chinese firms to 
expand overseas. However, the 1997 Asian financial crisis changed the economic 
landscape and many Chinese firms faced substantial losses from their overseas 
investments. This could also have resulted from the lack of investment know-how, the 
ignorance of the rule of law in the overseas markets and the shortage of management 
expertise. 
 
With the economic recovery in the region and worldwide, in 1999, the Chinese 
government issued a directive to encourage OFDI. OFDI in specific industries using 
instruments such as foreign exchange support, export tax rebates and direct financial 
backing. This was particularly noticeable in trade-related activities which aimed to 
promote exports. In 2001, the Tenth Five-Year Plan announced that the aim of the 
strategy of enterprises ‘going out’ to invest overseas was one of the means which would 
enable China to adjust itself to the trend of economic globalization (Xu, 2016). 
 
A notable specificity of China’s OFDI is the role of government in its implementation, 
from making the policy to assisting with the investments. The situational effect of the 
home country is largely omitted in the existing studies, host country instead, and hence 
in which address the institutional effect of the China’s experience is thus an interesting 
case to study. Voss et al. (2008) illustrated the evolution of China’s OFDI by focusing 






out that regulatory reform of China’s OFDI policy was gradual and continuous, and this 
decentralised and liberalised decision-making regime accompanied the surge of 
China’s OFDI. 
 
As this analysis demonstrates, dating back to 2000, Chinese companies began to take 
a more systematic approach to internationalisation. Over the years, more and more 
businesses expanded their portfolios beyond Chinese borders. Over the past two 
decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become an economic powerhouse, 
rising to the status of a major FDI net exporter and aid provider. Since the opening up, 
Chinas’ economy has been one of the fastest growing, with a 9.5% real annual gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth average in 2017 and a diversified economic structure 
demonstrating high competitiveness acrossdifferent sectors. 
 
While Chinese companies take a main role in rejuvenating the Chinese economy by 
expanding overseas, the way how states utilise the market forces of its domestic 
companies, specifically SOEs, and the way MNCs use the state to their competitive 
advantage requires further scrutiny, just as Stopford et al (1991,p.204) observe: ̀ There 
are growing interactions between national strategies designed to achieve rising levels 




Foreign policy actors relevant to Chinese companies 
 
This unprecedented presence of Chinese business abroad requires understanding 
how the foreign policy and diplomacy approaches adopted by the country are 
established domestically and to what extend companies 3 interact with them.4 The 
Politburo of the Central Committee ’s Standing Committee is the body with the highest 
responsibility and decision-making power. The nine members are former 
representatives of governmental organs (State Council, National People’s Congress 
and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference). The centralization of 
functions comprising party, state and military leadership is expressed through 
 
3 It is important to note that the position of the company depends on its ownership structure and size; 
sector; region of operations; general bilateral relations between China and target country, amongst other 
factors. 
4 Policy actors involved in internationalisation and the related approval procedures will be analysed in 






simultaneous occupation of the General Secretary of the CPC position, State President 
and the Chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC), equivalent to the US 
Commander in Chief. Thus, the CPC General Secretary leads the Foreign Affairs 
Leading Small Group (FALG), in charge of foreign policy coordination within CCP. 
There is also the International Liaison Department, including an intelligence bureau 
which also establishes cooperation with foreign political parties.5 
 
Another important actor is the Central Military Commission (CMC). There are the State 
and Party CMC as counterparts, which have different names to match state (People 
Republic of China - PRC) and party system (CCP) but have the same members. The 
PRC CMC is under the wider umbrella of the National People’s Congress, without 
having to respond to it and can be formally understood as the military branch of the 
PRC, including military and defence policy-making. 
 
As in other policy fields, the State Council has a central role in foreign policy-making. 
As the central executive body of the Chinese State, it is headed by the Premier, assisted 
by the Vice-Premiers and the State Councillors and has nearly all ministries and most 
state commissions under it. Here, different domains of foreign policy intersect: 
 
1. The Central (Committee) Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group FALG – State 
Council Foreign Affairs Office with a coordination function. 
2. In informal subordination to FALG and nominal State Council subordination, the 
prestigious Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of bilateral affairs with a 
geographical division in departments. It is in charge of diplomacy and interaction 
with foreign governments. In terms of policy domain, it has limited resources and 
little jurisdiction. 
3. The Ministry of Commerce is a powerful ministry and is in charge of domestic and 
international commerce supervision, investment and aid. It is necessary approval 
institutions for outbound investment and is present in foreign missions through 






5 In the case of Brazil, members of Brazilian parties are frequently invited to participate in exchange 






4. The National Development and Reform Commission defines the positioning of 
the economy and has a strong domain over energy and resources, including FDI 
approval procedures. 
5. The State Assets Administration Commission (SASAC) holds ‘ownership rights’ 
over central SOES belonging to State Council. As explained in Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation, it has decision-making power over several SOE-related activities, 
including internationalisation. 
6. The Ministry of Education is a cultural diplomacy actor in terms of expanding 
cultural and educational cooperation abroad. 
7. Line Ministries and Commissions, e.g. the Ministry of Culture has a Foreign Affairs 
Office for international relations, linked to liaison with FALG. 
 
Apart from the central level, provinces and municipalities are actors on their own behalf, 
without having any formal domain on foreign policy, but can be strong actors in 
investment attraction. Studies such as Zweig (2002) showed early on the 
decentralization of promotion policies of personal of both state and CCP tied to forging 
local economic growth. This increased local policy entrepreneurism in attracting foreign 
firms. Variance in local government performance can be understood through this angle 
of establishment key areas of economic interest, e.g. export manufacturing. Special 
economic zones (SEZ) in the coastal regions are one of these examples, where free- 
market principle integration was used for foreign investment attraction. Local 
experimentation demonstrates the domestic variance of economic growth and the 
importance of business-government alliances on provincial and local (municipal) level. 
 
Lastly, the National People`s Congress (NPC) is the highest entity of China’s state 
power, which meets yearly for a week to witness State Council reporting and approve 
legislation. The NPC has held different forms of international exchange in the past, as 
for example exchanges to parliaments. In the case of Brazil, for example, the 
Parliamentary Exchange Mechanism between China and Brazil has been in place 
since 20126. At the same time, the Brazilian congress installed a China Working Group, 
 
 
6 While the exchange mechanism aims to accelerate the implementation of agreements between the 
two countries, to facilitate debates, to improve the functioning of the Legislative and to adjust convergent 
legislations, another explicit component is to facilitate investments by Chinese companies in sectors 






composed of both House of Deputy and Senate members. The Chinese NPC equally 
established a working group on the matter. 
 
From the outset, foreign policy is a field representing broad interests. While firms can 
benefit from or influence the actors7 mentioned above, they may benefit from policy 
instruments and engagement mechanisms, including: 
 
• Strategic partnerships. China has strategic partnerships with the European 
Union (EU) and with Brazil, amongst others; 
• Economic cooperation (infrastructure cooperation); 
• Foreign aid; 
• Diplomacy in soft-power domains (sports, culture, language, media); 
• Resource-related loan provision. For example, credit lines for infrastructure 
have been integrated into the larger portfolio of Chinese economic cooperation, 
enabling long-term supply contracts and favoured access to resources assets. 
Such loans emerge in close cooperation with central government, policy banks, 
and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly national oil companies. 
 
Overall, the purpose of this section was to account for the historical and contextual 
setting of Chinese foreign policy to set the stage for the assessment of relations 
between China and Brazil. For the firms, there are various forms of participation in the 
foreign and commercial foreign policy, as for example in ministerial delegations, 
overseas missions, support of local embassies, in the context of parliamentary 
exchange or financial cooperation. At the same time, however, companies may 




7 Other actors, for example, include a wide array of think tanks that develop policy documents and 
recommendations concerning issues such as economic policy, business behavior of state firms, social 
and environmental responsibility, etc. The existence of varying policy actors generates a very complex 
stakeholder panorama that includes rivalries. For example, ministries are known for their turf wars 
(Breslin, 2009). Interplay of bureaucratic domains and overlapping of responsibilities implies that no 
single domestic foreign policy actor can dictate the outcome of policy issues and the related decision- 
making processes. At the same time, ministries must maintain good relations with line bureaus of the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
bureaus, on whom they depend for activities in other areas. 
8 This case study shows that the interaction between state and business is not uni-lateral but is a 
reciprocal process. The case of state-owned multinational companies (CUERVO CAZURRA, 2014) 




1.2 China’s engagement with Latin America 
 
Amongst the breadth of studies covering the People’s Republic of China’s engagement 
with Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC), many of them portray the ambiguities, 
pitfalls, and potentials of growing ties with region. Between 2015 and 2019, China’s 
government projected far-reaching ambitions for the region: $500 billion in trade and 
$250 billion in direct investment (DOLLAR, 2017). The economic cooperation at the 
state level is to be set within the wider framework of warming political relations since 
the establishment of diplomatic ties. While until the 1970s Cuba was the only LAC to 
formally recognise the PRC, it was in the following decade that most countries formally 
recognised the PRC. Since then, and with China’s gradual rise, the role of China for 
the countries in the region has changed substantially. 
 
According to the 2008 White Paper on Latin America issued by the Chinese 
government, a political condition for the establishment of bilateral relations between 
China and LAC is the recognition of the One-China Policy, which consolidates the PRC 
as the sole legitimate government of China. The table below lists the countries that 
have recognised the PRC (2018 Status): 
 
 
Table 1.1 - Countries’ recognition of the PRC - 2018 
 
 Recognition of PRC Recognition of Taiwan 
Caribbean Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, 
Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, 
Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Belize, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, St. 








Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 
Paraguay 




The following section provides an overview of the regional engagement China 
maintains with LAC through the available regional cooperation instruments. Without 







In the early 2000s, intensifying political interactions between political leaders of the 
Latin American continent and Chinese leadership resulted in official visits from the 
Chinese side, with former President Hu Jintao visiting in 2004, 2005, and 2008, and 
visits from President Xi Jinping in the following decade. When Xi visited Argentina, 
Brazil, Cuba, and Venezuela in 2014, the number of agreements and Memoranda of 
Understandings signed expressed the political willingness of both sides to engage in 
cooperation. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that China has signed free trade 
agreements with Chile (2006), Peru (2009), and Costa Rica (2011) and has established 
strategic partnerships with Brazil (1993), Venezuela (2001), Mexico (2003), Argentina 
(2004), Peru (2008), Chile (2012), Costa Rica (2015), Ecuador (2015), Uruguay (2016), 
and Bolivia (2018). 
 
Apart from bilateral relations, China has pursued relations with regional groupings: 
China-Mercosur, China-Community of Latin American Countries (CELAC) and China- 
Pacific Alliance (CPA) cooperation. China’s hosting of the China-CELAC forum in 2015 
resulted in the 2015–2019 China-LAC cooperation plan. 
 
 
Table 1.2 - Summary of China’s national and regional engagement with LAC 
 
Mechanism Summary 
CELAC In 2014, China approached Latin America as a region and launched the ‘1+3+6 
Cooperation Framework’ which embraces the China-CELAC Cooperation Plan 
(2015-2019). The plan identifies trade, investment and financial cooperation in six 
different fields of priority, namely energy and resources, infrastructure, agriculture, 
manufacturing, scientific and technological cooperation and information 
technologies. The First China-Celac Forum held in January 2015 in Beijing was 
endorsed with China's pledge of a $ 250 billion. 
 
The Second China-Celac Forum was held in January 2018 was held in Chile and 
included the announcement of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the China- 
proposed Belt and Road Initiative and making links between Latin American 
countries and the initiative, as it will ‘inject new energy into the China-CELAC 
comprehensive cooperative partnership and open up new prospects’ (Xinhua, 
2018). 
UNASUR Meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Brasilia in 2014.  




Despite the fact that the term ‘region’ may be difficult to define, in terms of political 






engagement. Other engagement may run through other groupings or mechanisms 
such as G20, BRICS, or trans-regional assemblies of countries. 
 
In terms of strategic framing, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published white papers 
on LAC in both 2007/2008 and 2016, providing a non-binding macro outline of the 
country’s approach to the continent. Therefore, rather than a coherent overall strategy 
for the continent, such an overall approach may be understood as an expression of 
increased relevance of LAC, but mostly within the context of China’s efforts to assert 
its own standing globally with a diversified and prepared foreign economic policy. The 
2016 policy paper meant a highly coordinated policy statement providing a window into 
the Chinese ambition and vision of becoming a global player, which was also confirmed 
by Xi Jinping in his role as CCP Secretary and President of State during the 19th Party 
Congress in October 2017, where he reiterated his effort to transform China into a 
global power ‘moving closer to center stage’. 
 
In terms of cooperation fields, the 2016 policy paper remained general and flexible with 
a strong networking component based on China’s key interests. It must be said that 
China published white papers on other regions, such as the first white paper on Africa 
published in 2006 and a second one in 2015, and one on the EU released in 2014. In 
terms of framing, it is necessary to highlight the narrative of Chinese policy documents. 
For example, in the context of China’s cultural diplomacy (e.g. ZHANG, 2017), studies 
have emphasized that these etymological differences are related to the different 
traditions of diplomatic thought and history in the country, which have been shaped by 
blending the country’s vision of development, opening up, and modernisation with the 






Table 1.3 - China’s policy paper on LAC 
 
Year Main content 
2007/ 
2008 
The paper branded the Sino-Latin American and Caribbean relations as a historical 
beginning in the regional ties, with different cooperation areas (cultural, economic, political, 
security and social). The paper also featured the ‘One China Policy’ as the political basis of 
cooperation: ‘The overwhelming majority of countries in the region are committed to the one 
China policy and the position of supporting China’s reunification and not having official ties 
or contacts with Taiwan. The Chinese Government appreciates such a stance. China is 
ready to establish and develop state-to-state relations with all Latin American and 
Caribbean countries based on the one China principle’. 
2016 Seeking mutually beneficial cooperation and common development is the endogenous 
driving force for the development of the relations. China is ready to work with Latin American 
and Caribbean countries to build the new ‘1+3+6’ framework for pragmatic cooperation (i.e. 
guided by the China-Latin American and Caribbean Countries Cooperation Plan (2015- 
2019), utilizing trade, investment and financial cooperation as driving forces, and identifying 
energy and resources, infrastructure construction, agriculture, manufacturing, scientific and 
technological innovation and information technology as cooperation priorities), actively 
explore the new ‘3x3’ model for capacity cooperation (which refers to jointly building the 
three major passages of logistics, electricity and information in Latin America, enabling 
healthy interactions among the enterprise, society and government, and expanding the 
three financing channels of funds, credit loans and insurance), and speed up quality 
improvement and upgrading of the cooperation between China and Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 




That said, scholars have highlighted the role of ideational leadership as an orienting 
factor of international politics, which has been the case in China.9 Overall, China’s 
cultural diplomacy is driven by a long-term and overarching system of values combining 
ideal and strategic orientations. In assessing the structures of China’s diplomacy and 
foreign policy efforts towards Latin America, it is necessary to locate the analysis in the 
wider historical context of China’s development and foreign policy. While in the past 
foreign policy was pursued rather moderately, recent years have demonstrated how 
the country has stepped up its international initiatives and the greater inclination 
towards grand narratives. Ultimately, the diversity of the Latin American countries that 
engage with China on a regional level themselves maintain different levels of quality 
where their relationships with China are concerned. The following table extracts the 





9 The historical precedents and Chinese leaders exercising intellectual leadership further shaped the 
country’s diplomatic thought, such as through the revolutionary culture and art by Mao Tze Tung (1942), 
material and spiritual civilisation by Deng Xiaoping (1980s), advanced culture and the Three Represents 









Retrieved from: China’s LAC White Paper, 2016 
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It is in this wider field of opportunities of cooperation that regional and bilateral 
engagement is anchored. Overall, and as outlined before, Chinese diplomacy towards 
to LAC expressed through an array of information activities, cultural exchanges, local 
government initiatives, and civil society initiatives. Overall, the nature of cultural 
diplomacy features two central elements. First, diplomacy is tied to the greater 
narratives, principles-based logic, and policy guidance of central government actors. 
The combination of a long-term national agenda for economic development as well as 
ideational/ideological underpinnings with diverse players creates a flexible platform 
and strong adaptive capabilities. Second, diplomacy is less coordinated and reflects 
the complexity of the country’s national administrative and political systems with their 
different layers and institutional cultures. This emphasises the key role of leveraging 
the collective weight and efforts to promote the desired outcomes. Thus, diplomacy 
may occur at different levels, such as high levels or working levels, and may target 
different sets of audiences, such as scholars, decision-makers in politics or public 




1.3 Infrastructure cooperation between China and Latin America 
 
Based on the abovementioned modalities and the overall framing of China’s foreign 
policy and diplomacy interaction positioning, this section examines infrastructure 
cooperation between China and Latin America as one of the main fields of interaction 
that drives Chinese engagement efforts on the continent. 
 
According to Naughton (2007), Chinese FDI development in China has been 
characterised by the fact that across the past decade it has provided a major gate to 
global capital (and not bank loans or portfolio capital) and substantial Chinese FDI 
inflows aimed at manufacturing; China’s FDI inflows have their origins in other East 
Asian economies, (e.g., Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao). Infrastructure and other 
significant business-related projects are areas of industrial operation key to Chinese 
foreign investment. They reflect the advanced stage of Chinese company 
internationalisation and experience gained by Chinese companies (Naughton, 2007). 
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Despite China’s infrastructure development, it is necessary to understand the actual 
outcomes of specific investment projects. In the case of Latin America, traditional 
challenges concerning infrastructure investment - mainly commitment of massive 
resources, long-term planning, and capital allocation, or the need for a clear regulatory 
framework – are subject to a multiplier effect in Latin America (VALDERREY AND 
MONTOYA, 2015). The Chinese government has been featuring infrastructure 
financing and development in its economic and diplomatic relations, such as Central, 
South, and Southeast Asia and Latin America. In terms of its recent development 
framework, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was launched in 2014, China has 
featured infrastructure investment as one of the framework’s central pillars (ZHANG, 
2015). 
 
Several studies have provided descriptions of the types of loans and grants provided 
by China (WOLF ET AL, 2013). When it comes to non-foreign aid-associated activities, 
various authors (GALLAGHER AND MYERS, 2015; SANDERSON AND FORSYTHE, 
2013; GRANSOW, 2015) have emphasised the growing importance of financial 
institutions such as Chinese commercial banks as well as Chinese policy banks (e.g., 
the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim 
Bank). 
 
Myers, Gallagher, and Fei (2015) have highlighted the fact that in 2015, Chinese policy 
bank financing of governments and companies in LAC increased to $29 billion, 
surpassing 2014 lending by $19 USD billion. In particular, the fact that Chinese policy 
banks can draw on direct government recapitalisation means low-cost funding for 
lenders. With slowing economic growth, these authors have argued, investment in 
Latin America could be understood as a strategic region for low-cost acquisition of 
assets in key sectors (GALLAGHER, MYERS AND FEI, 2015). With the growing 
tendency towards a regional cooperation between Latin American countries and China, 
China has increased development finance. Since 2015, regional financial platforms 
have increasingly shaped the interaction between China and the Latin American 
continent. The following financial platforms have been established: 
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Table 1.5 - Regional financial platforms between China and Latin America 
 
Special Loan 
Program for China 
Lac Infrastructure 
Projects 
$20 billion. Comes from China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE) and is administered by CDB 
China Lac Industrial 
Cooperation 
Investment Fund 
The fund aims at the industrial cooperation with Latin America. Initiated by 
the People's Bank of China (PBOC), the central bank, the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange, and the China Development Bank 




The fund is initiated by the Chinese Government with an investment of 5 
billion USD by Chinese institutions and consists out of two parts: 1. Part one 
is the China Co-financing Fund for Latin America and Caribbean Region, 
which has an initial input of 2 billion USD by China and is executed by the 
IDB in financing projects in LAC region in areas including education, water 
conservancy and energy, etc. The Co-financing Fund is already up and 
running. 2. Part two is a private equity fund. The Fund will be administered 
by The Export-Import Bank of China (China EXIM Bank) with a commitment 
of 3 billion USD from Chinese institutions. The PE Fund will focus on a 
diversified range of sectors including but not limited to energy and natural 
resources, infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing, high-tech and 
information technology. 




Gransow (2015) has highlighted infrastructure development as a core reform strategy 
for China that was accompanied by a clear development agenda and public support 
system. In this regard, it is also important to understand that there is a difference 
between Chinese FDI in Latin America and development aid, which can take the form 
of preferential infrastructure. In her review, Gransow (2015) differentiates between four 
different forms of Chinese infrastructure investment in Latin America: 
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for by Chinese 
investors 
The earliest form of Chinese infrastructure projects in LAC in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s were infrastructure ‘gifts’ such as sport stadiums, roads, and 
government buildings, which were primarily undertaken to convince those LAC 
governments that recognised Taiwan to change their position and acknowledge 
the One China policy. Examples of this kind of ‘checkbook diplomacy’ include an 
international convention centre for the government of Guyana and venues for the 
2007 Cricket World Cup in the Caribbean. Such projects were paid for by the PRC 
national government and carried out by Chinese companies and labourers. Under 
these circumstances, the recipients had little leeway to demand that local 
contractors or labourers be employed in the project. These infrastructure gifts 
helped to facilitate other, larger projects paid for by some LAC governments via 
loans from Chinese banks. 
Construction 
projects paid 
for by Chinese 
investors 
A new trend is underway, primarily in the Caribbean, of construction projects being 
funded by Chinese investors in cooperation with local counterparts. The funds 
come from Chinese banks or other sources of capital available through Chinese 
partners. These projects represent a new form of partnership between 
businesspeople and government officials from the two regions. Funded by 
Chinese investors, these projects have been carried out nearly exclusively by 
Chinese companies and with Chinese workers. They are often hotel and resort 
complexes, with infrastructure projects being the exception. One such exception 
was a Jamaican north-south toll road built by China Harbour Engineering 
Company (with a contract for $600 million USD in 2012) for which the investor 
should get its money back via a 50-year concession to operate the highway as a 
toll road. 
Projects paid 
for by Latin 
American 
governments 
While infrastructure gifts and initiatives by private Chinese investors have played 
an important role in opening up the region to construction work, the most rapidly 
growing group of Chinese infrastructure projects in the region consists of projects 
paid for by Latin American governments and financed by loans from Chinese 
banks. Thus far, loan-financed projects have focused on roads, bridges, port 
infrastructure, and hydroelectric and thermoelectric facilities. The governments of 
countries such as Venezuela,Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia, which lack access 
to capital because of investor concerns and capital flight, are in urgent need of 
financing for infrastructure. Even if they can find the capital, it is difficult for them to 
obtain the loans. ‘For the Chinese government, and Chinese construction firms, 
foreign project work is particularly attractive because it is typically paid for by an 
entity other than the Chinese state, while providing opportunities for Chinese 
workers and firms to diversify their skills and experiences by working in new 




be added as a 
further 
category 
These loan arrangements bring together the Chinese government, national oil 
corporations, and state policy banks, especially the CDB and the China Exim 
Bank. Both banks support China’s policies at home and abroad. They offer loans 
to fund infrastructure, energy, and mining. Despite their similarities as policy 
banks, they appear to play different roles. 




Overall, with the loans described above, are salient element of the Brazil-China 
relations and could provide an important opportunity to bring long-needed 
infrastructure financing to the region. 
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1.4 Trajectory of bilateral relations 
 
In order to understand the period under analysis it is important to introduce the broader 
historical elements marking Brazil-China relations. The establishment of diplomatic 
relations between China and Brazil in 1974 happened in the wider historical context of 
slowly warming US-Sino relations, such as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s visit 
to China in 1971, and President Nixon’s meeting with Mao Zedong the following year 
in Beijing. The warming ties between the USA and China led to the PRC obtaining the 
seat in the UN Security Council previously occupied by Taiwan. By the mid-1980s, with 
the beginning of reforms in China it was already clear that China was about to take the 
necessary steps for its post-communism economic survival. 
 
China-Brazil relations stemmed from these developments, and the initial period of 
bilateral relations (1974 –1985) between Brazil and China was mostly commercial with 
Brazilian companies engaging in the opportunities brought forward by the reforms 
introduced by Deng Xiaoping. That period included an agreement on maritime 
transport in 1979; the Commission, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement, 
and the 1982 visit of Brazilian president Figueiredo to China, where cooperation 
agreements for collaboration on commercial, scientific, technological, and nuclear 
issues were signed. In Brazil, after the 21-year rule of the military regime, a transition 
to democracy began with the election of Tancredo Neves of the Partido do Movimento 
Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) by Congress, Jose Sarney assuming presidency in 
1985, and the election of Fernando Collor in 1989, who was impeached in 1992 
(VIGEVANI ET AL, 2003) 
 
During Jose Sarney’s presidency, his state trip to China resulted in a boost in 
collaboration between the two countries. After two years of negotiation in 1988, China 
and Brazil signed a protocol establishing the joint research and production of the 
China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellites (CBERS). This was mutually beneficial 
because both countries were looking to develop international partnerships, and they 
have succeeded in providing continuity to the programme with the release of five 
satellites since the beginning of the cooperation (in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2013 and 2014) 
and the signature of a 10-year space cooperation plan in 2013 to expand the 
cooperation (ITAMARATY, 2018). In November 1993, President Jiang Zemin paid a 
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visit to Brazil, resulting in the launch of a strategic partnership between the two 
countries with a focus on technological issues. This provided a further step towards 
the institutionalisation of the bilateral relations between the two countries. 
 
The 1990s had initiated with competitive shocks over Brazilian companies, the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), large amounts of inward foreign direct 
investment, the valorisation of the Brazilian currency and the accelerated 
industrialization of export-led emerging economies in Asia. In 1995, the government of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso began under the impact of the economic stability provided 
by the Real Plan. The Cardoso government sought to establish and intensify the 
international positioning of Brazil, so Cardoso travelled to China in 1995 and endorsed 
the inclusion of China in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the same year. 
Domestically, Brazilian economy had been target to opening measures both under the 
administration of Fernando Collor and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, with the aim to 
increase the competitive outlook of the rather protected national economy. 
37 
 
Table 1.7 - Chronology of bilateral relations (1974–2017) 
 
Year Event 
1974 Establishment of diplomatic relations 
1984 President João Batista Figueiredo visits China (May) 
1984 Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian visits Brazil (August) 
1985 Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang visits Brazil 
1988 Beginning of CBERS Program (China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite) (July) 
1990 President Yang Shangkun visits Brazil (May) 
1992 Prime Minister Li Peng visits Brazil (June) 
1993 Prime Minister Zhou Rongji visits Brazil. Establishment of the Brazil-China Strategic 
Partnership (May/June) 
1993 President Jiang Zemin visits Brazil (November) 
1995 President Fernando Henrique Cardoso visits China (December) 
1995 Brazil endorses the inclusion of the RPC in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
1996 Prime Minister Li Peng visits Brazil (November) 
1999 Launching of the CBERS-1 satellite (October) 
2001 President Jiang Zemin visits Brazil (April) 
2003 Launching of the CBERS-2 satellite (October) 
2004 Minister Celso Amorim visits China (February) 
2004 President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva visits the PRC (May) 
2004 Creation of the Brazil-China High-Level Commission for Coordination and Cooperation - 
COSBAN (May) 
2004 President Hu Jintao visits Brazil. Signature of Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation 
in Trade and Investment, in which Brazil recognizes the status of China as a market economy 
2006 1st COSBAN meeting in Beijing, chaired by the Vice-President José Alencar on the Brazilian 
side and by the Deputy Prime-Minister Mme Wu Yi (March) 
2007 Establishment of the Strategic Dialogue between the Foreign Ministries (April) 
2007 Launching of the CBERS-2B satellite (September) 
2007 1st Brazil-China Strategic Dialogue Meeting, Beijing (November) 1st Brazil-China Strategic 
Dialogue Meeting, Beijing (November) 
2008 Visit to Brazil of Member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China, 
He Guoqiang (July) 
2008 Visit of President Lula da Silva to China, to attend the opening ceremony of the Beijing 
Olympics (August) 
2009 Visit of Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to Brazil (January) 
2009 Visit to Brazil of the Vice-President of the PRC, Xi Jinping, (February) 
2009 Visit to Brazil of the Vice-President of the PRC, Xi Jinping, (February) 
2010 State visit to Brazil of President Hu Jintao, parallel to the 2nd BRICS Summit in Brasília, and 
signature of the Brazil-China Joint Action Plan 2010-2014 (April) 
2010 2010 Minister of Defense of China, General Liang Guanglie, visits Brazil (September) 
2011 Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Antonio Patriota, to China (March 3-4) 
2011 State visit of President Dilma Rousseff to China. Participation in the Brazil-China Business 
Seminar, the Brazil-China High Level Dialogue on Science, Technology and Innovation, and 
the 3rd BRICS Summit, in Sanya (April 12-16) 
2011 Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC) Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change (Inhotim 
- MG, August 26-27) 
2011 Signature of the Joint Action Plan in Health Brazil-China 2011-2014 (October) 
2011 6th G-20 Summit, in Cannes, France. Meeting of President Dilma Rousseff and President Hu 
Jintao parallel to the Summit (December) 
2012 2nd Meeting of the Brazil-China High-Level Commission for Coordination and Cooperation 
(COSBAN), chaired on the Brazilian side by Vice-President Michel Temer and on the Chinese 
side by the Deputy Prime-Minister Wang Qishan (Brasília, February 13) 
2012 Visit of the Vice-Chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, Wang 
Zhaoguo, to Brazil (March) 
2012 4th BRICS Summit, in New Delhi, India. Meeting of President Dilma Rousseff and President 




2012 Premier Wen Jiabao visits Brazil, parallel to the Rio+20 Earth Summit, in Rio de Janeiro. 
Signature of the 10-Year Cooperation Plan, elevation of the bilateral relationship to ‘Global 
Strategic Partnership’ and establishment of the Foreign Ministers Global Strategic Dialogue 
(Rio de Janeiro, June 21) 
2012 7th G20 Summit, in Los Cabos, Mexico. Meeting of President Dilma Rousseff and President 
Hu Jintao parallel to the Summit (June) 
2013 Meeting of President Dilma Rousseff with the Chinese President Xi Jinping, parallel to the 5th 
BRICS Summit in Durban, South Africa (March) 
2013 Mission of the Minister Chief of the Civil Staff of the Presidency of Brazil, Gleisi Hoffmann, and 
of the Minister of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade, Fernando Pimentel, to China 
2013 Meeting of President Dilma Rousseff with the President Xi Jinping, parallel to the 8th G-20 
Summit in Saint Petersburg (September) 
2013 Meeting of President Dilma Rousseff with the President Xi Jinping, parallel to the 8th G-20 
Summit in Saint Petersburg (September) 
2013 Official visit of Vice-President Michel Temer to China: participation in the opening ceremony of 
the 4th Ministerial Conference of the Macau Forum, in the 3rd COSBAN, and meetings with 
President Xi Jinping and Vice President Li Yuanchao (November 4-9) 
2013 Launching of the CBERS-3 satellite (December) 
2014 Official visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi to Brasilia. First Meeting of the Global 
Strategic Dialogue (April 25) 
2014 Official visit of the President of the House of Representatives, Henrique Alves, to China (April) 
2014 State Visit of President Xi Jinping to Brazil. Participation in the 6th BRICS Summit (Fortaleza 
and Brasilia, July 15-16 
2014 Meeting of President Dilma Rousseff and the President Xi Jinping, parallel to the 9th G-20 
Summit in Brisbane, Australia (November) 
2014 Launching of the CBERS-4 satellite (December) 
2015 Visit of Vice President Mr. Li Yuanchao to Brazil to take part in the inauguration ceremony of 
President Dilma Rousseff (January 2) 
2015 Visit of Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira to China, to take part in the First Ministerial Meeting of 
the CELAC-China Forum, in Beijing (January 8-9) 
2015 Visit of Prime Minister Li Keqiang to Brazil (Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro, May 18-21) 
2015 Second Brazil-China High-Level Dialogue on Science, Technology and Innovation 
2015 Visit of Deputy Prime Minister Wang Yang to Brazil. Fourth Plenary Session of the High-level 
Coordination and Cooperation Committee - COSBAN (June 26) 
2015 Meeting of the BRICS Leaders in Antalya, Turkey, parallel to the G20 Summit 
2015 Meeting between President Dilma Rousseff and President Xi Jinping parallel to COP 21 
2016 The President of the Republic, Michel Temer, visits Shanghai to take part in the Brazil-China 
High-Level Business Seminar 
2017 Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aloysio Nunes Ferreira, to China 
2017 State Visit to China (August 31 - September 3) 
2017 4th Meeting of the Science, Technology & Innovation Subcommittee of the China-Brazil High- 
Level Coordination and Cooperation Committee (COSBAN) (Brasilia, September 5) 
Retrieved from: Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017 
 
 
All in all, the late 1990s and early 2000s initiated and strengthened Brazil’s international 
positioning. While the Brazilian government under Lula significantly expanded its 
relations with countries from the Global South, the foreign policy relations under Dilma 
Rousseff significantly declined as domestic factors gained increased relevance. During 
the Lula government, the state – business relations changed in the way the state 
related to firms, when the government increased the finance availability 
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of funds available to companies aimed at forging business growth. 10 Conversely, China 
had initiated its going global policy and was looking to further diversify and consolidate 
its partnerships, particularly with countries in the Global South. The following section 
sets the stage to assess the complexity of bilateral interactions between Brazil and 
China (bilateral needs, motivation of investment, bargaining process between 





2003–2011: The Brazilian government under the Lula presidency 
 
When it became clear that the global economic panorama was slowly changing at the 
beginning of the early 2000s, countries of the Global South, including Brazil and China, 
were getting ready to take their places in the global economic system. The first term of 
the Lula government emerged as a critical juncture because a favourable economic 
outlook implied that competing interests between diverse domestic actors could be 
more easily accommodated. In the first year of the Lula government, the president paid 
a state visit to China and was joined by high-level business and state representatives. 
The visit coincided with the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of 
diplomatic ties between the two countries. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
created a framework of the relations under which cooperation between Chinese and 
Brazilian firms could be extended. 
 
During the visit, important projects were announced: Vale joined three Chinese 
companies, namely the Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation, Chalco and Yankuang 
Group Co., and Yongcheng Coal and Electricity Group Co.; Petrobras established an 
alliance with the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation - SINOPEC; China National 
Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Co. signed a contract with the Southern 
Thermal Power Plant for the construction of a coal-fired power plant in Cachoeira do 
 
10 From 2002, with the increase in loans and the strategic reorientation of the Brazilian Development 
Bank (BNDES), Brazilian MNCs were entitled to BNDES support in its internationalisation efforts, 
through the subscription of shares on the stock exchange and expansion of loans targeting the export 
of engineering goods and services. These ties were particularly developed by the Policy for Industrial, 
Technological and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE) and the Productive Development Policy (PDP) ,as well 
as the strategic orientation of actors such as Petrobras, APEX and the Brazilian Ministry of Development 
(MDIC) (ARBIX AND CASEIRO, 2012). 
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Sul in the South of Brazil; Varig’s offices announced a joint venture with Air China to 
establish regular flights between Brazil and China; and Petrobras and one of the São 
Paulo governments together with BM&F were inaugurated in the presence of high 
authorities (MARTINS, 2004). 
 
The overall results of this visit were evaluated positively since it was the first visit of a 
Brazilian president to China since 1995. President Lula da Silva stated that the visit 
confirmed ‘the great expectations and possibilities that we have identified in Beijing’ 
and hoped that ’China would help Brazil regain competitiveness in the strategic sectors 
of rail, port, energy, steel and telecommunications infrastructure’ (VALOR, 2005). The 
MoU signed between the countries emphasises the facilitation of investment in the 
areas of energy, natural gas, environmental protection, transportation, biotechnology, 
and mining. 
 
In this overall effort, not only was the beginning of a newly warm China-Brazil 
relationship born, but President Lula also sought to emphasise the attractiveness of 
Brazil to encourage Chinese capital. One of the hallmarks of Lula’s state visit was 
ultimately the creation of the China-Brazil High-Level Coordination and Cooperation 
Committee (COSBAN), the highest permanent dialogue and bilateral cooperation 
forum, which was co-chaired by the Brazilian vice president and the Chinese vice 
premier. The COSBAN is divided into 11 subcommittees and seven working groups 
(ITAMARATY, 2006). This resumption and slow intensification of the bilateral 
relationship was later returned by Chinese President Hu Jintao in November 2004 on 
his Latin America trip when he toured Brazil, Chile, Cuba, and Argentina. During this 
trip, rhetoric appealing to a particular Sino-Latin American connection was particularly 
noticeable, drawing on common interests as developing countries in the Global South. 
When addressing the Brazilian Parliament, the Chinese president stressed the overall 
principles guiding the bilateral relations: 
 
Based on reality and looking into the future, we have jointly defined the four 
principles guiding the development of bilateral relations: (I) adhering to 
consultation on an equal footing and increasing political mutual trust; (II) 
insisting on mutual reciprocity and mutual benefit and expanding economic and 
trade contacts; (III) maintaining consultations and coordination and 
strengthening international cooperation; (IV) promoting non-governmental 
exchanges and increasing mutual understanding (ITAMARATY, 2004) 
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As Hu Jintao prescribed, to establish a fortified bilateral relationship it would be 
necessary to build grounded institutions and mechanisms for dialogue and further 
ensure the channelling of common interests at both bilateral and multilateral levels. In 
2005, relations between Brazil and China at the multilateral level were hampered 
internationally by China’s opposition to the proposed expansion of the UN Security 
Council by the so-called G4 including Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan. Brazil hoped 
to gain China’s support and endorsement of the draft. At the bilateral level, in 2006 the 
Agreement on Strengthening Cooperation in the Area of the Implementation of 
Construction Infrastructure (2006) was agreed upon, including projects in the area of 
energy, such as a cooperation between Eletrobrás and the CITIC Group on the 
modernisation of the thermal parks of the Manaus and Macapá transmission systems 
and other systems in isolated cities in the north of Brazil. 
 
In 2006, the multilateral level impacted bilateral relations when, at the margins of the 
61st session of the United Nations General Assembly, the meeting between the 
representatives of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) further fuelled a common 
rhetoric of the Global South. There were several interests to be accomplished through 
this alliance. While until this point these countries had shared common interests in 
terms of international financial cooperation, this was the first step towards building up 
the BRIC as a specific group. Although this had no immediate effect on bilateral 
relations, it contributed to further maturing a relationship of mutual self-interest and 
political willingness. 
 
In this context, it should be noted that the decade also meant a change in overall 
Brazilian foreign policy with implications for China’s importance to Brazil. Zilla (2017, 
p.8) has noted the following causes leading to the overall changes in Brazil’s foreign 
policy since the beginning of the Lula administration: 
 
• The erosion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ monopoly over foreign policy; 
• A South-South orientation; 
• An anti-status quo and pro-justice foreign policy discourse; and 
• The international profiling of Brazil as a trading power. 
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It is in this regard that the Lula administration understood the pivotal role China had in 
terms of trade balance and investment as well as the diversification of bilateral 
partnerships, reduction of vulnerability, and increase in autonomy in relation to 
established players in the global economy such as the US or central European 
countries. Additionally, 2007 marked changing power relations in the multilateral 
system with the 33rd G8 summit in Heiligendamm in 2007 announcing the full 
institutionalisation of the permanent dialogue between the G8 countries and five 
emerging economies. 
 
In 2007, the agreements and cooperation goals signed in the previous years were put 
into practice. In Brazil, a conjoined effort between the state and the private sector 
happened in the context of the China Agenda, where coordinated actions to enhance 
trade balance and investment flows included action strategies focusing on previously 
identified sectors with potential and interest to invest in the Brazilin market. The China 
Agenda was promoted by the Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign 
Trade; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and 
Supply, and the Brazil-China Business Council was set up with the goal of linking 
government agencies connected to the country’s foreign trade with the effective 
presence of the Brazilian business sector, especially those businesses active in export 
activity. 
 
The strategic dialogue between the chancelleries of the countries was initiated in April 
2007, and the first meeting was held in Beijing in November 2007. Challenges were 
found in different sectors; for instance, at the first meeting of the COSBAN Inspection 
and Quarantine Subcommittee in the second semester of 2017 between China’s 
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) – 
a ministerial-level department under the State Council in charge of inspection and 
quarantine – and the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA), 
no final agreement could be reached, and the Brazilian side remained unsatisfied with 
the result concerning meat trade (DIARIO DO COMERCIO, 2007). 
 
The gradual development of multilateral ties between Brazil and China led to a new 
chapter of Sino-Brazilian relations in 2008. At this time, a meeting between the BRIC 
foreign ministers was held in Russia in May 2008. What had begun as a political 
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dialogue on asymmetries in the international system developed into a grouping with an 
informal summit of BRIC leaders in Japan in 2008 at the sidelines of the G8 Outreach 
Summit and the first full-scale meeting in Russia in 2009, followed by a second summit 
in Brasilia in April 2010. Still, in 2008, the Chinese government launched its first white 
paper on Latin America, setting the broad cooperation framework, and in 2009, state 
visits of Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping to Brazil and President Lula to China led to 
further close cooperation in the interest of mutual benefits. In the context of Xi’s state 
visit to Brazil, a protocol on energy and mining cooperation (2009) aimed at intensifying 
‘bilateral cooperation in the areas of oil, natural gas, renewable fuels, electricity, mining 
and ore processing’, demonstrating the political will of the countries that joint 
investments of Chinese and Brazilian companies in these areas would be 
operationalised, and for Brazilian interest in particular, the agreement affirmed that the 
countries would make efforts to transform ethanol into an energy commodity and 
promote its use in the international arena. 
 
The document therefore mentions the Joint Action Plan (2010–2014) suggested during 
President Lula’s visit to Beijing in 2009 putting the COSBAN in charge of implementing 
the proposed actions. The Communiqué further anchored multilateral issues into the 
bilateral relationship, vowing to intensify cooperation. This became evident in 2010 
when Hu Jintao visited Brazil during the II BRICS Summit and paid a state visit to Brazil 
with a group of business representatives, resulting in MoUs and investment promises 
in diverse sectors. Simultaneously, the Joint Action Plan (2010–2014) was signed, 
highlighting the need for precise and objective goals for each of the cooperation areas 
based on specific initiatives, as well as their monitoring and evaluation, the promotion 
of exchanges of national experiences in mutual interest areas, and a strategic 
approach to bilateral relations vis-à-vis developments in the international arena. In this 
context, it was also declared that the COSBAN would meet biannually, whereas the 
subcommittees should reunite annually. For the months preceding and following the 
meeting, the increasing engagement of the Chinese side was conceivable. This 






11 Interview with former Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2018. 
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Marking the end of Lula’s second term, his administration had successfully managed 
to scale up engagement with countries of the Global South, consolidating its role as a 
regional power and increasing its engagement with other geographical regions. The 
end of the Lula administration also marked an important development when it comes 
to the volume of Chinese FDI in Brazil. In 2010, Brazil grew to be an important 
destination of Chinese investments, with the industry sector attracting most of the 
investment. Between 2010 and 2016, 94% of the value China invested in Brazil went 
to the secondary sector, while the rest went to the tertiary sector. Sixty-four per cent of 
investments were devoted to industry, and 36% to the service sector. In 2010–2016, 
90% of the total flow of Chinese investment in Brazil went to these two sectors 
KUPFER ET AL, 2016). 
 
Between 2010 and 2016, 79 Chinese companies came to Brazil or showed interest in 
establishing themselves in the country. At least 53 actually entered Brazil, while 12 had 
their plans modified and did not settle in the country. Although these numbers suggest 
a massive inflow of Chinese business into the Brazilian economy during the years 
2010–2016, Chinese direct investments were very concentrated in terms of the method 
of entry, value, sector, and investing companies. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 - Entry mode of Chinese companies in Brazil (2007-2016) 
Retrieved from: CEBC, 2016 
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According to the CEBC data (2016), the entry mode of Chinese companies in Brazil 
from 2007–2016 shows little variation. M&A has increased significantly in 2014, 
reflecting the modus operandi of Chinese enterprises in other countries because it 
enables them to access mature assets (CEBC, 2016). Chinese investment projects in 
Brazil between 2007–2016 showed little variation in terms of confirmed investments, 
meaning investments directed to projects/projects in Brazil whose information can be 
confirmed by more than one data source, including institutional pages of companies or 
institutions directly involved. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 - Evolution of Chinese investment projects in Brazil (2007- 2016) 
 
Retrieved from: CEBC, 2016 
 
 
Figure 1.3 on Chinese investment in Brazil by type of company between 2007–2015 
provided by the China-Brazil Business Council makes the distinction between central 
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state 12, state, and private companies. This distinction is useful because firm categories 
are not straightforward in China, because many ‘private’ companies maintain close 
relationships with the governments. However, recent years have shown a greater trend 
of separation between private and state companies in various sectors and industries. 
 
Figure 1.3 - Chinese investment in Brazil by type of company (2007 - 2015) 
 
Retrieved from: CEBC, 2016 
 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the share of state enterprises in the total number of enterprises in 
Brazil. SOEs play a pivotal role, especially in strategic sectors of the economy (e.g., 
power generation and distribution, defence, civil aviation, waterway transport, 
petroleum and petro-chemicals, telecommunication, and coal). Other industrial 
sectors, such as automobiles, equipment manufacturing, information technology, 
construction, iron and steel, and nonferrous metals sectors – pillar sectors of the 










12 Chinese SOES operate at either at central, provincial, and local levels. Central government holds 
ownership of SOEs operating in strategic industries (e.g. energy and defense). The central SOEs are 
managed by the State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). The 
company of our case study, SGCC operates at central-level. 
47 
 
2011–2016: The Brazilian administration under Dilma Rousseff 
 
When she assumed office in 2011, Dilma Rousseff had a more or less well-articulated 
foreign policy to draw upon. Overall, the Rousseff administration took a more realist 
approach to bilateral relations with China, while mostly maintaining the foreign policy 
initiatives pursued during Lula’s two terms. The visit of the new Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Antonio Patriota to China was followed by President Rousseff’s visit to China to 
participate in the BRICS Summit, which South Africa joined in late 2010. While in 
China, President Rousseff also participated in the Brazil-China High Level Dialogue on 
Science, Technology and Innovation. At the time of her visit, it was readily observed 
that there had been asymmetries in the Sino-Brazilian relationship, and the state visit 
had been targeted by a climate of domestic criticism by national industry, including the 
Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP), which is affiliated with the 
National Industry Confederation (CNI) and which was pressuring the government for 
not granting China market economy status, diversifying China’s investments in the 
country, and strengthening emphasis on higher value-added products. The Joint 
Communiqué resulting from the occasion of the visit emphasised cooperation across 
areas, especially infrastructure investments and the installation of Chinese industries 
in Brazil (FUNAG, 2016). 
 
2012 began with the second meeting of the COSBAN in Brasília, with the Brazilian 
delegation headed by Vice President Michel Temer and the Chinese delegation by 
Deputy Prime Minister Wang Qishan. The meeting featured a broad range of topics 
including multilateralism, priority areas for cooperation, and trade-related issues, as 
particularly Brazil sought to leverage commercial asymmetries. Another matter on the 
agenda was a 10-year plan as a broad roadmap of Brazil-China relations. In March 
2012, President Dilma met Hu Jintao at the BRICs Summit in India, where the 
recreation of the BRICS Development Bank would exercise impact on the global 
international system. During the Rio+20 Conference in Rio de Janeiro, Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao paid a visit, and amongst the documents signed was the 
Decennial Cooperation Plan between Brazil and China (2012–2021), elevating the 
strategic partnership to a global one. This plan further reiterated the common strengths 
of both countries and their mutual interests across a variety of priority sectors. 
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In 2013, President Dilma met with President Xi Jinping parallel to the 5th BRICS 
Summit in Durban, South Africa (March), as well as during a parallel meeting during 
the 8th G-20 Summit in Saint Petersburg (September). During the BRICS finance 
ministers’ meeting in March 2013, Brazil’s Finance Minister Guido Mantega welcomed 
Chinese capital in energy, especially oil and gas sectors. In the same year, a mission 
by then-Minister Chief of the Civil Staff of the Presidency Gleisi Hoffmann and Minister 
of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade Fernando Pimentel travelled to China 
with the mission to attract investment in the railroad concessions program. Later that 
year, during Vice President Michel Temer’s visit to China, Brazil and China signed the 
Ten-Year Cooperation Plan for the period from 2013 to 2022 at the third meeting of the 
COSBAN in Guangzhou, China. As previously described, the plan was agreed upon in 
2012 during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to Brazil in 2012. 
 
By 2014, Sino-Brazilian relations had laid the foundations to see the inherent value 
come into reality. In April, the official visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi to 
Brasilia marked the first meeting of the Global Strategic Dialogue, serving to prepare 
for the state visit of President Xi Jinping to Brasilia and the sixth BRICS Summit in 
Fortaleza in the same year. These important events coincided with the 2014 
commemoration of the 40 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The 
document produced at the end of the third meeting of the COSBAN13 held in China in 
November 2013 was, in fact, the guiding element in the negotiations conducted 
between Brazil and China in July 2014 (MRE, 2013) during the state visit of President 
Xi Jinping to Brazil. On that occasion, bilateral agreements were signed featuring the 
bilateral demands across a range of industrial areas, including renewable energy and 
other resource-related issues. Concerning the field of energy and mining, the meeting 
reiterated the interests in the electricity grids, and in this context, agreements were 
signed between Eletrobras, Furnas and CWE and China’s Three Gorges Corporation, 






13 The efficiency of COSBAN to articulate state-level bilateral demands between countries has been 
under scrutiny. From the Brazilian perspective, several interviewees remarked the insufficient 
coordination between Brazilian ministries and the lack of a follow-up process of the negotiations 
(Interview with representative of Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018) 
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In the same period, the Sixth Leaders’ Meeting of the BRICS group in Fortaleza, was 
concluded with two important results: the establishment of the BRICS Development 
Bank and the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) to support member 
countries with short-term liquidity pressures similar to the proceedings of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). In addition to the state visit and the BRICS summit, 
the CELAC-China Forum was symbolically launched at the Brasilia Summit of Leaders 
of China and Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean held on July 17, 2014, 
which was the first external dialogue mechanism formalised by CELAC with a 
developing country. The beginning of 2015 marked the beginning of Rousseff’s second 
term, and Vice President Mr Li Yuanchao took part in the inauguration ceremony of 
President Dilma Rousseff on January 2nd. This set the tone for further opportunities to 
strengthen the ties at the bilateral and regional cooperation levels. 14 In the same 
month, Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Mauro Vieira took part in the first ministerial 
meeting of the CELAC-China Forum in Beijing. During his visit, the minister stated the 
opportunities given the overall cooperation frame: 
 
With the CELAC-China Forum, we now also have another mechanism to 
promote reciprocal trade and investment. Over the past five years China has 
substantially increased its direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Companies from Brazil and other countries in the region have also increased 
their presence in the Chinese market. It is our expectation that the CELAC- 
China Forum should promote new investment from our region in China, as well 
as Chinese investment in Latin America and the Caribbean. (ITAMARATY, 
2015) 
 
Giving the continuity of the COSBAN mechanism, the second Brazil-China High-Level 
Dialogue on Science, Technology and Innovation was held in June and co-chaired by 
Vice President Michel Temer and Vice Premier Wang Yang of the State Council. The 
meeting featured innovation as the key theme, and the signing of the ‘Memorandum of 
Understanding on Bilateral Cooperation in Science, Technology, and Innovation in the 
area of Scientific and Technological Parks’ marked the event. On that same day, Vice 
Premier Wang Yang met President Dilma Rousseff and emphasised the need to 
stabilise the bilateral trade scale and promote areas such as production capacity, 
infrastructure construction, finance, and agriculture. The following year was a meagre 
year for Sino-Brazilian bilateral relations. Under the surface, Brazil’s political economy 
had been caught up in the country’s largest corruption scandal in the history. More 
 
14 Interview with representative of Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018. 
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than 12 months into her second four-year term, Rousseff bowed to the inevitabilities of 
the senate’s vote and was ousted from the presidency in 2016. She underwent an 
impeachment process resulting in her suspension from office and leaving Interim 
President Michel Temer as the country’s leader. With the senate’s approval of the 
removal of President Rousseff, the Chinese government used its state-sponsored 




2 INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF BUSINESS POLITICS 
 
In the context of internationalisation, business politics are most valuable to companies 
because they are intangible assets in securing opportunities and managing risks across 
different country contexts. Following the broader notion of ‘portfolio analysis of business 
investment in politics’ (Schneider, 2009), this chapter situates the role of business 
politics in the context of emerging countries’ SOE internationalisation. With the 
increasing internationalisation of SOEs, global economic dynamics, home and host 
country and government relations, and foreign policy strategies play fundamental roles 
and call for an in-depth understanding of the political behaviour of companies, their 
decision-making processes, and the structures and articulations of their relationships. 
This chapter features the determinants and ways political influence exercised by 
emerging multinational companies (MNCs) takes place across their internationalisation 





2.1 State-owned enterprises as actors in state-business relations 
 
In the case of SOEs, it is a common misinterpretation that SOEs are passive agents 
receiving ‘government orders’ (KENNEDY, 2009) and represent homogeneous state 
interests. On the contrary, the ways SOEs aggregate interests are varied, as are their 
motivations and methods of impacting political agenda setting and exercising policy 
impact. That said, SOEs do not act in a vacuum but exercise a certain extent of 
autonomy. Studies on state-business relations in the energy sector demonstrate the 
complex environment that links the way SOEs interact with market and state 
institutions. The political process concerning the deregulation of the Swedish electricity 
industry started with discussions on deregulations in the late 1980s, which led to the 
corporatisation of the Swedish state-owned utility Vattenfall in 1992 and introducing 
the new Electricity Law, which came into force in 1996. Andersson et al (2011) anayse 
the relevant actors who contributed to shaping both the new institutional environment 
and the political discourse by analysing the formal political decision-making process 
and the activities of a variety of ministries, boards, and agencies, as well as the 
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processes by which energy companies and other relevant industrial actors influenced 
the outcome of the regulatory reforms. The study confirmed that firm actors were 
particularly skilful at influencing the policy process by drawing on business and political 
arenas, but it also demonstrated the need to understand that the boundaries of firm 
autonomy and overall embeddedness differs from case to case and are utterly tied to 
the conditions of the institutional environment. 
 
Vattenfall actively mobilised its political support during the different phases of 
internationalisation; for example, when it initiated its expansion and acquired a Finnish 
electricity distribution company in 1996, expanded its business activities into Germany 
and Poland in 1999 and 2000, respectively (HÖGSELIUS, 2009). During 
internationalisation, the company associated its image to Sweden’s reputation as 
environmentally friendly country to keep a credible political stance, when it invested in 
coal or nuclear energy assets. 
 
While studies on SOEs have associated reform and restructuring endeavours and 
corporate governance emphasising CCP and government-level intervention, a series 
of recent studies have attributed the relevance of considering the endeavours and 
business scope of state-owned companies as active participants with their own 
business tactics to advance their objectives. For example, Heilmann and Shih (2013) 
have referred to the political impact of SOEs and the national industrialization 
approaches formulated on a supra-ministerial level and aim at cross-sectorally 
coordinated development. Leutert (2016) refers to the administrative ranks occupied 
by firms and their leaders as critical assets for influence-taking. Pei (2006) has referred 
to the resistance and difficulties of reform in China’s state industry, largely because 
state industry opposed action and therefore prevented various reform attempts. In the 
case of the state industry, the work of Naughton (2005 and 2006) on the ties between 
government and state industrial actors has particularly focused on SOEs and the State- 
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). This 
foundational work points to the increasing role and close ties between government 
agencies and the corporate interests of the state industrial actors, resulting in a 
complex dynamic between them. 
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Political entrepreneurship of firms allows to understand their ability to lead with risk and 
their capacity to engage on policy matters and create alliances for the sake of business 
interest. Overall, understanding firms as political entrepreneurs means conceiving 
them as rational actors in that they make decisions based on the costs and benefits of 
proposed activity. This all demonstrates why business politics are most valuable to 
firms: the political capital of multinational corporations (MNCs) is different from other 
forms of MNC assets. While many studies have focused on economic transformation 
processes at the intersection of economic regulation and competition, there is a 
broader dimension to the role of business politics. Simply put, the degree and size of 
formal and informal networks and connections are fundamental tools for companies’ 
political leverage. Many studies have confirmed that the larger the firm, the greater the 
chance to informally influence government through personal connections and positively 
benefit from administrative, legislative, or other regulatory changes. 
 
While it is commonly assumed that private companies, particularly large enterprises, 
have a strong interest in influencing matters in their favour, in the case of SOEs, it is a 
common misinterpretation that SOEs are passive agents receiving ‘government 
orders’. On the contrary, the ways SOEs aggregate interest are varied, as are their 
motivations and forms of influencing political agenda setting and exercising policy 
impact. That said, SOEs do not act in a vacuum but exercise a certain extent of 
autonomy. Such ‘relative autonomy’ is therefore connected to the foundational micro 
and macro-economic structures of the institutional environment. 
 
In the case of China, this is also substantially held by Xu (2017) who has argued that 
(a) central SOEs are not mere passive receivers of policy directives from the party- 
state; (b) those with long-term strategic vision, human and financial resources, and 
institutional capacity can shape government policies to their liking as policy advocates; 
and yet (c) no one, including central SOEs, monopolises this process in any given 
policy area; thus, policy outcomes reflect competition among players and their constant 
interaction with government policymakers. 
 
The continuous building of political leverage thus reveals business politics as a 
dynamic process that remains flexible and bound to the immediate political and 
regulatory environment it interacts with, specifically the government and the state. For 
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example, since the 1990s, the role of firm embeddedness has been impacted by the 
change in the nature of firm’s political relations when official political goals were 
featured under the national development discourse and became a necessary condition 
for the career advancement of the country’s bureaucrats (ZHOU, 2010). 
 
At the same time, however, Chinese companies became more dependent on the 
bureaucrats for market development; they put people in administration leadership 
positions in the companies so that they could smoothly steer the company through the 
bureaucratic and administrative web of China’s political economy. While this made 
state-business relations in the country more informal and rooted in shared interest 
between state and government (TSAI, 2007), the highly decentralised government 
further added to the complexity by introducing diverse negotiation levels and 
bargaining needs. These political connections also demonstrate the value of top 
managers and the way their personal political values and connections can flow into 
corporate decision-making processes (LI AND LIANG, 2015; STEINBERG AND SHIH, 
2012) and the nourishment of relations of trust in order to facilitate business. This is 
particularly relevant, for example, in concentrated industry sectors where firms face 
high levels of uncertainty and constantly require competitive advantages. 
 
Dynamics of state-owned enterprise internationalisation are tied to the interplay 
between business politics and state oversight in both recipient and home countries, 
pointing to the need for SOEs to best exploit and build their institutional comparative 
and competitive advantages. State-owned enterprises may be entangled in the 
complex structure of state ownership administration, incentive structures, sectorial 
policy regulations, and internationalisation procedures, while simultaneously pursuing 
their own agendas and policy preferences. In the end, the strategic embeddedness of 
firms and the resulting relative autonomy remains crucial for influencing processes and 
thus impacting either policy processes or SOE business interests. An enterprise’s 




2.2 Dynamics of business politics: interests and state-industry aspects 
 
If internationalisation theories are concerned with non-tangible issues including political 
values and firm embeddedness in broader political settings, the notion of business 
politics refers the entrepreneurial capabilities firms develop to facilitate and conduct a 
favourable business environment at a political level through different channels, actions, 
and mechanisms. Variation in capitalist economies is an outcome of different national 
institutional configurations impacting firm behaviour. In these different contexts, the 
dimension of power may affect the institutional structures of national systems 
stemming from the role of political institutions (IVERSEN AND SOSKICE, 2009). While 
collective action and coordination between competing and economic actors increases 
the complexity, political institutions also show differences in promoting cooperation or 
competition (MARTIN AND SWANK, 2008). Firms must therefore understand how best 
to navigate in an environment where difficult political institutions generate different 
needs and outcomes. Basically, business politics implies the idea of firms as 
established political and policy actors. Thriving specifically based on institutional 
approaches, the political behaviour of firms has long been examined in the political 
sciences. 
 
Evidently, business politics and firm participation in policymaking varies over time, 
across policy areas, and between countries (SCHNEIDER, 2012, P. 300). Firms’ 
interactions occur within different arenas, specifically industrial relations, vocational 
training and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations, and labour relations 
(HALL AND SOSKICE, 2001), throughout which they interact with the most different 
actors, including other firms, banks, customers, stakeholders, shareholders, and 
labour. Consequently, the approach hypothesises that institutions shape and constrain 
firm behaviour to a lesser or greater extend, providing firms with opportunities of which 
they take advantage (HALL AND SOSKICE, 2001; CROUCH, 2005). Overall, it is 
presumed that there is complementarity between corporate strategies and institutions. 
 
Up until this point, this dissertation has mainly traced the debates between political 
economy scholars and International Business debate. However, it is important to set a 
wider stage of the dimensions of the business politics by offering how to best assess 
the business politics in the internationalisation process to make sense of certain 
56 
 
understudied and overlooked aspects of state economy in the context of the 
internationalisation of emerging SOEs. With that in mind, a conceptual approach is 
therefore described below, explaining the need for business politics to: 
 
• Incorporate sectorial arrangements, including the institutional, regulatory, and 
political arrangements departing from studies on business interest organisation 
and how relations between the state and business affect business behaviour in 
relation to policy (DURAND AND SILVA, 1997; MAXFIELD AND SCHNEIDER, 
1997); 
• Incorporate characteristics of business association and collective actions 
departing from approaches of political mobilisation relying on Olson’s approach 
to collective action, whereby political mobilisation is more viable when there is 
concentration and a greater homogeneity of interests, organisation, and 
coordination, thereby resulting in and qualifying corporate actors to engage in 
political action (MCADAM ET AL., 2001; TARROW, 2011); 
• Possess the capacity to influence the agenda from studies on the organisation 
of business interests (MCADAM ET AL., 2001; TARROW, 2011); and 






Table 2.1 - Business politics 
 
Sectorial features, institutional and regulatory 
arrangements 
Features of business 
associations and business 
politics of the sector 
Capacity of effectively 
influencing the agenda 
Use of mechanisms of 
influence 
Particular institutional features which facilitate the 
influencing activity of firms 
Transparency and access of 
business participation (formal and 
open/ informal and opaque) 
(SCHNEIDER, 2012) 
Bargaining, negotiation Channels of influence 
mediating the participation 
(SCHNEIDER, 2012) 
Particular characteristics of companies and the 
competitive relationships with in the sector 
Organization of business 
participation 
Information Deliberative or consultative 
councils 
Structures and mechanism of regulatory 
competencies which may result in ‘political 
intervention’ in the economy 
Participation is collective and 
organized 
Intimidation Corporate tripartite bargaining 
Power of intervention in the economic environment 
of firms, the nature of the policies which 
government pursue and the regulatory and 
resource allocation activities of government 
Participation is dispersed and 
individual 
Favours granted as part of 
special networks of relationships 
Lobbying 
Intra-agency coordination and cooperation 
(business interests and preferences) 
Campaign and party finance 
Direction of governing party in the administration, 
state structure of the relations to society, types of 
discourse in government and the impact on 
exogenous events. 
Networks and appoints to 
government positions 
Coordination of interests between actors as 
reflections of the effectiveness of the decision- 
making process 
Retrieved from: Own elaboration 
58 
 
This provides the basis for the overall approach to the dissertation by identifying the 
importance of the opportunity for influence in a political context, the potential 
advantages of exploiting these opportunities from a competitive point of view, and the 
importance of industry structure and competitive environment for influence. Moreover, 
the fragmented and weak nature of formal institutions implies that informality prevails, 
for example, in the establishment of firm relationships (LUO AND ZHAO, 2011) and 
the location of political support. Below, the different forms of mechanism (formal/open 
vs. informal/opaque) are put in context with the forms of action taken 
(collective/organised/network-based vs. individual and dispersed vs. direct and 
indirect). Depending on the firm’s embeddedness, the choice of political strategy can 
be either punctual or channelled to build up long-term relations. 
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Table 2.2 - Embeddedness in China and Brazil 
 Mechanisms Formal/Open Informal/Opaque 
CHINA Collective/organised 
(network-based) 
Business  associations, 
information, and formal 
institutions for private sector 
dialogue 
Bargaining, negotiation, and 
information 
Individual/dispersed Traditional mechanisms of 
governmental influence and 
political relations with formal 
government agencies and 
institutions are of high 
relevance for private actors 
Nomenklatura:  relationship 
between government and 
business organisations; 
political    connections 
(executive  and   legislative 
connections); networks and 
appointments to government 
positions,   parties, and 
regulatory  agencies; and 
participation in policymaking 
due to governments’ strong 
reliance on firm expertise in a 
specific area 




Indirect Grassroots lobbying Favours granted as part of 
special networks of 
relationships; networks and 
appointments to government 
positions, parties, and, 
regulatory agencies; 
participation in policymaking 
due to governments’ strong 
reliance on firm expertise in a 
specific area; and intimidation 
BRAZIL Collective/organised Business  associations, 
information, and formal 
institutions for private sector 
dialogue 
Bargaining and negotiation 
Individual/dispersed 
(network-based) 
Traditional mechanisms of 
governmental influence and 
formal political relations with 
formal government agencies 
and institutions are of high 
relevance for private actors 
Political connections 
(executive and legislative 
connections) 
Direct Information, lobbying, and 
grassroots lobbying 
Media 
Indirect Grassroots lobbying Favours granted as part of 
special networks of 
relationships, campaign and 
party finance, grassroots 
lobbying, and intimidation 
Retrieved from: Own elaboration 
 
What has emerged is an array of perspectives about how best to understand not only 
the nature of the relationship between the firms and economy but also its general 
direction. This distinction between the different forms of firm influencing may be key, 
because even though there are serious disagreements about how to best capture 
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business politics, most would agree that firms possess strong dispositions for 




2.3 Embeddedness: The organization and influence of business participation 
 
A remaining dimension concerns the organisation of business participation. Formal and 
informal channels of business are tied to the structure logics of the specific industry. 
Kennedy has also evidenced this, arguing that variations in the manner and the 
outcomes of government-business interactions in China ‘are related to the varying 
economic circumstances of individual firms and the sectors of which they are a part’ (p. 
56). This characterises how the political activities and interest representation and 
mobilisation occur. 
 
In a very recent empirical study exploring how advocacy and outcomes in the electricity 
industry are procedurally related to each other, Sampson (2016, p.256) has discovered 
state firms’ ‘indirect’ approaches towards generating proactive sectoral policy impact. 
In this regard, the central government’s policy preferences were relevant for policy 
output and outcomes, but it was the state industrial actors who influenced how central 
policy was applied and who were relying on the macro-level orientations provided by 
central government to steer the issues in the direction of its own interests, thereby 
impacting the functional logic of the industry. Thus, Sampson has highlighted the fact 
that ‘to change sectoral policy so as to follow its own preferences, central SOEs needed 
to tactically manoeuvre very real structural limitations set by existing policy and formal 
bureaucratic processes’ (SAMPSON, 2016, p.253), as well as ‘find ways to combine 
their own ambitions with government’s macro priorities and to argumentatively 
persuade top leaders that they are contributing to the solution of urgent cross-sectoral 
policy challenges’ (SAMPSON, 2016, p. 254). Within these institutional limitations and 
constraints, the rather indirect bargaining style of Chinese state actors relies strongly 
on political opportunity to advance their corporate agendas. 
 
Whereas individual participation of companies in political influence has been related to 
company size, business associations and groups can be a powerful means of 
impacting the business environment. A vast amount of literature has explored the 
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importance of diversification in the development and growth of entrepreneurial groups 
(KHANNA AND PALPEU, 1997; SCHNEIDER, 2015). The explanation of the 
importance of diversification can be described in four main points: (i) the fact that the 
group has firms in several sectors increases its leverage power in the market, meaning 
that groups that interact in different markets prefer to support multiple interactions in 
order to reduce rivalry with competitors; (ii) the diversified structure allows the 
exchange of resources between firms and makes them closer, meaning that it is 
possible to contract different resources such as technology, brands, and people that 
act in the different firms of the sector and thereby create an internal market; (iii) using 
information asymmetry, diversified groups create value by operating in the domestic 
capital market, which circumvents problems associated with obtaining external 
financing; and finally, (iv) the diversification of the groups can be a response to political 
distortions (GHEMAWAT AND KHANNA, 1998). 
 
In the same way, organised interest groups have demands for policy and government 
benefits they must make to please the members and funders who support their 
organisations. Business associations can engage in organised political action through 
actions and incentives with the goal of influencing political decisions, sectorial action, 
and political discourse (KENNEDY, 2009). 
 
The cases of emergence and business associations in China provide a number of 
useful insights into the complex embeddedness a firm has to uphold when engaging in 
collective and formal interest representation. Associations in China can be divided 
between chambers of commerce in which the members originally shared a common 
ownership form (private, state-owned, or foreign), and industry-specific associations. 
In China, most industry associations have limited independence because they were 
initiated by government agencies that act as their sponsors, supervisors, and leaders 
(KENNEDY, 2009). Kennedy has pointed out that many Chinese business associations 
are decentralised like their government counterparts. This is why they have non-
hierarchical, ‘flat’ organisational structures that are not subject to control by trans-
sectoral associations. It is also possible to encounter overlap, competition, and 
horizontal division between many of these associations. On the other hand, Brazil 
presents a fragmented and complex collective representation structure of corporate 
interests formed by pluralistic and corporatist entities that act in several areas of public 
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policies (DINIZ, 2010). They can engage in consensus building between members and 
channel interests and needs. While associations and their structures can differ, they 
provide platforms of agenda building and access to information (SCHNEIDER, 2004). 
 
When it comes to the transparency and access of business participation, the access 
of business participation in decision-making is largely dependent on political 
momentum related to the macro-level policy agenda and involved actor coalition. 
 
One of the most important dimensions for business access is the role of political 
connections. Within the Chinese state bureaucracy, social relations have long been 
pivotal for conducting business activities, but also for personal career advancement 
(ZHOU, 2010), limiting uncertainty, providing access to information, mobilising 
resources, and counteracting unexpected problems. For example, in the case of the 
role of formal government agencies, Wang (2014) has compared the political relations 
of both private and state-owned firms listed on China’s stock markets. Across all 
ownership types, 90% of listed companies have ties to the national government, local 
government, the National People’s Congress or political consultative committee 
(described as a national parliament), a local people’s congress or consultative 
committee (described as a local parliament), a national Chinese Communist Party 
Congress, a local Communist Party congress, or the People’s Liberation Army. 
 
In China, relations are often opaque and guanxi15 - based, involving regular and 
sporadic forms of formal and informal contact. In the case of SOEs, this can, for 
example, involve connections and access to government and bureaucracy due to high 
administrative rank: administrative ranks in central SEOs are still under the logic of the 
formal ministerial status (i.e., that of the planning ministry) the SOEs formerly held 
(LEUTERT, 2016). This results in SOE management having the same level of 
hierarchical status as several of the government bodies responsible for their 
management or the supervision of their activities. This can provide important access 
to information, help SOEs advocate for or against policies for their industries, and 
provide access to documents relevant to business endeavours, meetings exclusively 
open to certain rank categories, CCP training courses, etc. Both formal and informal 
 
 
15 Guanxi, according to Park and Luo (2001, p.455) , refers to the concept of drawing on a web of 
connections to secure favors in personal and organizational relations. 
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connections to top officials can be established through committees, enabling, for 
example, opportunities to circumvent authorities of sectorial relevance. Here, proactive 
measures to influence policy-related decision-making can be reached. 
 
Macher and Mayo (2015) have stated, ‘We understand that different types of firms 
pursue different public policy strategies that depend in part on their market and 
nonmarket positions, as well as their own political resources and capabilities’. The 
interaction between SOE management and state structures evolved alongside the 
reform and economic development of the sector. Meidan (2016, p.40) demonstrates 
this in the context of the Chinese oil SOEs: 
 
Indeed, throughout the various stages of reform, the NOCs managed to 
maintain their power. Originally, their political clout stemmed from their 
bureaucratic ranking and their ties to the top leadership but over time, as they 
became increasingly profitable, their leverage over the government was 
strengthened by their financial clout. The NOCs could argue in favour of 
retaining a greater percentage of profits to further invest in their development 
programmes, which then granted them greater autonomy in financing overseas 
transactions. 
 
The form in which policymaking is organised by the state and its institutional structures 
will contribute to the businesses’ ability to influence (HALL, 1997), whereas the way 
business actors engage within the institutional structures can further advance or 
constrain their endeavours (FAIRFIELD, 2011). Furthermore, the diverging interests of 
actors further increases their need to strengthen strategic capabilities and ensure that 
their preferences are being considered in the policymaking process. Similarly, 
Gourevitch (1986) and Hall (1997) have pointed out the different than diverging 
interests impact on the capacities of actors to ensure that their preferences are being 
considered in the policymaking process and have emphasised the issue of the ability 
to mobilise support and pressure different government agencies. 
 
The different contexts to which firms are exposed make them adaptable to learning, 
strategic differentiation of opportunities, and cultural conditions of political actions. Just 
as important as the organisation of business participation and its access are the 
channels through which business participation is structured and legitimised. Corporate 
decisions on how to relate to other social actors including formal institutions are 
inherently political, because they may have political effects to a higher or lower degree. 
The same can be said of the channels, because different channels entail 
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consequences to the extent that one choice of channel may be connected to the others 
and justify the use of others. 
 
The strategic embeddedness of firms and their resulting relative autonomy remains 
crucial for influencing processes; thus, impacting either policy processes or interests 
related to SOEs business endeavours allocates a political role to the enterprise and its 
relative autonomy when pursuing its strategic interests. For this purpose, however, the 
use of channels is complex and multidimensional, may be punctual or over a certain 
amount of time, and demands more or less discretion. For example, the use of 
channels can have the following objectives: firms may hire consultancies for lobbying 
purposes, but mostly hire local managers to work with the mobilisation of political 
support in favour of the firm’s needs. 
 
The information channels are vital due to the information asymmetries between 
policymakers and interest groups, the existence of multiple groups simultaneously 
pressuring the government, and the different challenges associated with political firm 
activities, including the ability of some groups to disrupt the flow of information from 
others to the government, thereby indirectly changing the equilibrium of policy efforts. 
This is why the channels of business participation can help firms to enhance the 
coordination of institutional capacities related to policy guidance and policy demands, 
support the pursuit of preferences of internationalisation with cross-sectorial agendas, 
and support the interplay and coordination between institutional actors relevant to 
oversight in the home and host contexts. 
 
Blumentritt and Nigh (2002) have examined the different factors that make MNC 
subsidiaries coordinate political activities with affiliated units. These authors have 
sought to understand how MNCs are confronted by diverse political issues, which 
range from a unified corporate posture to different competitive activities, and from 
subsidiaries’ answers to local political matters. The interactions between MNCs and 
governments vary in their degrees of internationalisation, coordination, and knowledge 
sharing. Consequently, the ways firms engage in business politics and make use of 
participation channels may demonstrate differences when it comes to the ownership 
and origin of the firm. 
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In the case of the US, Hansen and Mitchel (2000) have conducted a study on corporate 
political activities that permits direct comparison between domestic and foreign-owned 
corporations and allows for firmer conclusions about the dimensions, particular 
motivations, and relative significance of foreign-based political activity within the US. 
Their evidence suggests that foreign firms are less likely to contribute to candidates 
and are less likely to engage in public lobbying by appearing at congressional hearings, 
but they are about as likely as domestic firms to have a lobbying presence in 
Washington (HANSEN AND MITCHEL, 2000). More than that, evidence on charitable 
contributions provides some support for a lower propensity towards donations by 
foreign-owned firms and indicates that the political contributions by U.S. affiliates of 
foreign corporations are consistent with foreign firms in Britain, who are less likely to 
make political contributions (HANSEN AND MITCHEL, 2000). This study demonstrates 
that firms adapt to the political scene but seek to maintain a low profile in terms of 
visibility. In this regard, Hansen and Mitchell (2000, p.899) write: 
 
 
We found evidence that foreign firms adapt to local behaviour but at the same 
time try to avoid the appearance of influencing the politics of another country. 
The data set that we used is more extensive than in earlier studies, but further 
measurement refinements are needed. In terms of the independent variables, 
we improve on the earlier, cruder, industry-level measures of regulation, and 
we incorporate an ownership measure, a countervailing power measure, and 
press measures of visibility. 
 
 
This shows that MNCs’ experiences in emerging markets, including central and eastern 
Europe, have highlighted the importance of institutions, not only exogenously in terms 
of how they produce specific constraints for firms, but also how they lead to different 
firm behaviours across institutional settings (JACKSON AND DEEG, 2008). That said, 
external institutional pressures mostly originate from nonmarket actors in the 
subsidiary’s surroundings, such as the host country government or regional 
governments as well as non-governmental interest groups (NELL ET AL., 2015). When 
it comes to developing or emerging economies, internationalisation processes may be 
characterised by the strong government support provided to firms (SARGENT AND 
GHADDAR, 2001). Similarly, Gammeltoft, Pradhan, and Goldstein (2010) have 
acknowledged that in the case of emerging economies, government support may take 
the form of support in terms of financing and inputs. 
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Thus, this dissertation is based on the premise that the ‘politics’ dimension of business 
politics implies the mobilisation of firms’ political capacities. Business political 
participation does not necessary have to occur in parliaments. Culpepper (2011) 
argues that when an issue is less politically salient, business interests have great 
power to achieve exactly what they want. More than that, as opposed to traditional 
approaches in political science literature, this author emphasises that informal 
institutions have a primary business role in issues of low salience. Keller (2016) has 
built on this study to distinguish between ‘noisy’ and ‘quiet’ politics as strategies 
targeting the impact on the political process by different processes. The contrast and 
differences between quiet and noisy politics are further visualised in Table 2.3 in terms 
of their content, dimensions of conflict, targets, and influence mechanisms. 
 
Table 2.3 - Quiet and noisy business politics 
 




Provision of empirical 
evidence and expert 
knowledge 






Noisy Mobilisation on Competing legitimate Support-seeking Mainly pressuring 
Politics demands and and potentially salient decision-makers through conflict 
 implications deemed claims  expansion and 
 legitimate, (un)fair, or   increasing the 
 (un)desirable   salience 




While the two approaches do contrast, there is overlap, and there are multiple reasons 
for companies to choose one strategy or another. Keller (2016) has highlighted the 
roles of the targeted venue, initial and potential levels of media attention, and 
availability of a framing strategy. 
 
Relationship with key figures (contact with political parties and parliamentarians 
through visits and informal meetings) and the influencing of governmental 
representatives in Brazil, for example, include relations with the actors of the 
government executive, congress (senate and deputy chamber), the judicial system, 
and regulatory agencies; the identification of strategic actors in the legislative process 
(e.g., members, presidents, leaders of different parliament interest groups); the 
establishment and maintenance of relations to parliamentarians; participation in 
commissions meetings and public audiences; relationships with parliamentary and 
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commission advisors; and finally meetings with individual parliamentarians and contact 
with other stakeholders. These relationships can be practiced at both national 
(including local and state) and international levels. For example, with respect to MNCs 
investing in China, the political system makes it advantageous for MNCs to uphold 
dense government relations to strategically manage risks. 
 
This can be achieved through hiring local managers (LUO AND ZHAO, 2013) or 
enacting safeguarding strategies if political contacts and relationships with key figures 
could be damaging for business (e.g., due to the change in political leadership) 
(BODDEWYN AND DIELEMAN, 2012). Use of these mechanisms can include both 
individual firms and groups with homogenous interests, which influence in some way 
can or want to take on the decisionmaker. The goal is to find a voice in those 
government agencies that is relevant to the relevant facts. Access to policymaking, and 
decision-makers in particular, is therefore paramount, regardless of whether opinions 




2.4 Framing ideas and ideology: Expertise and agenda setting 
 
When it comes to determining the entry point of companies as actors with matured 
strategic skills and environments, Crouch (2005, p.153) has argued that firms are not 
to be seen as actors independent from the market, because many display capacities 
to influence and take proactive steps in shaping market responses, thereby increasing 
their autonomy and entrepreneurship skills. On the other hand, politicians and 
policymakers themselves may engage with business to forge political support 
(SCHNEIDER, 2004), influence behaviour (HAGGARD ET AL., 1997; SCHNEIDER, 
1997), and access information for policymaking purposes (SCHNEIDER AND 
MAXFIELD, 1997). Policymakers usually have a basic understanding of the impact of 
legislation on economic realities, possible user reactions to changes in framework 
conditions and expected economic development in general. However, in order to be 
able to draft comprehensive changes in the legal framework and then be able to adopt 
them, information deficits must be remedied. As a result, decision-makers need to 
incorporate detailed expert knowledge into their own decision-making processes, 
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because they will not be able to acquire the necessary specialist knowledge within the 
time available. 
 
There is an asymmetry of information between the decision-makers and the actors 
acting as experts. The providers of the required information can only be the users 
themselves, their representatives, or scientists. Early input of expertise (e.g., through 
offering legislative recommendations) will result in more effective and efficient 
regulations in favour of the firm. This can also occur through the elaboration of technical 
studies and expertise (reports, events, informative materials, and working missions). It 
is possible for stakeholders to influence decision-makers at every level, and it is also 
conceivable that the process will be disrupted at every level. Studies have also 
highlighted the fact that policy-makers also draw on cooperation with the business 
sector to positively influence policy outcomes or implementation when state resources 
are limited or constrained (FUCHS, 2007; MAXFIELD AND SCHNEIDER, 1997; 
SCHNEIDER, 2004). 
 
While it is widely presumed that firms uphold a ‘strategy’ in terms of guaranteeing 
political leverage, this is not always the case. Firms do have to have the ability and the 
opportunity to engage in business politics effectively, and even if they have the chance, 
they do not always do so. Studies on business politics in the EU have explored the 
complexity of business politics, as demonstrated, for example, by the Ydersbond (2014) 
on the lobbying strategies of interest organisations in Germany’s energy industries to 
influence the formulation of the EU renewables directive: 
 
 
enquiring into multi-level lobbying strategies where it is reasonable to expect 
interest organizations to lobby at multiple levels, rather than focusing solely on 
the national or the international level. With the EU steadily increasing in depth 
and scope, research attention should focus on coordinated lobbying, as interest 
organizations appear to lobby across political levels to an increasing extent. 
Finally, we note that lobbying by complex multi-level advocacy coalitions may 
be decisive for political outcomes in the EU, which testifies to the substantial 
importance of coordinated lobbying behaviour and coalition formation across 
levels (YDERSBOND, 2014, p. 35-36). 
 
 
The understanding of multi-level engagement brings us closer to the essence of 
understanding firm strategies, which can punctually include forms of media coverage 
or wider Public Relations campaigns and can be determined through the existence of 
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a government or regulatory affairs department, as well as the corporate network and 
ability to access information of strategic value and open opportunities to exert influence. 
It is in this regard that the political arena in which firms operate does not necessarily 
occur in parliaments or at informal lunch tables; it can be also built through joining 
opportunities and building up a public discourse. 
 
Bringing together the role business politics play in state-business relations is therefore 
at the forefront of all market relations. While in the case of China state-business 
relations are largely informal and linked to party relationships, in Brazil there are more 
formal institutionalised links between states and businesses with public-private 
interaction. While in China it is the state that usually sets the agendas, in Brazil this 




2.5 Business politics abroad: The role of MNCs 
 




the processes which fashion, maintain or change state-business relations are 
political processes, and the ideas, interests, ideologies, forms and degrees of 
power and/or influence which organisations or organised interests – on the state 
or business side, or externally – bring to the practice will determine the evolving 




In the context of state-business relations, business politics refer to a way of directly or 
indirectly leveraging corporate interests, and it seems self-explanatory that firms would 
like policies and political environments set in a manner that suits them. 
 
Embeddedness as a concept has been used to trace the relationships between 
institutional actors and businesses in contributing to organisational success (PARK 
AND LUO, 2001, UZZI 1997). Embeddedness looks at different levels of abstraction 
spanning from the home to the host context. For example, home country conditions, 
such as the support given to innovation and FDI policies, can have a significant impact 
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on MNC strategies abroad (CUERVO CAZURRA, 2012). Apart from the gains for 
countries showing elevated levels of FDI, there has been recognition that MNCs 
abroad were increasingly understood to include concerns of political involvement, as 
Zhu (2016, p.1) has demonstrated: 
 
It seems that the existing literature has overlooked the strategic interactions 
between foreign firms and host governments. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
untaken by MNCs is different from other forms of capital flows, such as 
remittances and portfolio investment, in the sense that it involves the transfers 
of physical assets, human resources and technology, while demanding deep 
engagement and long-term commitment from parent companies. In this regard, 
MNCs – the vehicles for FDI – are sensitive to the political and economic 




Returning to the initial part of this chapter, companies may have a strong interest in 
influencing matters in their favour, depending on the overall context they are immersed 
in. Companies adjust their strategies and adopt their modus operandi – an issue is not 
always worth engaging. Multinational corporations may react to legislative and 
regulatory activity by explaining the company’s position, providing seminars or other 
presentations, or otherwise responding to legislators’ requests for information. If MNCs 
also engage in the legislative process in a proactive way, they may do so indirectly by 
mobilising interest groups, or directly by lobbying legislators. The choice to behave 
proactively may be an independent one, or it may be a response to the encouragement 
of headquarters, etc. Conversely, working towards the goal of passing particular 
statutory language or budget allocations can provide MNCs with the resources or 
knowledge they need to win auctions or obtain other advantages, supply technical 
information, or rely on their presumably greater political and technical expertise in order 
to decide how to use that information most effectively and what decisions would be 
favourable for the energy sector. 
 
There is a growing body of literature on government-business relations in China, but 
much of it is oriented in a way that does not fully address issues of lobbying behaviour. 
These studies have examined the actors who are most likely to be vehicles of political 
change: private entrepreneurs. State-owned enterprises and MNCs are usually 
disregarded because they are not expected to be in the political vanguard. 
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It is widely presumed that companies go into the political sphere because this could 
benefit business procedures (i.e., they could benefit from certain opportunities or 
leverage resources to their advantage), or as a reaction to government-related threats. 
There are normative presumptions that business interests may or not be in the direct 
public interest, businesses dedicate vast resources to gaining political leverage, and 
this political leverage is turning out in their direct favour. However, these observations 
do not amount to a theory of business politics. Existing work has established the 
plausibility of the argument that companies use politics strategically, and while the 
process may involve many actors, the company’s ability to modify ongoing processes 
in its favour occurs within the limits and constraints of state-society relations. When 
and how companies engage in business politics is an open question and, overall, of a 
discretionary nature. Existing work on business politics does assign companies an 
active role in the policy process (e.g., interest concentration in legislative processes). 
Additionally, different studies have analysed the role of companies in campaign 
financing across different national contexts (e.g. POWELL, 2012). 
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3 INDUSTRY-LEVEL DETERMINANTS: ELECTRICITY SECTORS IN BRAZIL AND 
CHINA 
 
This chapter helps to establish the background for the analysis of SGCC business in 
Brazil that is discussed in Chapter 6 through a brief examination of the development of 
electricity policy in Brazil and China since the beginning of this century. The main goal 
of this chapter is to explain how the electricity policy grew from uncertain beginnings in 
the early 2000s to shaping state-business relations in both countries. The origins of the 
formal or informal institutional pattern of state-business relations in the electricity sector 




3.1 State-business relations in the energy sector 
 
The history of electricity policy in Brazil and China have some interesting parallels. 
Policymakers in the power sector faced structural challenges and increasing energy 
consumption. Making the sectors competitive involved a number of serious hurdles: 
most scholars would agree that energy policy is a ‘contested field’. Energy policy is not 
a neutral subject; rather, it is subject to various competing interests, actors, and 
institutions since, for example, the electricity sector is a vital input to goods and 
services of national economies, as well as an important fraction of national GDP itself. 
With economic growth, electricity demand increases. Emerging economies are 
predicted to have to significantly scale up their investments in electricity from the $240 
billion they spend each year to $495 billion annually between 2015 and 2040 for a total 
of $13 trillion. This raises different issues central to the ownership, financing, and 
delivery of energy infrastructure. In China, an annual growth rate of around 10% meant 
an electricity demand increase of approximately 12% annually from 2002 to 2012, and 
almost triple the per capita consumption of electricity over this period (WEF, 2016). For 
the same period, the economic growth and electricity demand for Brazil increased by 
approximately 4% annually (WEF, 2016). 
 
Comparative studies on specific fields of the energy sector can further distil the 
elements shaping the national contexts. In the 1990s, debates on the role of public 
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development finance in the energy sector focused on low-performing public utilities, 
resulting in the decline of World Bank funding in the field of electricity sector investment. 
By 1993, the World Bank issued a policy paper analysing poor performance, 
deteriorating finance, and the wider macro-economic impacts, leading to the proposal 
of private-sector participation: in other words, reform implementation became a 
prerequisite for lending (WORLD BANK, 1993). The foundations of the reforms of the 
power sector were laid in the US in the 1970s when new competition laws targeting 
unbundling were introduced through which independent power producers were able to 
sell electricity to investor-owned utilities. While the role of the state and market 
coordination in the context of this economic liberalisation in the US, followed by other 
countries with advanced economies such as the UK, has generated substantial debate, 
what is relevant here is that the trust in the market as a platform for economic 
coordination introduced changes in the electricity markets across a number of countries, 
renegotiating the role of the state in coordinating economic activities, even with a 
considerable degree of variation across countries (ERDOGDU, 2013). 
 
In the beginning of the 2000s, debates on power sector reforms exposed the energy 
sector as a contested industrial segment. Even though it happened at different 
moments in time, sectorial stakeholders in both Brazil and China issued their concerns 
when it came to decide on the different degrees of liberalisation, deregulation, 
unbundling, and privatisation of SOEs, altering structures and functions of the industrial 
sector (VICTOR AND HELLER, 2007), and deciding how the energy market should be 
structured. As described in the subsequent parts of this chapter, these structural 
changes laid the foundations on which the companies would operate and concerning 
whom they would relate to, including principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures. 
 
The reform of the energy sector was implemented in Brazil and China in verydifferent 
ways. For example, Hsueh (2011) has analysed how macro-level liberalisation in China 
was cyclical and accompanied by ‘sectoral reregulation’ of strategic industries 
considered vital to national security or holding a strategic value due to technology 
intensity, etc. On the other hand, in Brazil, privatisation has been handled at a different 
speed across several administrations through different measures, either by selling 
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public companies or through the transference of the share control of mixed companies 
to MNCs and investors. 
 
The following table describes the basic features of recent reform efforts in the Chinese 
and Brazilian electricity industry. 
 
 
Table 3.1 - Electricity industry structures and forms of ownership, regulation, 
and competition 
 Brazil China 
Industry Model Corporatised Corporatised 
Ownership of generation Mixed private and state State 
Ownership of transmission Mixed State 
Ownership of distribution Mixed State 
Key legislation Federal State and federal 
Form of regulator Competitive market oversight Price regulation 
Regulators MME, ANEEL, CNPE, CMSE NDRC, State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission 
Extent of competition Limited, periodic auctions Competition to build new power 
plants, but not for dispatch 
Retrieved from: Wilson et al, 2015 
 
 
To understand the differences, we examined studies on renewable energy policy 
studies, a comparative field of China-Brazil relations which has been relatively well 
explored. In her comparative study on the drivers and barriers of solar energy 
development in Brazil and China, Gilmanova (2018) has confirmed that Brazil adopted 
market-led development with solar energy auctions and net-metering systems as a 
policy driver, while China followed a state development path with a feed-in tariff system 
for large-scale and distributed generation, as well as the PV Top Runner Program, a 
state-driven programme designed to encourage developers to invest in innovative 
technologies. 
 
A similar approach has also been taken in the recent paper ‘Wind and Solar Power in 
Brazil and China: Interests, State–Business Relations, and Policy Outcomes’, in which 
Hochstetler and Kostka (2015) have assessed the business relations in Brazil and 
China in the context of the two countries’ respective renewable sectors. Institutional 
differences were responsible for generating differing outcomes: in China, corporatist 
state-business relations implied that state interventions were deeper. In the case of 
China, the authors have drawn attention to the corporatist state-business relations with 
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the domain of the state and the proximity to the state-driven business (SOES or mixed 
ownership forms), an authoritarian decentralised governance structure between local 
and central governments, market control, and businesses’ need to main intimate 
relationships with the state. In contrast, these authors have portrayed Brazilian state- 
business relations in the renewables sector as a hybrid ‘between national public 
planning, procurement, and financing agencies and an increasingly private sector’ 
(HOCHSTETLER AND KOSTKA, 2015, p. X). 
 
With the state-business relations at the centre of attention for analysis, the pre- 
conditions for firms in both contexts raise interesting questions about the changes and 
challenges for firms to operate in different market and policy environments. While this 
dissertation does not focus on an energy source, but rather on a segment in the 
electrical power industry, the way market and state actors interact reflects the general 
choices made by the energy system. As a result, corporate relations move within the 
possibilities and constraints of the macro and sectorial conditions and arrangements to 




3.2 China’s electric power sector 
 
This section proceeds with a review of China’s energy sector, its evolution, and its 
actors, and then discusses how the global rise of the sector’s SOEs has impacted 
business-state relations. The section ends with an assessment of the relation between 
the public sector and firm internationalisation under the conditions of the party-state 
relations. To begin with, China’s 13th Five-Year Plan for Electric Power Development/ 
’ ’ (2016–2020)  called  for  stronger  participation  of  Chinese 
companies in electrical sectors overseas. In a context where the country has already 
become a major investor and provider of energy goods and services abroad, its energy 
sector and the way industry and state-owned business in the party state structures 
function and develop reveal the foundations of the functioning of the sector and the 
ambition for its internationalisation. 
 
These guidelines also reveal that China’s energy sector is constantly on the move. To 
begin with, China’s power sector experienced major reform efforts in the early 2000s. 
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Horizontal or vertical unbundling in the energy sector follows split core business units 
of distribution, generation, and transmission into entities differing in terms of legal and 
operational aspects. Electricity sector reforms are nothing new, and the discussion of 
energy sector reform in China can be put in context with reforms of other economies at 
the beginning of the early 2000s (LEI, 2018). There is an abundance of literature on the 
energy sector in China covering different aspects of reforms (CUNNINGHAM, 2015; 
YAO, 2015), energy sectors such as oil, renewables (HOCHSTETLER AND KOSTKA, 
2015), and the electricity market. This section focuses on the electric power sector. 
 
In China, continuous reforms of the electricity sector created a playing field of gradual 
reform efforts with many institutional struggles between the institutional actors 
(Cunningham, 2015). In 2002, the State Council issued the ‘State Council notification 
on the electrical power system reform plan’ ( ێ ᶐො ) 
– Document No. 5. This document significantly impacted state enterprises, implying 
that companies had to unbundle their traditional monopolistic asset arrangements and 
move towards upstream and downstream market competition between various state- 
owned actors (SAMPSON, 2016; CUNNINGHAM, 2015). The corporatisation of the 
state industry further implied the drive for the SOEs to deliver higher economic profit, 
while corporate management and career progress of senior staff would be based on 
increased performance. Resulting from the reform process, too, was the institutional 
structure of the state industry, where mandates often overlapped and crossed specific 
sector and cross-sector issues.16 Further steps towards reform were undertaken in 




Overview of industrial policy in China’s electricity industry 
 
In the decades preceding economic reform, ownership, control, and management in 
the electricity industry were operated by government and followed political goals 
negotiated at the central level (SAMPSON, 2016; XU, 2016). Electricity production and 
distribution were organised within the state-operated plants and transmission system, 
which operated according to projections of demand and political estimation esteems. 
 
16 Interview with former employee, NDRC Department of Foreign Investment, 2017. 
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In the following two decades, restructuring in the power sector was part of an effort to 
alleviate ongoing problems with power shortages and inefficient power distribution, 
which were generally believed to result from a faulty arrangement of the government 
institutions responsible for devising and implementing economic policies (SAMPSON, 
2016). 
 
Andrews-Speed (2013) has added that during these different phases, administration 
over the electricity industry shifted between different ministries with varying scopes of 
authority, including the Ministry of Fossil Fuels (until 1955) and the Ministry of Water 
Ressources and Electric Power (MWREP), which was repeatedly dissolved and 
reinstated throughout the 1960s and 1970s, interrupted by brief periods in which the 
separate Ministry of Electric Power existed. The Ministry of Energy (MoE) was created 
in 1988 and disintegrated in 1993 due to administrative and operational overlapping 
with the State Planning Commission (SPC), leading to bureaucratic stalemate and 
inefficiency. Later, the re-emergence of a separate Ministry of Electric Power (MEP) 
subordinate to the State Council-reporting SPC once again changed the administration 
and operation of the electricity sector by diving its government and commercial 
functions, implying that micro-economic energy planning, policymaking and 
supervision were all exercised by the entity, leaving macro-level decisions to the SPC 
(SAMPSON, 2016; XU, 2016). 
 
The next round of reforms in China in the 1990s focused on efficiency in terms of both 
bureaucracy and industry towards the greater separation between administration and 
enterprises whereby property rights were tackled and efforts towards commercialising 
SOEs were further advanced by transforming parts of former ministries into companies, 
specifically SOEs. In 1997, the Electric Power Ministry was corporatised into the State 
Power Corporation of China (SPCC), and the electric power bureaus at lower 
administrative levels were corporatised as subsidiaries (CUNNINGHAM, 2015; 
SAMPSON, 2016). 
 
With these profound changes in the industrial structure, the electric power department 
of the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) replaced the regulatory and 
policymaking functions. Despite these changes, however, various authors have 
emphasised that the relationship between the SETC and the SPCC remained very tight, 
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resulting in SETC’s difficulties in maintaining authority (SAMPSON, 2016, 
CUNNINGHAM, 2015). 
 
The following table describes the basic features of recent reform efforts in the Chinese 
and Brazilian electricity industry. 
 
Figure 3.1 - Timeline stages of electricity sector restructuring 
 
 
Retrieved from: An et a, 2015, p.6 
 
 
In 2002, the Power System Reform  Plan ( ێ ᶐො ), 
issued by the State Council introduced a marketisation agenda and was received as a 
breakthrough step towards reorganising the industry. According to Lei et al. (2018, p.3), 
the reform divided the power generation and grid elements. Five SOEs – China Guodian 
Corporation, China Huaneng Group, China Datang Corporation, China Huadian 
Corporation, and State Power Investment Corporation – were given domain over the 
generation segment, while the grid was split between SGCC and China Southern Power 
Grid Company Limited (CSG). While SGCC takes care of the majority of China’s 
territory, CSG operates the grid in the provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, 
Guizhou, and Hainan. The reform efforts created the possibility of competition of SOEs, 
targeting both the quality of service and industrial development (SAMPSON, 2016). 
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The mandate to supervise the marketisation agenda was given to the 2002 Electricity 
System Reform Working Group ( ێ ᶐૡ ੜ ) and then transferred to 
the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC), also under the overall oversight 
of the State Council. In 2003, the SERC was mandated to formulate proposals for 
market regulation. In the context of the restructuring, the adjustment of the government 
functions exercised a strong influence on the sector and on firm behaviour, because 
the decision-making environment had become more diversified. The National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) took the place of the State 
Development Planning Commission in 2003 and has since become one of the most 
important line ministries. The NDRC is in charge of macro-economic planning and 
several other functions related to energy policymaking, including price-setting authority 
(wholesale retail) and investment approval. 
 
Apart from various specific stakeholders – including MOFCOM, MOF, MOST, 
Environmental Protection, the Ministry of Land and Resources, etc. – having specific 
roles in the energy industry, the reform continued to drive changes. Since the scope of 
the reform was wide and required stronger coordination, the high-level staffed National 
Energy Leading Group (NELG, ੜ ) was inaugurated to coordinate the 
energy efforts and further formulate recommendations for the energy policy; in 2008, 
the NELG was replaced by the State Energy Commission (SEC, ). With 
the administrative reforms advancing, the energy bureau of the NDRC was 
institutionalised into the National Energy Administration (NEA, ), holding 
vice-ministerial rank and being responsible to coordinate the efforts of the energy 
sector management. With a broad ranging mandate, the NEA remains one of the most 
powerful energy sector regulators in China, with duties including management of the 
energy industry, planning and promotion of research and development, FDI approval, 
and negotiation with international energy agencies. 
 
Following the post-2008 reforms, the following administrative structure emerged: 
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Figure 3.2 - Administrative structures of the Chinese electricity sector 
 
Retrieved from: Xu, 2016 
 
Apart from the regulatory bodies, the administration of the state-owned assets requires 
further attention. State-owned assets are managed by the SASAC, and in this regard, 
the role of the SASC is less on the industrial level and more on the company level. This 
section then introduces the role and responsibilities of SASAC and how its actions can 
impact firm decision-making processes. 
 
The SASAC was established in 2003 during the overall restructuring effort to proceed 
the division between government and the SOEs. In 2017, the SASAC received 
between 5% and 15% of its companies’ annual net profits in the form of dividends, 
which it accumulates into a ‘state capital management budget’ ( ) 
drawn up by the SASAC and overseen by the Ministry of Finance (MoF). 
 
The SASAC is an institution under the direct management of the State Council, while 
members are appointed by the organisation department ( ) of the CCP. 
According to the SASAC official website, the responsibilities of the agency include the 
following tasks: 
 
• Supervising and managing the state-owned assets of centrally administered 
SOEs, performing investor responsibilities, and supervising and managing the 
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state-owned assets of the enterprises under the supervision of the central 
government; 
• Having the responsibility of supervising the preservation and increment of the 
value of the state-owned assets of the supervised enterprises, including (1) 
establishing and improving the index system of the preservation and increment 
of the value of the state-owned assets, (2) supervising and administrating the 
preservation and increase of the value of the state-owned assets of the 
supervised enterprises through statistics and auditing, and (3) establishing and 
implementing policies related to management of wages and remuneration of the 
supervised enterprises and regulations of the income distribution of the top 
executives. 
 
As Sampson (2016) and Xu (2016) have noted, it has to be mentioned that the 
executive management of SOEs that the SASAC can define comes from the 
aforementioned organisation department of the CCP, including the board of directors, 
general manager, and deputy positions. This is important because it means that there 
is a personal connection between the performance of the companies and the incentives 
at managerial and personal levels. 
 
Further responsibilities include the following: 
 
• Take charge of the reform and restructuring of the SOEs, guiding and pushing 
the reform and restructuring, advancing the establishment of modern enterprise 
systems, and establishing corporate governance; 
• Taking charge of the appointment and removal of the supervised enterprises, 
giving rewards and penalties according to performance, establishing a 
corporate executive selection system in accordance with the requirements of 
the socialist market economy system and modern enterprise system; 
• Taking charge of the daily management of supervisory panels; 
• Taking charge of the relevant work of state-owned capital operational budgets, 
being responsible for organising the supervised enterprise to turn state-owned 
capital gain over to the state, participating in formulating the management 
system and methods of the state-owned capital operational budget; 
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• Driving supervised enterprises to apply the guiding policies, principles, laws, 
and regulations; 
• Taking charge of the fundamental management of the state-owned assets of 
enterprises, drafting laws and regulations on the management of state-owned 
assets, and establishing related rules and regulations. 
 
The SASAC has approval responsibility when it comes to acquisitions or investments.17 
 
According to the National Bureau of Statistic of China (2016), the number of companies 
supervised by the SASAC has decreased from 196 (2003) to 102 (2016), while their 
size and profitability has increased dramatically. Many of the companies guided by the 
SASAC combined their highest quality assets into subsidiary firms that were 
subsequently listed on domestic and international stock exchanges to raise capital 
(although majority ownership of the subsidiaries, and full ownership of the mother 
companies, remained with the SASAC). In the electricity industry, this applies to all of 
the ‘Big Five’ power generation companies, but not to the two grid companies, which 
remain under full SASAC ownership. 
 
According to Cunningham (2009), while regulations relating to ownership of Chinese 
domestic energy assets are tightening, rules governing the growth of outward FDI have 
increasingly liberalised to allow a wider range of firms and regulators increased breadth 
in approval and to lower institutional barriers to capital outflow (Cunningham, 2009). 
This diversification of actors and decentralisation of approval has supported increased 















17 Interview with official of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, 2016. 
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3.3 Brazil’s electric power sector 
 
The following provides an overview of the Brazilian power sector, including the 
administrative and regulatory moves relevant to SGCC’s market entry and the relevant 
institutional actors. 
 
Here, the most important developments and entities are briefly introduced in the 
context of the sectorial reform steps that took place in 2004. In Brazil, the late 1990s 
and early 2000s witnessed the exhausted investment capacity of the state-dominated 
model, demanding changes towards greater efficiency of the system in order to 
balance both public and private capital within a competitive market environment. At the 
same time, the energy crisis of 2001 developed into a national crisis, severely 
impacting electricity distribution and supply. This crisis was caused by a lack of 
investment and planning in the generation segment. Apart from the economic impact, 
the consequences were political. During the presidential campaign the crisis was used 





Adjustments of the Brazilian electricity sector in the context of the Lula 
government: The context of Laws Nr. 10.848 and 10.847 
 
Since the Brazilian Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT) partially relied on 
conservative entrepreneurs and sectors for its election, the party made commitments 
that prevented ruptures with existing public policies, including privatisation policies and 
the fragmentation of the electricity sector in business units (generation, transmission, 
and distribution). After the 2002 parliamentary election, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, or 
Lula, succeeded Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party 
(Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira – PSDB) as president, and the new 
government not only introduced new regulations on the role of public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) but it also began to look into restructuring the electricity sector 
(GOMES ET. AL, 2015). 
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2003 was marked by extensive discussions between the entities of the sector and the 
federal government, represented by the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), to design 
and implement what was called the ‘New Model of the Electricity Sector’. In February 
2003, the federal government through the MME established a working group to advise 
on the formulation and implementation of the institutional reform of the electricity sector. 
The work carried out by this group is detailed in the document entitled ‘Institutional 
Model of the Electric Sector’ published by the MME on December 11, 2003. The 
proposed model established three main objectives: ‘to guarantee the security of 
electricity supply’, ‘promote tariff modality through the efficient contracting of energy for 
regulated consumers’, and ‘promote social insertion in the Electricity Sector, in 
particular through universal service programs’ (MINISTRY OF MINES AND ENERGY, 
2003, p.7). The model was implemented based on Provisional Measures n. 144 and n. 
145 in December 2003. While the first changed the institutional and regulatory 
frameworks of the sector, and the second approved the creation of the Energy 
Research Company (EPE). The new model introduced the following changes: 
 
• The resumption of the role of the executive as granting authority, previously 
performed by ANEEL and transferred to the MME; 
• The restructuring of medium and long-term planning through the EPE and 
monitoring of competition in the generation segment with the bidding for the 
lowest tariff; 
• The long-term redirection of energy contracting compatible with the amortisation 
of investments made; 
• The creation of two energy contracting environments: a free and a regulated 
one; 
• The untying of the distribution service of any other activity; 
• The establishment of a conjunctural reserve to re-establish the conditions of 
balance between supply and demand and the establishment of a regulated 
energy contracting pool to be purchased by the distributors. 
 
In this regard, the new regulatory framework of the Brazilian electric sector, which was 
established by Acts no. 10847 and 10848 in 2004 under the Lula government, is 
oriented to long, medium, and short-term sector planning functions in order to 
guarantee energy supply, promote tariff modality, and strengthen the existing agencies. 
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The government returned energy planning to a central, government-led role (GOMES 







Figure 3.3 - Institutional agents of the Brazilian electricity sector 
Retrieved from: Tomalsquim, 2012, p. 31 
 
According to Tomalsquim (2012, p. 34), the separation between government and 
regulatory activities explains why on the one hand political guidelines (government and 
majority in Congress) are followed in Brazil’s power sector, while on the other hand 
ongoing stable and autonomous activities must continue unhampered by circumstantial 
aspects. This is the context that required legislative adaptations to the spheres of the 
competence of the regulator, as is explained below. Due to the importance of Brazil’s 
power sector, the government (political power) must also remain keenly aware of the 
progress of construction works and facilities in this sector, which is why the Power 
Sector Monitoring Committee (CMSE) was established. In the following section, the 
structure and actors of the sector are briefly introduced. Law no. 10,848/2004 
significantly altered the regulatory framework of the Brazilian electricity sector and 
resulted in the institutional structure still prevailing today with its functions 
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and institutions is organised as follows (GOMES ET. AL, 2015; TOMALSQUIM 2012; 
ANEEL, 2017): 
 
• The National Council for Energy Policy (Conselho Nacional de Política 
Energética – CNPE) is an advisory body for the President of the Republic, the 
function of which is to formulate energy policies and guidelines with a view to: 
promoting the rational use of the country’s energy resources, ensure the supply 
of energy to the most remote areas of the country, and provide a periodic review 
of the country’s energy matrix. 
• The MME is an organ of the federal government that represents the Union as 
Granting Authority and is responsible for conducting the country’s energy 
policies. Its tasks are to formulate and implement policies for the energy sector 
in accordance with the guidelines defined by the CNPE. It is also responsible 
for defining the planning of the Brazilian electricity sector, monitoring the 
security of supply through the CMSE, and determining preventive actions to 
restore security of supply in case of conjuncture imbalances between supply 
and demand of energy. 
• The CMSE is a committee created in the ambit of the MME with the participation 
of representatives of ANEEL, CCEE, the EPE, and ONS, and its main objective 
is to ensure continuous and safe supply to the electric power market of the 
country. In the case of conjuncture imbalances between supply and demand, it 
may propose preventive measures to restore adequate levels of security at the 
lowest cost to the consumer. 
• The National Electric Energy Agency (ANEEL) is an entity linked to the MME 
whose duties are determined by Law no. 9,427/1996, which was constituted by 
Decree no. 2,335/1997. Its main duties are (i) to regulate and supervise the 
generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electric energy; (ii) to ensure 
the quality of the services provided, the universalisation of service, and the 
establishment of tariffs for final consumers, and to preserve the economic and 
financial feasibility of agents and industry; and (iii) to directly or indirectly 
promote the auctions for the contracting of electric energy by the distributors 
within the scope of the ACR, currently carried out by the CCEE, under the 
supervision of the ANEEL. 
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• The EPE, which is linked to the MME and was instituted by Law no. 10,847/2004. 
The purpose of the EPE is to provide services in the area of studies and research 
aimed at subsidising the planning of the energy sector, such as studies and 
projections of the Brazilian energy matrix; analyses of the technical-economic 
and socio-environmental viability of power plants; obtaining the previous 
environmental license for hydroelectric and electric power transmission projects; 
elaboration of studies that propitiate the planning of the expansion of the 
generation and transmission of electric energy in the short, medium, and long 
term; and execution of studies that propitiate the integrated planning of resource 
energy. 
• The National Operator of the Electric System (ONS) is an institution created by 
Law no. 9,648/1998 and regulated by Decree no. 2,655/1998, with amendments 
via Decree no. 5,081/2004. This body is responsible for operating, supervising, 
and controlling the generation of electric energy within the scope of the SIN and 
managing the basic network of electric power transmission in Brazil. The ONS 
operates under the ANEEL. 
• The Electric Energy Trading Chamber (Câmara de Comercialização de Energia 
Elétrica – CCEE) is a non-profit civil association made up of agents that operate 
in the electricity purchase and sale market. Its function is the accounting and 
settlement of electric energy purchase and sale operations, along with monthly 
calculation of the differences between the amounts contracted and those 
effectively generated or consumed by market agents. To this end, the CCEE 
records contracts signed by buyers and sellers of electricity and measures the 
physical amounts of energy moved by agents. The CCEE is also responsible for 
the calculation of the LDP; the development, improvement, and dissemination 
to market participants of energy trading standards; the promotion of auctions for 
the purchase and sale of energy under the ACR; and the management of the 
contracts signed in these auctions. Since 01/04/2014, the CCEE has been 
responsible for the administration of the ACR account intended to cover 
extraordinary expenses of electricity distributors (CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF ELECTRIC ENERGY, 2014). 
 
Given the above outlined actor structure, in terms of interest representation and 
corporate interest consolidation, the Brazilian electric sector can be accessed in the 
88 
 
following spheres: a) the National Congress (law projects, public hearings, etc.), b) the 
executive branch and the ANEEL (ordinances, CMSE minutes, resolutions, 
despatches, etc.), and c) sectoral institutions (the ONS, CCEE, EPE, and environmental 
organs) concerned with energy balance and subsystem flows, auctions, tariff 
readjustments, and revisions. As we will see in the case study, foreign companies 
mostly draw on b) and c) in order to interact with the state structures. 
 
When it comes to the specific operation structures of the segments, energy 
transmission is separate from generation, commercialisation, and distribution. 
Companies maintain contracts with distributors, transmitters, and the ONS, which is 
responsible for managing transmission services in Brazil, including remunerating the 
transmitters through the allowed annual revenue. The payment of revenues derives 
from charges for the use of the transmission system paid by consumers and users and 
collected by the ONS based on contractually agreed-upon amounts of usage. All of 
these charges are calculated by the ANEEL and form the total RAP of the transmission 
companies. To become a new transmission concessionaire, the company must be the 
winner of a transmission auction by offering the highest RAP discount through an 
auction held by the ANEEL or must acquire a previously auctioned concession on the 
market, provided that the transfer of ownership is approved by the ANEEL. Oliveira 
(2007) has argued that democracy and political stability played an important role in 
increasing the electrification rate in Brazil and facilitated the gradual adaptation of 
power sector reforms. 
 
Moreover, before launching into privatisation, strong regulatory foundations acted as a 
precursor to attract private capital. The wider political context in Brazil in the 2000s 
during the terms of both Lula and Rousseff was characterised by a pro-business stance 
since, for example, public-private partnerships in electricity generation shaped the 
enabling environment for firms. 18 The revenues of the transmission agents are 
therefore defined at the time of granting the concession according to a ceiling revenue 
model; these revenues, calculated based on the necessary investments, their 
adequate remuneration, and the cost associated with the required quality of service, 
are adjusted annually according to economic indexes defined in the contract and may 
 
 
18 Interview with energy transmission expert, University of Sao Paulo, 2017. 
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or may not be subject to periodic reviews (depending on the date of grant due to 




3.4 Sectorial reforms, privatization and entry of foreign capital 
 
Foreign capital plays a vital role in the Brazilian electricity market. The shifting interests 
of states in certain economic sectors and the growing number of companies and actors 
interested in participating change the nature of the market relations as a process of 
ongoing changes. Since privatisations in the 1990s, there has been significant 
participation of foreign capital in Brazil’s economic infrastructure sectors, including the 
energy, oil and gas, and telecommunication sectors, with the latter two being among 
the main recipients of FDI in the country in the last 10 years (SÁ AND MEDEIROS, 
2006; SÁ, 2011). This for example can be seen by the participation in the capital types 
by the M&A enterprise value in the generation, transmission and distribution segment 
between 2016 and 2018, reflecting the increasing participation of foreign capital (both 
state and private) in the Brazilian energy sector: 
 
Figure 3.4 - Participation in the capital types by M&A enterprise value in the 
generation, transmission and distribution segment: 2016 - 2018 (R$ Billion) 
 
 
In Brazil, the opening of the sector reflects the need to relieve critical power restraints 
and to improve technical efficiency. It was in 1995 through the Concession Law, the 
Electric Sector Law, and EC No. 6 that there was legal certainty definitively allowing 
the entry of foreign capital into t he sector. The creation of the ANEEL in 1996 also 
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favoured the entry of foreign investors in this market by withdrawing from the MME the 
powers to inspect the provision of services, the definition of tariffs for the use of 
distribution systems, and the resolution of potential conflicts between the granting 
authority and private operators, among other functions (ANEEL, 2008). 
 
Concerning companies in the sector, the MME defines strategies and guidelines such 
as the need for bids and privatisations, including for example energy-marketed or 
privatisation of some system that the ministry itself does not think is more appropriate 
to maintain control (ABREU, 1999). These definitions are important in defining 
company strategies for the sector. At the same time, the role of expert knowledge 
arises as a critical resource in the energy sector, because state actors in the auctions 
must also listen to firms’ requirements since the firms respond to government auctions 
and are dependent on the conditions for participation to generate private sector 
interest.19 This turns the access of firm interests to the energy sector institutions 
involved is a necessary condition to guarantee the operation of the transmission sector 
in the long run.20 
 
As the following chapters show, from the firm perspective, the competitive environment 
resulting from the market reforms in China enabled the Chinese companies in the 
sector to profit from technology transfer from foreign MNCs, upgrade their equipment 
and gain valuable operating experience in China, specifically with the hybrid UHV AC 
[alternating current] and DC [direct current] grid 21. In Brazil, investment promotion by 
the Brazilian government, including the Brazilian Agency for the Promotion of Exports 
and Investments (Apex-Brasil); the National Investment Information Network (RENAI), 
belonging to the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC); the Civil 
House Commission to encourage private productive investment (Sala de 
Investimentos) and the Department of Trade Promotion of (DPR), of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, aimed to attract international companies to the market. 22 This 
welcoming attitude, including high-level support by state leaders and ministers, further 




19 Interview with ANEEL employee, 2018. 
20 Interview with former employee of the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy, 2018. 
21 Interview with State Grid Research Institute Employee, 2016. 
22 Interwiew with APEX representative, 2018. 
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In addition, several structural elements of the state-business environment impacted on 
the increasing participation of foreign, specifically Chinese companies in the energy 
transmission segment. Both countries face similar structural constraints, including 
increasing energy consumption and large distances between generation and 
consumer centres. In the transmission segment, both countries have the largest 
transmission systems in the world. 
 
The energy shortages in the beginning of the 2000s in both countries were critical 
junctures that acted as triggers for changes in the electricity system and institutions 
governing the sector.23 Concerning the political-institutional environment, the sectorial 
environment relevant to the transmission sector demonstrates fundamental differences 
in the state-business relations. In China, the transmission sector is state-driven with 
targets and guidelines. Private sector participation is nearly inexistent24 , because 
SOEs dominate and can draw on multiple sources of state support, and a combination 
of different institutional issues such as ministerial turf wars, overlapping coordination, 
etc. enable state-owned companies to emerge as policy actors. At the same time, 
strategic efforts of local, central, and provincial levels of the government further fuel 
the policy dynamics, pushing for change at local levels.25 Firm participation is informal. 
In contrast, state-business relations in Brazil are characterised by state-private sector 
interaction and a clear separation of responsibilities between the sectorial actors in 
terms of political, regulatory, and research/demand-related inputs. In turn, this creates 
more opportunities for firms to build on advantages and capabilities to participate in, 
access, or obtain relevant resources.26 At the same time, the industry-level state- 
business relations in which foreign companies are embedded rather formal and open 
in terms of market participation. Lastly, the strong Chinese presence in the Brazilian 
energy sector requires a look beyond the electricity power industry as a strategically 
important sector of the countries’ economies. In order to understand how companies 
in China, as central level large firms emerged and established themselves as actors in 
the internationalisation process and interacted both with the FDI attraction by Brazil 
and the FDI promotion and `going out` policy guidance issued by the Chinese state. 
 
 
23 Interview with official at the National Energy Administration, 2016. 
24 For the role on foreign companies and private sector in China, see Kellee (2007). 
25 Interview with energy strategy expert, 2017. 
26 Interview with representative of Brazilian Ministry of Planning, 2018. 
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4 FIRM-LEVEL DETERMINANTS: SOE INTERNATIONALISATION IN CHINA 
 
Political economy literature has argued persuasively that the recognition that ownership 
is separated from decision-making authority requires examination of how decisions are 
made on both sides of the relationship between the SOES and the state, rather than 
assuming that ‘state ownership means state direct control (XU, 2016). The Chinese 
state industry has concentrated on few strategic sectors, culminating in what Pei (2006) 
has denominated ‘selective withdrawal’. The industrial policy regime underpins the 
internationalisation process, which created the powerful entities of SOEs. China's SOE 
internationalisation created powerful emerging market firms that operated across 
continents, which formed the backdrop of pro-market reforms in several industrial 
sectors in the 90s and 2000s. According to SASAC, the value of overseas assets held 
by China's centrally owned SOEs has exceeded 6 trillion yuan ($1.2 trillion) and 
comprises investments in more than 185 countries and regions. Political status and 
strong embeddedness in the domestic institutional and industrial context has formed 
the foundations of all SOEs’ internationalisation attempts. This chapter provides an 
overview of central SOE development trajectory in the state economy and the 




4.1 SOE consolidation after opening-up 
 
State-owned enterprises remained vital players in the Chinese economy. These 
companies originated from the planned economy under Mao Zedong, when a central 
planning regime held strong control over production and factor allocations. State- 
owned enterprises were regarded as work units that generated the main industrial 
output. In the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping initiated an ‘open door’ economic policy while 
promoting systematic economic reforms, thereby spearheading China’s market 
economy transition. This also implied reform of SOEs, and the government decided 
that it would aim for gradual reform of SOEs: The reforms were to be achieved through 
ownership reform or restructuring and sought to increase competition, resolve 
managerial issues, and enact institutional changes. The government opted for gradual 




During the 1980s, SOE reform focused on increasing the exposure of SOEs to market 
competition. Competitive exposure involved the use of township and village enterprises 
(TVEs) and incentive schemes for SOE workers and management to encourage 
productivity and efficiency. The use of a dual track approach as a means of market 
liberalization involved a market space being introduced as a niche in the planned 
system (BENNETT, DIXON AND HU, 2008). This granted the SOEs autonomy to sell 
output beyond established quotas and hence keep the margins. This system was 
maintained until a transition to the market economy as a national development 
objective in the context of the price reform in 1992. 
 
Despite the effect of the latter in shaping the slow beginning of liberalisation efforts, 
SOE profitability was hampered by the organisational and regulatory surroundings; 
managers had to attain specific revenue targets under the 'contract responsibility 
system', and large price differentials created incentives for arbitrage gains. Each SOE 
underwent its own negotiation of the profit tax rate. Together with the composition of 
different public entities as ownership representatives, this resulted in rent-seeking and 
detachment from the direct mandate of the SOE. It was only in 1990s, when the 1993 
company law provided a legal foundation for SOEs, that SOEs could be corporatised 
into shareholding companies with a modern corporate board structure that could 
nonetheless be easily constrained by the chairman. Ownership diversification was 
limited because the state remained the majority stakeholder of most listed corporations, 
and shares were non-tradable until 2005. 
 
During the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the preparation for China's 2001 WTO 
accession, SOE reform was continued between 1998 and 2002. The slogan 'Grasp the 
big, let go of the small' was adopted, and many small SOEs underwent privatisation at 
local government level, drawing on management buyouts, share issue privatisation, 
and joint ventures with foreign firms and mergers. It was in this context that the central 
and provincial government entities withdrew from competitive sectors but kept control 
of pillar and strategic industries while merging large SOEs into conglomerates. The 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administrative Commission (SASAC) was 
founded in 2003 to act as a shareholder and regulator of non-financial SOEs. State- 
owned enterprises were large contributors to China’s going out policy in the early 2000s 
because SOEs were supported by the policy banks. The prominence of the 
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SOEs was further backed by the 2008 stimulus package that was launched in the face 
of the global financial crisis (ZHENG, 2015, LEUTERT, 2016). 
 
At present, the central SOEs are divided into two categories, depending on size and 
strategic role. The first is a core group of 53 firms known as important backbone state- 
owned enterprises. This group includes many of China’s largest and best-known 
companies such as Sinopec, China Mobile, and State Grid. Due to their varying 
strategic importance and size, these two groups of central SOEs possess different 
administrative ranks. The core 53 state firms are ranked at the vice-ministerial level. 
This provides their top executives with official standing that is equivalent to political 
elites of the same administrative rank, such as provincial party vice-secretaries or 
governors (ZHENG, 2015, LEUTERT, 2016). 
 
The second group comprises the remaining firms - a varied mix of global industry 
players such as Sinosteel, lesser-known companies such as the China National Salt 
Industry Corporation, and state-run research institutes such as the General Research 
Institute for Nonferrous Metals. The remaining centrally owned firms have department- 
level rank. Administrative rank confers important political privileges that can enhance 
executives’ ability to advocate for benefits to their companies such as licenses or to 
oppose economic policies that would be disadvantageous to their industries. These 
political privileges include access to documents of varying grades of classification, 
invitations to meetings for officials of a certain rank, and the opportunity to participate 
in study groups and further training at the Central Party School of the Chinese 
Communist Party (ZHENG, 2015, PANG, 2014, LEUTERT, 2016). 
 
 




Defence, power generation and 
distribution, oil and petrochem, 
telecom, coal, civil aviation, 
shipping 
Maintaining 100% state ownership or absolute 




Machinery, auto, IT, construction, 
steel, base metals, chemicals, land 
surveying, R&D 
Absolute or conditional relative controlling 
stake; enhancing   the influence   of state 
ownership even as the ownership share is 
reduced where appropriate 
Other Trading, investment, medicine, 
construction materials, agriculture, 
geological exploration 
Maintaining necessary influence by controlling 
stakes in key companies; in non-key companies 
state ownership will be clearly 
reduced 
Retrieved from: Conway et al, 2010 
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In 2013, the reform of SOES was debated at the Third Plenum Reform. The discussion 
concluded that SOEs should increase international competitiveness. The discussion 
also addressed management systems and governance issues such as SOE 
classification, the establishment of modern enterprise systems, and ownership issues. 
In September 2015, Beijing released long-delayed guiding opinions for reforming state 
firms, which were followed by a series of policy documents. 
 
Three key challenges block the path ahead: deciding when and how to grant market 
forces a greater role, especially after stock market turmoil; aligning managerial 
incentives with firm performance and corporate governance priorities; and overcoming 
company-level obstacles. Continuing to restrict competition in protected sectors while 
merging centrally owned firms will increase these companies’ market share at the risk 
of long-term competitiveness and efficiency gains. Yet such performance concerns are 
a lesser priority for SOEs in strategic industries, where political concerns rather than 
market logic remain paramount. Second, while the Chinese Communist Party under Xi 
is actively exercising its authority to appoint and remove the top leaders of central 





4.2 The political underpinning of the domestic SOE coordination 
 
An examination of the SOEs in China permits a glance at a particular corner of state- 
business relations in China. Domestically, SOEs benefit from direct and indirect 
subsidies for factor costs (notably capital, energy, and land); regulatory preferences; 
preferences under competition law; preferences in public procurement; and restricted 
access and technology transfer for foreign companies because of a highly restrictive 
investment regime. This has allowed them to maintain their position as administrative 
monopolies in a broad range of sectors. However, despite the Chinese leadership’s 
pledge at the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2013 to let the 
market, and thus the growing private sector, to play a 'decisive role' in resource 
allocation, the current reform design suggests that SOEs are likely to retain many of 
their privileges. This will hinder private domestic and foreign firms in their future 
attempts to compete with SOEs on a more equal footing in and outside China. 
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In the case of China, firm embeddedness is shaped by the political economic system, 
which consists of mechanisms between state-business coalitions within a 
decentralised system. Economic embeddedness is closely tied to political 
embeddedness and is associated with close ties to the government. Political 
embeddedness refers to the social embeddedness of firms and especially pertains to 
political actors and institutions. Hence, firms with individual and institutional ties to the 
state at the interpersonal level (managerial ties to political actors) and at 
interorganisational level (organisational ties to political institutions) (SUN, MELLAHI, 
AND THUN, 2010) suggest that in the post-Deng era, increasing factionalism and 
power struggles place SOEs in the middle of these power struggles. This is because 
high-ranking SOE management positions imply upgrades in the party and the state 
structure.27 
 
In the 1990s, SOE increased their political saliency as industrial and regulatory reforms 
were discussed and implemented. In a similar vein, the rise of the SOEs during the 
regulatory reforms in the 1990s implied their growing political relevance in the industrial 
regime. Consequently, SOE leadership, which mostly comprised high-ranking CCP 
members, held greater power in terms of relative impact on industrial policy. In this 
context, Wang (2017) has described China’s SOEs as consisting of a two-pronged 
corporate governance structure: legal governance and political governance, the latter 
of which pertains to the CCP’s control of SOEs. Both structures run separately but 
intersect in the decision-making process (WANG, 2017). Recent literature has 
described the determinants, valuation, and consequences of personal-level political 
connections (e.g., politicians sitting on corporate boards) in emerging economies 
(FACCIO, 2006). Close ties between the state and SOEs are clearly visible in corporate 
governance structures. Unlike private firms, where managers generally report to an 






27 For recent debates on the ongoing SOE reforms, Leutert (2016) stresses re-classifications and the 
articulation for SOE operation and reform in different sectors, central level actors including SASAC and 
state council are fundamental. In this regard however, the different interests of different actors of party, 
government and business cause coordination difficulties (Leutert, 2016). This is for example emblematic 
through the fact SOE executives occupy higher ranks as the regulating agencies, or the high ranking 
positions within the Communist Party or local government are occupied by ex-SOE executives. 
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Top SOE managers are often political insiders, which further blurs the lines between 
business and politics. Their performance as corporate leaders impacts their positions 
not only with the firm but also in the political hierarchy. Business managers in SOEs 
thus often view their responsibilities as two-fold—to advance the interests of the firm 
and the state—and may suffer consequences for failing to do so. Third, financial 
support also provides leverage over SOEs. These firms do not and in many cases 
could not operate without the financial sponsorship of the state. 
 
In China, embeddedness is tied to close social relations between political and 
economic elites. The power to appoint managers at the largest 50 SOEs lies with the 
Central Organisation Department (COD), the head of which is a member of the 
Politburo. The SASAC maintains the power to appoint the leadership of the 100 smaller 
central SOEs, subject to the approval of the COD. A study by Pei (2006) has 
demonstrated that the three top leadership positions - CEO, chairman, and party 
secretary—in almost all centrally-managed Chinese SOEs are occupied by senior 
members of the CCP. In a number of cases, the CEO and party secretary are the same 
person. The management of legitimacy to strengthen the ruling position of the CCP is 
embodied in all major aspects of the governance structures of SOEs (Wang, 2014, p. 
637). Chinese SOEs are legally organised in the corporate form and feature all or most 
of the attributes of the separation of ownership and control model, but the real control 
comes from the party-state of the CCP. The CCP controls SOEs through general 
requirements on policy compliance and specific powers such as appointing the senior 
executives of SOEs (WANG, 2014, p. 636). 
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4.3 Participation and business politics of central SOEs in the business sector 
 
It is necessary to consider China’s state firms as politically relevant actors. Regardless 
of the formal separation of government and enterprise functions, the high-level 
management of central SOEs such as SGCC have maintained vice-ministerial 
positions because many central SOEs emerged from ministries. As SOE reform did not 
contemplate the ranks, the institutional background of these companies implies that 
SOE management may have the same administrative rank as the highest level of the 
government counterpart that supervises the SOEs. This is also true for SGCC: the 
firm’s privileged access for political support and informal and formal ties may positively 
impact participation in policy making but may also be due to the government's strong 
reliance on firm expertise in specific industrial sectors where business input is needed. 
In some cases, the informal connections to top officials allow the circumvention of 
sectoral authorities and liaison with top leaders. On the other hand, the formal 
connections to government due to the high administrative rank of SOE management 
may provide direct access to relevant institutional actors in the state structure. 
 
The party state structures that underlie the outward investment are complex. In the 
following section, I review the different competencies of actors with specific regard to 
outward investment. Several actors also have their stakes in foreign economic policy 
matters and resource-related issues, making it difficult to attribute them to one specific 
function. The table below, elaborated by Cheng (2012) gives an overview of the   main 
actors involved in the coordination of China’s SOE internationalisation process: 
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Table 4.2 - Actors in the internationalisation process (until 2018)  
 
State Council The State Council functions as central leadership and takes care of fundamental 
issues of concern such as diplomacy, national defence, finance, economy, culture, 
and education; it does not concern itself with concrete policy initiatives (Luo et al., 
2010). The State Council formulates regulations and orders and defines institutional 







The NDRC evolved from the State Development Planning Commission, which was 
the successor organisation to the National Planning Commission (NPC) (Luo et al., 
2010). According to a 2008 circular of the State Council concerning organisational 
structure, the NDRC as one of the component departments of the State Council 
should approve, authorise, and review key investment projects for overseas 
resources development investment projects that utilise a large amount of foreign 
exchange as mandated by the State Council. The State Council should also develop 
strategies, plans, goals, and policies to balance and optimize outward investment. 
One of the most important policies issued by NDRC took the form of the Interim 
Administrative Measures for the Examination and Approval of Overseas Investment 
Projects. The NDRC works closely with the Chinese policy banks to provide financial 
support for relevant overseas projects. The Department of Foreign Investment and 
Overseas Investment is under the control of the NDRC and is responsible for the 
examination of overseas resource development, large investment projects, and the 
plans to use foreign exchange for OFDI. 
MOFCOM The MOFCOM resulted from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (MOFTEC). The MOFCOM's functions include drafting and 
implementing policies and regulations of large non-financial OFDI projects, 
negotiating bilateral and multilateral investment and trade treaties, ensuring that 
China's economic and trade laws adhere to international treaties and agreements, 
and coordinating China's foreign aid policy and relevant funding and loan schemes. 
The Department of Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation 
(hzs.mofcom.gov.cn) is the under the control of the MOFCOM and is the competent 
authority of OFDI. This department is set up to formulate laws and regulations with 
regard to OFDI, to formulate administrative measures and policies guiding overseas 
investment, to examine and approve OFDI and the establishment of overseas 
affiliates (excluding financial companies) and supervise their operations, and to 
guide the work of Chinese authorities in foreign countries. These responsibilities are 
reflected by the MOFCOM's examination and approval of OFDI projects according 
to the Measures for Overseas Investment Administration. The MOFCOM is also 
involved in information provision and technical assistance, particularly the 
publishing of the Countries and Industries for Overseas Investment Guidance 
Catalogue. 
People's Bank 
of China (PBC) 
The People’s Bank of China is one of the component departments of the State 
Council and functions as China’s central bank. The PBC's main responsibilities are 
the macro-control and coordination of the Chinese financial system, which includes 
issuing and enforcing regulations, formulating and implementing monetary policy, 
and regulating interbank markets. The PBC's influence on China's OFDI is 
exercised by its combined powers over monetary policies and foreign exchange 
control. For example, some incentives to motivate enterprises to invest abroad 
include RMB appreciation and a reduced foreign exchange reserve ratio. However, 
the PBC does not provide grants or loans for enterprises to invest abroad. These 
loans are provided by China's policy banks (directly under the State Council) and 





Similar to the NDRC and MOFCOM, the SAFE's current tasks have been confirmed 
after several reorganisations which can be dated back to the State General 
Administration for Exchange Control in 1982 (Voss et al., 2008). The SAFE is 
principally responsible for monitoring cross-border capital flows, supervising 
overseas and domestic foreign exchange accounts, and undertaking management 






The SAFE is under the direct control of PBC and governs China's foreign exchange 
reserves. Its main responsibilities include putting forward foreign exchange 
management system reform, drafting regulations related to foreign exchange 
administration, and supervising the domestic and overseas foreign exchange 
accounts. Any enterprise that seeks overseas activity must apply to SAFE or its 
local branches for the OFDI foreign exchange registration certificate. Meanwhile, 
the SAFE works with MOFCOM to inspect and evaluate Chinese enterprises' 
performances per annum. The SAFE also has rights to punish institutions which 
violate relevant stipulations regarding foreign exchange administration. 
Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) 
The OFDI-related responsibilities of MOF include formulating and implementing 
government policies on mergers and acquisitions, managing the government's 
non-tax revenues and governmental funds for supporting enterprises, monitoring 
the corporate finance of central enterprises and profitability of state-owned assets, 
and supervising the appropriated funds for investment projects by the central 
government (www.mof.gov.cn). One of MOF's key contributions is to provide 






The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is a ministry-level unit that 
is directly under the State Council. Its main responsibility is to regulate China's 
securities and futures markets to ensure their orderly and legitimate operation. This 
includes drafting policies and development planning for securities and futures 
markets; inspecting the issuance, listing, trading, custody, and settlement of stock, 
convertible bonds, and corporate bonds; supervising listed companies and their 
stock market behaviour; inspecting domestic enterprises' direct or indirect 
overseas issuance and listing; monitoring foreign institutions that attempt to set up 
securities and futures organisations in China. The CSRC issues annual reports to 







In 2003, the SASAC was established and made directly subject to the State 
Council. In terms of the SASAC’s structure, the SASAC is the only name in the 
category 'special organisation directly under the State Council’. The SASAC is the 
state’s investor; guides and pushes forward the reform and restructuring of SOEs; 
supervises the preservation and increment of the value of state-owned assets for 
enterprises under its supervision; appoints, evaluates, rewards, punishes, or 
removes top executives of the enterprises under the supervision of the central 
government; and directs and supervises the management work of local state- 
owned assets (www.sasac.gov.cn). The SASAC primarily functions with the 
administration, approval, and support of central enterprises. However, SASAC has 
been questioned over whether it can fulfil the objective of ensuring that SOEs will 
remain competitive or whether it can maintain and further increase the value of 
state-owned assets (Naughton, 2007, Pearson, 2005). 
The SASAC works at the national and sub-national levels and exercises its power 
through appointing senior managers to SOEs and through involvement in the major 
decision-making of its controlled firms (Naughton, 2007), particularly before 2010. 
Tan (2009) has reported that at the end of 2009, the Organisation Department of 
the CPC Central Committee and SASAC promulgated two measures to administer 
and supervise SOEs' senior management. The Interim Provisions Concerning the 
Administration of Central Enterprise Leaders formulates the requirements, 
positions, and working periods for SOEs' boards of directors, senior managers, 
party committee members, and other leaders. Additionally, the Measure to 
Comprehensively Assess and Evaluate the Leadership Team and the Leaders lists 
the detailed procedure and methods to assess senior management and the 
relevant rewards and punishments. Although the complete official versions are not 
available, these two measures noticeably indicate that the Chinese government 
has the rights to appoint and assess all leadership members of SOEs. These 
managerial candidates may not be most suitable but are the most rewarded (Voss 
et al., 2008). Furthermore, an OFDI project is regarded as a crucial decision that 
influences an SOE's value of state-owned assets and thus cannot avoid SASAC's 




 The conflict between SASAC's two roles has not yet been clarified (Wen and Tan, 
2009). Because SASAC is a representative body that was created to exercise the 
government's ownership rights over selected state-owned firms (Naughton, 2008), 
its staff primarily came from the State Economic and Trade Commission, which 
has now been restructured and cancelled (Hu, 2005). The SASAC has the right to 
promulgate policies and regulations, which typically is the responsibility of 
institutional organisations. Except for its performance as the governmental 
supervisor, SASAC is currently the largest investor and owner of all non-financial 
SOEs (Luo et al., 2010). However, this phenomenon is not consistent with the 
criterion of 'separating politics from capitals' (Zhang, 2009). 
Retrieved from: Cheng, 2012, p. 61- 65 
 
 
Economic coordination in the context of SOE internationalisation is complex. In 
strategic and pillar industries, sectoral policy is developed and executed by three types 
of institutions of the party-state: 1) the state bureaucracy regulatory agencies (the 
NDRC and the NEC), 2) SOEs, and 3) the Chinese policy banks (China Development 
Bank – CDB, the Export Import Bank – China Exim Bank, and the China Investment 
Corporation). 
 
Overall, investment decisions are the by-product of cooperation between these 
institutions and the CCP leadership to secure the political influence of the state in the 
market. However, the role and influence of the CCP in investment decisions may vary 
according to industry and investment volume. This coordination binds the SOEs due 
to their position within the Chinese power hierarchy due to the influence of the 
nomenklatura system and guanxi networks. The coordination also addresses the 
problem with the state institutions’ lack of overview of the sectors and their limitations 
in controlling SOEs (ZHENG, 2015). 
 
However, the SOEs maintain freedom to decide on the direction of investments and 
the overall administration of the company. The state initiates a range of policies that 
provide those SOEs with access to financial resources and licenses to operate certain 
technologies to ensure that they acquire a monopoly in the strategic sectors. 
Furthermore, the SOEs are granted the authority to implement state policy by 
channelling private investments in the sector. This is intended to speed up the decision-
making process and approach market-driven investment decisions instead of 
administrative ones (ZHENG, 2015). 
 
Chinese state-business relations move within the broad SME framework, which 
includes cooperation between the state and domestic business at various 
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administrative levels, thereby forming a dynamic state-permeated market economy. By 
contrast, internationalisation strategies have become assertive and entangled within a 
state-centric but not necessarily state-driven web of relations and are embedded in a 
wider economic development framework. Internationalisation strategies through firms 
in China can be ushered through ownership and policy-making aimed at outward 
internationalisation, which includes the adoption of suitable policies, measures, or 
programs that are capable of encouraging OFDI. This can include 1) streamlining 
administrative procedures, 2) easing capital control, 3) the provision and guidance on 
investment environments, and 4) reducing political and social investment risks (LUO et 
al, 2010). Another factor concerns state-driven coercive pressure within state-business 
relations that is aimed at displaying the ties between the economic elite and the state 
and party structure (VOSS ET AL, 2009; DING AND LI, 2016). 
 
Economic development is central not only to domestic policy making but also to the 
formulation of foreign policy, and internationalisation efforts have been connected to 
economic foreign policy preferences. As ten Brink (2015) has noted, China’s foreign 
economic and currency policy reflects the state-permeated and developmentalist 
elements of its non-liberal form of capitalism. Moreover, foreign economic policy is 
increasingly characterised by proactive state promotion of FDI (MC NALLY, 2012, TEN 
BRINK, 2015). This includes mechanisms directed at reducing market failures, 
economic and political risks, and programmes and policy measures. For example, the 
OFDI in certain sectors such as high technology sectors is promoted through a series 
of incentives including tax rebates, foreign exchange assistance, and financial support. 
This can also create regulations or pressures to boost or even limit internationalisation 
of certain industries. 
 
The multi-level structure of governance in China also applies to the way firm 
internationalisation efforts relate to state capacities. That said, internationalisation 
efforts also can differ according to the relevant administrative level (WANG ET AL, 
2012). The central government provides regulatory frameworks to steer 
internationalisation, ease capital controls, and provide information on investment 
opportunities; the governments at lower administrative levels must comply with the 
government’s policies. Specific foreign policy measures and instruments are drawn 
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upon to promote the development strategy in the more complex context of the actors 
of Chinese foreign economic policy formulation (TEN BRINK, 2015; LUO ET AL, 2010). 
 
According to Zhang et al. (2009) and Wang (2016), policy support for FDI can draw on 
two central characteristics: the first refers to the federalist administrative structure, or, 
as Xu (201) has stated, the policy making system reflects political centralisation and 
economic regional decentralisation. Chinese FDI policies are largely decided centrally, 
which is different from other economic policies which are negotiated and structured 
through the different local and central actors. This may be explained by the 
experimental nature of Chinese policy-making since the re-opening and by the recent 
trajectory of Chinese development (ZHANG ET AL, 2009; WANG 2016). 
 
The second feature is the role of the intertwined economic and political order. 
Promotion policies for OFDI are subject to an intertwined economic and political order 
that is dominated by an administrative bureaucratic regime at the central level. This 
augments the political legitimisation that fosters, creates, and expands OFDI and 
business development (ZHANG ET AL, 2009; WANG, 2016). 
 
Overall, the formal state support in terms of the policies that are directly targeted at 
OFDI can be classified as: 
 
• Encouragement guidelines and regulatory mechanisms to stimulate 
internationalisation. In 2011, the MOFCOM issued the Opinions for Promoting 
the Internationalisation Development of Strategic Emerging Industries. These 
Opinions had the message that internationalisation is an inevitable choice for 
fostering and developing strategic emerging industries. The document specified 
four internationalisation development directions of the emerging industries: (1) 
promote the market competitiveness of the whole industry chain including R&D, 
manufacturing, and marketing; (2) improve the internationalisation capabilities 
of entities; (3) create a supporting system (fiscal incentives, financial support 
etc.); (4) and consolidate domestic foundation for the internationalisation of 
strategic emerging industries. 
• Approval policies: The structure for overseas investment processes is more 
complex. Wenbin and Wilkes (2012) have examined the administrative level of 
foreign policy making and the policies concerning overseas investment. The 
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authors have identified 26 central government agencies involved in the process 
of policymaking. According to Cunningham (2016), diversification of actors and 
decentralisation of approval has supported increased investment abroad but 
weakened central state control over investment. 
 
Wenbin and Wilkes (2012) have identified different levels that structure the investment 
processes. The State Council is responsible for the overall control of China's 
government decision-making procedures at the first level layer. The MOFCOM, the 
SAFE, and the NDRC are the primary ministry-level entities involved in foreign 
investment management at the second layer. he SASAC regulates the central and local 
levels' sale, merger, purchase, and yearly auditing of a limited group of state assets. 
Personnel moves for vice-ministerial and lower-ranking officials are also subject to the 
commission's approval. MOFOCM and NDRC are coordinating their activities as they 
draw on common standards and criteria to review partnerships, ventures, mergers and 
acquisitions, and other proposed projects (WENBIN AND WILKES, 2012).  
 
Figure 4.1 - Approval procedures and processes 
 
Retrieved from: Xu, 2010 and own elaboration 
 
 
While the NDRC ensures alignment to national development goals, the MOFCOM 
approves FDI projects and ensures that administrative measures are in line with 
SASAC, SAFE, and NDRC. Overall, the MOFCOM is in charge of keeping track of 
investment volumes and destinations. 
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Table 4.3 - Cross border M&A deals and their approving departments 
 
Value Departments 
Central Enterprises Other SOEs 
R < $200m MOFCOM, NDRC, and SC MOFCOM, NDRC, and SC 
$100m < R < $200m MOFCOM and NDRC MOFCOM and NDRC 
$30m < R $100m NDRC NDRC and local MOFCOM 
R < $30m None Local NDRC and local MOFCOM 
I < $100m MOFCOM, NDRC, and SC MOFCOM, NDRC, and SC 
$50m < I < $100m NDRC and SC NDRC, SC, and local MOFCOM 
$10m < I < $50m NDRC NDRC and local MOFCOM 
I < $10m None Local NDRC 
Retrieved from: Cheng, 2012. Note: R = overseas development; I = investment 
 
 
The third level includes functional agencies that mainly share the burden of assistance 
to ministers. These agencies relate to specific investment areas, particularly those 
which are priorities of national economic development, such as energy. For example, 
monitoring policies can be targeted to introduce reporting and forms of control through 
data collection and progress. This was introduced in 2011 by the SASAC to report 
more systematically on the status of overseas assets. 
 
Another dimension is the financial support system, which includes fiscal incentives, 
financial guarantees, credits from state-owned banks, sovereign wealth funds, and 
preferential credit in key priorities set by the government. China adheres to the state- 
permeated market economy type because most of its companies are immune from 
short-term volatilities on global capital markets because they possess state-backed 
funding. China’s policy banks, the CDB and the Ex–Im Bank of China; and several 
commercial banks including the Bank of China, Bank of Shanghai, China CITIC Bank, 
and the Bank of Communications have also provided huge credit lines and loans to 
wind power enterprises. Some loans were specifically designed for certain companies. 
Other examples include the Advanced Manufacturing Fund, which has been charged 
with allocating RMB 20 billion for upgrading the technology of key industries; the 
National Integrated Circuit Fund, which has RMB 139 billion at its disposal; and the 
Emerging Industries Investment Fund, which holds RMB 40 billion (ZHENG, 2016). 
 
Overall, a pro-business development approach and policy support that is aimed at 
internationalisation pursue the overall objective of moving up the value chain. Within 
this dynamic of domestic and international arrangements, domestic policy support for 
outward FDI draws on competitive political advantage, comparative economic 
106 
 
advantage, and a comparative symbolic and economic diplomacy advantage, as Alden 
and Hughes (2009) has demonstrated. 
 
According to Alden and Hughes (2009), the non-interference principle of China is its 
competitive political advantage. This principle enables China to engage with any state 
regardless of its international reputation and restrictions. The comparative economic 
advantage of Chinese MNCs derives from policy support and state-business relations. 
This advantage involves a low-cost bidding strategy that is centred on lower-skilled 
labour and lower managerial costs. At the same time, the comparative symbolic and 
economic diplomacy advantage refers to how Chinese diplomatic attention is a 
prominent feature when it comes to bringing in MNCs. Depending on the context, this 




4.4 Energy-related investments and internationalisation 
 
From the company view, the example of Chinese oil companies provided by Meidan 
(2016, p. 20-21) exemplifies how the business politics of internationalisation had 
provided the company with skills beyond market-related resources and benefits: 
 
In 1993, Wang Tao, president of CNPC, explained the rationale behind going overseas, in terms 
of a window of opportunity that had opened up for China: the initial experience of cooperation 
with foreign companies had been fruitful, and concerted diplomatic efforts were all creating a 
‘good environment for developing overseas oil cooperation in developing new sources,… 
overseas oil could alleviate the shortage. The objectives of foreign cooperation, according to 
Wang Tao, were to enhance the skills of Chinese oil company employees, help China implement 
a global strategy by familiarizing itself gradually with global trends and new technologies, acquire 
resources, capture a share of the international market, and build up CNPC’s image and 
reputation abroad. At the same time, Wang Tao was clearly cognizant of the need to appeal to 
a political audience and suggested that closer commercial ties with these energy producers 
would also contribute to fostering closer political ties… Moreover, further overseas acquisitions 
were important for distancing corporate activities from government scrutiny. 
 
This statement pitches the strategic non-market advantages of internationalisation 
closely rooted to home context reasons and the deeper logics of outward firm activities. 
While the oil industry is one of the earlier examples of Chinese firm internationalisation, 
it served as example for the `catching up process of other energy industry segments`, 
as one interviewee confirmed. Oil industry SOEs had set an example of how the firms 
had navigated the political arena of state- party domestically. This was particularly 
useful knowledge as calls for strengthening the position of the Chinese industry 
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globally further fed into the systematic internationalisation of diverse industry segments. 
As a guiding document, for example, China’s 13th 5-Year Plan for Electric Power 
Development (2016-2020) called for the strengthened participation of Chinese 
companies in electrical sectors overseas. By summarizing the 12th and the 13th 5-Year 
Plan for Electric Power Development, the overall strategic narrative, calling for constant 




Table 4.4 - Five-Year Plans for Electricity Power Development 
 
12th Five-Year Plan for Electricity Power 
Development 
13th Five-Year Plan for Electricity Power 
Development 
-Establish cross-sector coordination mechanisms 
such as energy, diplomacy, finance and taxation, 
foreign trade, and finance, and strengthen macro 
guidance and services for overseas energy 
development and utilization. 
-Improve the energy ‘going out’ filing mechanism 
and improve the coordination of enterprises 
participating in the development of overseas 
resources. 
- Establish and improve the international energy 
information platform, carry out international 
energy reserves and emergency mutual 
assistance cooperation, formulate energy 
security emergency plans, and enhance the 
ability to respond to various emergencies. 
- Adhere to the new energy security concept of 
mutually beneficial cooperation, diversified 
development and coordinated protection, actively 
participate in the development of overseas 
energy resources, expand energy foreign trade 
and technical cooperation, enhance the 
supporting capabilities of transportation and 
finance, build a new pattern of international 
cooperation, and jointly safeguard global energy 
security. 
- Focusing on enhancing global oil and gas 
supply capacity, giving full play to China's market 
and technological advantages, and in-depth 
cooperation with energy resources countries. 
- Actively promote cooperation in refining, 
chemical and storage operations. Support 
superior energy enterprises to participate in the 
development of overseas coal resources and 
carry out overseas power cooperation. Relying 
on overseas energy project cooperation, the 
energy equipment and engineering services will 
be ‘going out’. 
- Adhere to the combination of attracting 
investment and attracting energy and the 
development of energy industry, optimize the use 
-Implementing the Belt and Road Initiative, 
strengthening international cooperation in power, 
adhering to the principles of openness, 
inclusiveness, policy differentiation, and win-win 
cooperation, making full use of international and 
domestic markets and resources, and actively 
promoting international cooperation in power 
equipment, technology, standards, and 
engineering services. 
- Promote cross-border grid interconnection and 
interoperability as needed. 
- Encourage power companies to participate in 
the construction and operation of overseas power 
projects. 
- Explore the construction of a global energy 
Internet to drive global electricity demand in a 
clean and green way. 
- Actively carry out foreign business. 
- Expand the export of power equipment and 
actively promote the export of large-scale 
complete sets of equipment such as thermal 
power, hydropower, nuclear power, and power 
transmission and transformation. 
- Actively promote foreign power services, carry 
out power upgrade and cooperation, and promote 
international cooperation in power supply design 
and standards. 
On the basis of controlling financial risks, we will 
steadily promote foreign power investment. 
 
In terms of achievements, the international 
leading UHV transmission technology began to 
be applied, and the construction of ±1100 kV DC 
transmission project started. The power grid 
dispatching operation capability is continuously 
improved, and the power supply safety and 
reliability level is effectively improved. Key 
technologies and complete sets of equipment 
such as new energy generation grid-connected, 




of foreign capital structure, guide foreign 
investment to strategic emerging industries in the 
energy field, and promote the introduction of 
advanced technology, management experience 
and high-quality talents. 
- Encourage foreign capital to participate in inland 
complex oil and gas fields and deep sea oil and 
gas field risk exploration. Select exploration and 
development cooperation zones in shale gas 
resource-rich basins such as Sichuan and Erdos, 
and construct pilot demonstration projects. 
- Encourage cooperation with oil resource 
countries in the construction of refining and 
storage facilities. 
- Encourage cooperation in coal safety, high 
efficiency and green mining. Learn from the 
advanced experience of international energy 
management, and strengthen exchanges and 
cooperation with major countries and 
international institutions in strategic planning, 
policies and regulations, energy conservation 
and efficiency improvement. 
- Optimize the structure of energy trade. Focusing 
on crude oil and supplemented with refined oil, 
we will consolidate and expand the sources and 
channels of imports, expand the scale of oil trade, 
and increase the proportion of oil and gas 
imports. 
- Promote diversification of energy trade. - 
Encourage more qualified enterprises to 
participate in international energy trade and 
promote the diversification of trade entities. 
Comprehensive use of futures trade, long 
association trade, entrepot trade, barter trade 
and other means to promote diversification of 
trade methods. Actively promote the 
diversification of trade channels, varieties and 
transportation methods. 
- Encourage domestic insurance institutions to 
carry out ‘national oil national security’ and 
overseas personal and property insurance. - 
Actively and steadily participate in international 
energy futures market transactions, and rationally 
avoid market risks. 
- Actively participate in global energy 
governance, make full use of international energy 
multilateral and bilateral cooperation 
mechanisms, strengthen exchanges and 
dialogues on energy security, energy 
conservation and emission reduction, climate 
change, clean energy development, etc., promote 
the establishment of a fair and 
reasonable new global energy order, and 
coordinate energy conservation Safety. 
have made breakthroughs, and multi-terminal 
flexible DC transmission demonstration projects 
have been completed and put into operation. 
Power international cooperation to expand into a 
new situation. External nuclear power, thermal 
power, hydropower, new energy power 
generation, and power transmission and 
transformation cooperation have been 
continuously strengthened, and investment forms 
have become increasingly diverse. It has driven 
China's standards, technology, equipment and 
finance to go out. Conduct electricity trade with 8 
neighbouring countries and regions, and invest in 
power grids such as Brazil and Portugal. 
 
The internationalisation of power companies 
faces the experience of accumulating 
international competition, improving the 
diversification of products and services, 
connecting power industry standards with 
international standards, fulfilling corporate 
environmental responsibilities, and improving 
financial insurance supporting services. The 
process of power internationalisation puts new 
demands on the power interconnection and 
power equipment manufacturing level between 
China and neighboring countries. 
Retrieved from: 12th and 13th Five-Year Plan for Electricity Power Development 
 
Anchoring the sectorial narrative to a competitive environment encouraged companies 
to anchor their business culture to a bold expansion abroad, stepping into competitive 
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markets. Technological innovative approaches and internationalisation were thus 
complementary activities: While going global, firms had to adapt their business 
practices and turned more competitive. 
 
In the wider context of business groups, encouragement has been provided by the 
China Electric Power Enterprise Association. This clearly demonstrates that the ‘going 
out strategy’ (‘ ’) is a vital form for Chinese companies in the electricity sector 
and has received active encouragement from the state and business associations. 
According to Hongyi et al. (2014), the institutional advantages for Chinese SOEs also 
include government-driven support, which includes diplomatic support, financial 
backing from state ownership, and also the possibility to access and draw upon state- 
supported scientific and technical research. For the SOE internationalisation of energy 
companies, such a support basis would be vital for generating competitive advantages, 
given that SOE internationalisation is not as straightforward of a process as it might 
seem. 
 
Firms must navigate a heterogeneous state where state agencies compete and where 
the companies have multiple connections through formal and informal state structures. 
In these structures, the companies maintain the level of ownership, sectorial limitations, 
and government access. Overall, the internationalisation of energy investment in China 
means that a differentiated picture is necessary to further understand the layers and 
nuances of the different forms and degrees of state participation, guidance, and 
corporate interests. Firms must navigate strategically between the different policy 
arenas of China’s party-state to survive economically and politically. 
 
Moreover, while interviewees were hesitant to explicitly link foreign policy to top-down 
and state-guided firm internationalisation, there is a strategic element to 
internationalisation for foreign policy that has been expressed ideologically and 
practically through public policies and incentives. For example, CPC orientation for 
SOEs and outward investment is closely followed up in the wider SASAC structure. 
This orientation uses the advantages of the international resources of the central SOEs, 
fully serves the country’s overall diplomatic standing, improves the level of foreign 
affairs management services, and accurately serve international cooperation. Rules 
also provide further guidance for compliance, such as the 2017 ‘Guiding Opinions on 
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Strengthening the Prevention and Control of the Risk of Cleaner Overseas Chinese 
Central Enterprises’ (‘ 强 ). 
Global competitiveness, integrity, and anti-corruption is ensured through a tight CPC 
grip: 
 
The party committees and discipline inspection commissions (discipline 
inspection teams) of the central enterprises must stand at a height of 
comprehensive and strict administration of the party, profoundly understand the 
importance and urgency of grasping the prevention and control of the risk of 
overseas cleanliness, and earnestly fulfil the party's responsibility for managing 
the party’s political affairs. The prevention and control of corruption risks runs 
through the entire process of overseas party building work and investment 
management, strengthens supervision and management with strong measures, 
and enlarges central enterprises and fosters global competitiveness in order to 
maintain the safety of state-owned assets, strengthen and optimize the 
company (STATE COUNCIL, 2017). 
 
 
Finally, the complex structures of companies in the energy sector makes them large 
business groups, and business groups are special cases for internationalisation. In 
particular, Yiu (2011) has specified that Chinese business groups possess unique 
multinational (ownership–location–internalisation) attributes for expanding overseas, 
which includes an internal market in the form of horizontal and vertical linkages among 
group affiliates as well as institutional support from the government. 
 
Overall, we can see that the more systemic issues to feed into the empirical context: 
growing China-Brazil relations with increasing diplomatic ties and cooperation, and the 
different structures of the electricity sectors, which impact how the firm case is to be 
analysed in the second study. The point of this part is that different state-business 
relations impact how companies navigate different institutional environments and draw 
on business politics to support their business endeavours. The energy sector is an 
arena where political action takes place in the form of policy decisions that strongly 
influence national and international companies. The specific sector arrangements and 
needs are vital to understanding how a firm organises itself. While the sectoral 
influence over policy is determined by state-business relations arrangements, the 
degree of interest and ability of actors to advocate for their preferences 
(GOUREVITCH, 1986) can have impact on the quality of sectorial policies and 
outcomes that is equal to the impact on company decision-making processes. 
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The role of SOEs in China’s domestic environment has substantially changed. Today, 
Chinese SOEs have developed into international players with a strong backing from 
the state. In China, the informality of the state-business relations is mediated through 
the state-party structure, reflecting state domination. Formal institutional linkages and 
visions such as guidelines and political macro orientations further shape coordination 
and the enterprise agendas. Formal and informal links, the embeddedness of SOE 
business politics, and the logic of SOE action demonstrate how non-market factors 
inform the decision-making processes of companies and how they coordinate their 
business strategy regarding SOE internationalisation. 
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5 THE ‘GOING GLOBAL’ DYNAMICS OF A CENTRAL ELECTRICITY SOE 
 
‘Yes, the Russians and Japanese might have the technology. But the most advanced 
core technologies cannot be bought,’ said Wu Yusheng, deputy chief engineer of SGCC. 
‘Besides, we have our own conditions and technological requirements that are different 





In China, the clout of central SOEs extends deep into the national economy. This 
chapter examines SGCC’s emergence and consolidation, as well as its integration into 
the state industry structure and the internationalisation efforts undertaken by the 
company. The chapter follows the argument anticipated by Sampson (2016) that 
SGCC’s global presence is due to political and economic motives. Drawing on the 
previous chapters on the characteristics of the Chinese electricity supply sector, as 
well as the internationalisation promotion efforts by the Chinese state mechanisms, 
this chapter assesses the specific government-related and firm-specific advantages 




5.1 The emergence of the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) 
 
Domestically, and in the case of the electric supply industry, studies on the role of 
central-level SOEs in domestic restructuring processes of strategic industries have 
found that the central government’s guidance over this specific industry as a 
strategically important sector of the country’s economy is subject to substantial 
interference by central state firms (Sampson, 2016). 
 
The first years of SGCC in the context of the energy sector were marked by sector 
reforms, the going global policy, and a surge of unfolding technological development 
in a sector that was characterised by supply shortages. Before SGCC’s rise to become 
the largest public utility company, holding a monopoly in China with a core business in 
transmission and distribution, the reform efforts of the Chinese power sector had been 
ongoing for over a decade. The power sector reform in China was approached in a 
three-stage process starting in 1985. The reform timeline below reviews the steps 
analysed in the third chapter. In its essence, since 2002, the liberalisation of the 
companies led to increasing competition in the power sector segments. 
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Table 5.1 - Reform timeline for China’s electricity sector 
 
 1980-1984 1985-2001 2002-Present 
Industrial 
Structure 
Vertical integration Vertical integration Unbundled generation & 





Central and provincial 
government ownership. 
Increasing private investment 
in generation 
Central and provincial 
government ownership, 
declining share of private 
investment 
Dispatch Economic dispatch 
based on total 
embedded cost 
Equal shares dispatch Equal shares dispatch; pilot 







Investment recovery based 
on financial lifetime (1985) 
Investment recovery based 
on operational lifetime (2001) 
Benchmark price (2004) 
Fuel price-wholesale price 
movement (2004) 




The last stage occurred in 2002 when the State Council issued restructuring measures 
to initiate competition and divide the generation and transmission elements. The State 
Council Document No. 5 installed this change with the main objective to separate 
government and business functions. The State Grid Corporation of China was founded 
in 2002 and succeeded the integrated power sector monopolist – the State Power 
Corporation of China (SPCC) – and the MEP. This reform divided the SPCC into five 
generation groups, two grid companies, and accessorial business groups. Concerning 
the grid element, alongside the SGCC, China Southern Grid Corporation (CSCG) was 
founded, resulting in a diversification of the actor structure. As an outcome of the 
reforms, the SGCC was in charge of transmission and distribution with national 
coverage of almost all provinces. 
 
Bound to the state-owned asset management system, State Grid is a state-owned 
enterprise, with the SASAC exercising the ownership rights of the assets and dividends 
being paid at 15% of the net profits in 2016 (ZHENG, 2015). The restructuring resulted 
in increased competition in the electricity industry, with companies having to start to 
compete to receive attention from the SASAC and other sectoral government agencies. 
Today, the company considers investment in construction and operation of the power 
grid its core business and undertakes the basic mission of ensuring safe, economic, 
clean, and sustainable power supply. With headquarters in Beijing, the SGCC’s grid 
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network covers 26 provinces regions policies administered by the central government 
and maintains five out of six regional grids, totalling 88% of the national territory. 
 
The non-financial SOEs are vertically integrated groups, with a state-owned group 
company at the top of the hierarchical core, below which a constellation of different 
subsidiary companies, including publicly listed firms, joint venture firms, finance 
companies, and research institutes. Each of these subsidiary entities may in turn have 
additional subsidiaries or hold shares in other such subsidiary entities. Today, State 
Grid is embedded in a large structure consisting of headquarters, provincial 
subsidiaries, research institutes28 and other direct subsidiaries, as illustrated in the 
figure below. In other words, the company is a large-scale conglomerate involving 

































28 Research institutes have been key for technology development and delivery of patents. Policymaking 
encouraged the consolidation of research institutes in fields relevant to the firms and its increase of 
international competitiveness. With more than four research institutes, R&D has a main role in SGCC`s 
firm activities (annual R&D input later in the chapter). The company also maintains partnerships with 
university, where it undertakes applied research together with the academic community. 
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Retrieved from: SGCC CSR 2016 Report, 2016 
 
As a large corporation, the SGCC acts with a large variety of subsidiaries; for example, 
for foreign investments such as those in Brazil, State Grid International Development 
Limited is the responsible unit. 
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Figure 5.2 - State Grid International Development Limited structure 
 
 
Retrieved from: Source: State Grid Website, 2018 
 
In terms of internal group-governance, Lin (2014) establishes that group-governance 
structures are detailed in legally binding arrangements, embraced by all group 
members. The process is top-down in terms of control of decision-making processes 
but accepting input and participation from the subsidiaries. The main company imposes 
the terms of the articles, and the internal governance rules provides the main company 
with veto rights and governance rights regarding to the group (Lin 2014). 
 
The corporate governance of Chinese SOEs implies internal (board of directors, board 
of supervisors and operators’ incentive constraint mechanism) and external (securities 
market, legal system, institutional investors and other issues) governance (SONG, 
2016).29 The legal structure of the SGCC and its interaction with other government 
agencies is based on different institutional and legal prerogatives, including the Power 
Law, the SOE Law, and the State Council’s Document No. 5 (XU, 2016, p. 139). In 
2003, the State Council approved two legal documents – ‘The Formation of the State 
Grid Corporation of China’ and ‘The Charter of the State Grid Corporation of China’ – 
 
29 In the broader context of Chinese corporate governance, this author describes the Chinese corporate 
governance system as `transplanted`, as the Chinese system differed to other countries where the legal 
and market system has reached a higher degree of maturity. The form of Chinese corporate governance, 
specifically in the case of SOEs, operated on different codes, laws and market rules, as well as corporate 
culture and the legal system. 
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submitted by the SETC. These documents provide the legal basis for the SGCC’s 
interactions and navigation of bureaucratic and administrative structures. The SGCC 
was created under the ‘Law on Industrial Enterprise Owned by the Whole People’ (SOE 
Law), which requires Chinese corporations to assume the responsibility for wins and 
losses and base their operations on a market-system approach. According to Xu (2016, 
p. 37), ‘this made SGCC a company with operating flexibility, but without the financial 
responsibility of commercial corporations’. 
 
Corporate governance is also shaped along the ideational lines of the state-party 
structure. Such a duality has been recognized in the 2005 ‘Guiding Opinions on 
Strengthening the Construction of Corporate Culture in Central Enterprises’ (SASAC, 
2005) which recognized the ‘ corporate culture is the spiritual pillar and source of power 
for the … development of enterprises, and is an important part of the core 
competitiveness,…corporate culture is an important part of strengthening the party's 
ability to govern….a strategic measure for enterprises to improve management level, 
enhance cohesiveness and build core competitiveness’. 
 
SGCC has integrated this in six guiding principles: (1) Uphold the party's overall 
leadership, implement the decision-making and deployment of the Party Central 
Committee and the State Council; (2) Adhere to the corporate tenet, and promote the 
core values of the company; (3) Adhere to the basic mission of promoting re- 
electrification, building an energy internet, and meeting power demand in green way; 
(4) Adhere to the construction of a strong smart grid with UHV as the backbone network 
and coordinated development of all levels of power grids; (5) Constant improvement of 
the modern state-owned enterprise system with Chinese characteristics with growing 
competitive advantages; (6) High-quality development, focusing on the development 
layout of ‘one core, three pillars’ (grid business and industry, finance, international 
business). 
 
To this complexity is added the role of the party, as in the context of Chinese corporate 
governance, according to Song (2016), SOEs have to take care of the relationship 
among the shareholders’ meeting, board of directors and board of supervisors; as well 
as the commission for discipline inspection and the Party Committee. 
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Figure 5.3 - Central SOE corporate governance structure 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
In the first and second chapter, the overall features of China’s party-state system were 
outlined. When it comes to understanding the access a company can have in China 
within and outside of the state-party structure, one must understand both the political 
and bureaucratic forms of access a company can engage in. According to Xu (2016), 
the Chinese party-state is characterised by the constraints of the institutional rules in 
which the agents act, but also by the incoherent set of visions between the institutional 
agents and the need to convert the frequent policy guidelines and orientations into 
practical and achievable outcomes. 
 
State-owned enterprises must rely on their negotiation skills to access information and 
ensure that their interests are being attended. As a state-owned company administered 
at central government level, the SGCC’s embeddedness in the institutional and party 
structures of the Chinese state has become evident at the corporate governance level 
of the management leadership. Chinese central SOEs follow two overlapping 
personnel management schemes, the corporate and the party (following the CPC 
structure, including secretary, deputies and other ranks) system. Generally, the 
corporate rank as a corresponding in the party system rank. For example, the SGCC’s 
former chairman Liu Zhenya ( ) was an alternate member of the CCP’s central 
committee (2007–2012) with the rank of vice minister (SAMPSON, 2016). With the 
formal establishment of the board of directors in 2013, Shu Yinbao replaced Liu as 
chief executive officer (CEO), and Liu became board chairman (XU, 2016). 
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As in the case of company internationalisation30, the chosen approach to innovation in 
China can be impacted by the different relations between corporate governance and 
ownership, as well as the segment of industrial activity. Concerning domestic 
policymaking, studies on the industry policy impact of SOEs have concluded that 
particularly in the strategic sectors of the energy sector (oil, natural gas, and electricity), 
structural and policy developments are driven by firm preferences. Several studies 
have also portrayed SOEs as pursuing their own internationalisation agendas 
independent of central government interference. Xing (2013) has noted the erosion of 
government authority in some strategic industry settings concerning state firm 
oversight regarding policymaking and implementation. Furthermore, the political 
interplay between SOEs and Chinese authorities and officials shifts over time, and the 
political embeddedness is both organisationally and strategically constructed out of a 
trajectory of success and failure (DOWNS, 2006; TSAI, 2013; LIAO, 2014). 
 
Xu (2016) has contributed to this perspective by emphasising that central SOEs are 
not automatically entitled to participate in policy processes; neither are their own 
interests or preferences automatically advocated for in an environment with 
overlapping and conflicting government institutions and mandates. Thus, Xu (2016) 
has emphasised, SOEs do have to possess do some degree of proactivity in proposing 
new ideas and participating in policy debates. Bearing in mind, then, the complexity of 
the bureaucratic, administrative, and regulatory contexts structuring the state- 
permeated market economy of China, political embeddedness of firm actors is 
therefore a strategic asset and represents a comparative advantage for accelerating a 
company’s interests and preferences. 
 
State Grid is a well-connected actor within China’s wider business environment. 




30 The degree of which state-investment abroad is in fact largely state-guided, in other words, oriented 
by a strategically driven top-down approach by the government differs from case to case. It however 
contradicts common approaches allocating the decision power for outward investment entirely to the 
directives of the state agencies (Pearson, 2005; Eaton, 2013); or on the other hand, to studies affirming 
great autonomy to SOE´s actions. Such accounts hide the fact that the process of SOE 
internationalisation in emerging economies, particularly in the case of China, relies on mutual synergies 
and interactions and while undoubtedly China's government facilitates the political relations between 
countries and SOEs may facilitate political relationships, the fulfillment of possible economic and even 
political objectives may rely on a interdependent dynamic between the actors involved. 
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business groups under the control of the Chinese central government as an important 
organizational feature of Chinese state-owned companies. 
 
Figure 5.4 - Intergroup networks among industrial business groups 
 
Retrieved from: Lin, 2016 
 
Through a series of associations, it engages with different levels (councillor, chairman, 
president, etc.). Since 2012, the company has also further stepped up its engagement 
in the international associations relevant to firm advocacy, specifically in the context of 
international standardisation. Thus, as is explained later in the chapter, the SGCC itself 
has actively moved to the stage of interest mobilisation by founding the Global Energy 
Interconnection Development and Cooperation. The following figures illustrate the 
increased strategic engagement of the company with national and international 
associations in 2008 and 2012. 
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Figure 5.5 - State Grid Participation in associations in 2008 
 
Retrieved from: State Grid, 2008 
 
 
What can be seen from these figures is the increase in associations SGCC joined and 
the strategic engagement by occupying positions in these associations. SGCC joined 
national associations, industry associations and international sector associations, such 
as standardization bodies. While such memberships may be strategically vital to the 
internationalisation of the grid equipment and the consolidation of SGCC as market 
power, the power of the industry associations vary, can involve different aspects of 
SGCCs operations and focus on local or international aspects of the corporate 
strategy. Thus, in China, the public-private divide differs from other countries and is not 




Figure 5.6 - State Grid Participation in associations in 2012 
 
Retrieved from: State Grid, 2012 
 
 
In the case of private companies, the use of associations may be a way of interacting 
with the public sector agenda without directly having to access the government or 
regulatory agencies outside the immediate corporate interests regarding its business 
operations. This differs in the case of SOEs, particularly in the domestic context in 
China. First, because many associations are tied to the state-structures. Second, SOE 
management personnel is classified as public servants and often occupy high ranks in 
government. Consequently, the purpose of associations serve more the function of 
industry-focused engagement forum. 
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Apart from the associations, the way the company interacts with the state can be seen 
below: 
 
Figure 5.7 - Involvement with state structures 
 
Retrieved from: Xu, 2016 
 
This figure shows how the company is not only embedded through ownership linkages, 
but other control channels that go beyond the normal shareholder rights. 
 
In the newly restructured energy sector, companies have to engage in policy advocacy 
if they want to remain competitive in a newly restructured market (PEARSON, 2008; 
SAMPSON, 2016; XU, 2016). When the electricity shortages turned into a political 
issue in the early 2000s, the NDRC’s reaction was to adopt a variety of measures such 
as raising energy tariffs, speeding up and improving approval procedures for coal 
plants, increasing investments in hydropower, and finally increasing investments and 
policy formulation for the adoption of renewable energies and technological capacity 
building (SAMPSON, 2016; XU, 2016). It was in this context that the SGCC suggested, 
during informal talks with the NDRC, building a cross-region, ultra-high-voltage 
transmission network. 
 
As Xu (2016) has emphasised, in the context of the 2002 reform, the transmission and 
distribution segment were largely operated by the SGCC, which explains the 
company’s need to speed up its advocacy if it was to survive the ongoing sector 
reforms in accordance with its own interests. As the SGCC proposed, the solution to 
the energy shortages and the coal-driven energy sector was to build countrywide 
transmission networks rather than having to transport coal to load centres. 
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5.2 Ultra-high voltage as a window of opportunity 
 
In China, the need to link consumer centres and energy generation centres across 
several thousand kilometres implied several challenges, including operational 
problems and electricity loss. The demand for higher efficiency created further 
incentives for the company to think of technology-oriented solutions like ultra-high 
tension (UHT) technology. In the course of its corporate development, the SGCC 
developed a large portfolio of solutions including advances in smart grids, electric 
mobility, and ultra-high voltage (UHV) technology. Turning specifically to UHV 
technology, UHV itself was not a new technology; rather, it had been developed in 
advanced economies but had not been advanced due to feasibility issues. 
 
Figure 5.8 - UHV Development 
 
2009 The world’s first commercial 1000kV UHV AC project under operation in China 
2010 The world’s first ±800 kV UHV DC project under operation in China 
2011 India’s first ±800 kV UHV DC project under construction 
2012 The transmission length of China’s ±800 kV UHV DC transmission project 
2013 The world’s first double circuit (UHV) AC project under operation in China 
The world’s first scale f±800 kV UHV DC transmission project integrating thermal and wind 
generation bases in China 
2015 Belo Monte ±800 kV UHV DC transmission project under first stage construction inBrazil 
 
The world’s first ±1000 kV UHV DC project under construction in China, transmission 
length exceeds 3000 km 
Retrieved from: State Grid, 2018 
 
 
As major operator of transmission and distribution spanning over 80% of China’s 
domestic territory, SGCC leads UHV transmission in China, by assimilating and 
localizing low- and mid-end technologies and driving the vertical integration of 
transmission utilities and manufacturers of electrical components. The SGCC 
understood UHV as a window of opportunity: ‘SGCC’s grid development agenda posed‘ 
a good leapfrog opportunity to secure a commanding position in international grid 
technologies’ (SAMPSON, 2016, p.147). It is necessary to look back on how the SGCC 
engaged with research and development (R&D) agenda as a strategic asset whereby 





following table provides an overview of SGCC’s increased R&D expenditure over the 
years: 
 
Table 5.2 - SGCC’s R&D expenditure over time 
 
Year R&D expenditure (RMB Billion) 
2005 RMB 2.001 billion 
2006 RMB 2.836 billion 
2007 RMB 4.559 billion 
2008 RMB 5.055 billion 
2009 RMB 5.138 billion 
2010 RMB 6.129 billion 
2011 RMB 6.452 billion 
2012 RMB 7.940 billion 
2013 RMB 5.787 billion 
2014 RMB 7.08 billion 
2015 RMB 7.376 billion 
2016 RMB 6.921 billion 
2017 RMB 7.828 billion 
Retrieved from: State Grid CSR Reports, 2005 - 2017 
 
 
To further understand the SGCC’s growth, the role of technology requires further 
consideration. According to Xu (2016, p.223), 
 
Technology is neither political nor interest neutral, as its selection is a political 
process where various interests compete, and those with ideas, resources and 
political influence tend to win. A technology that gains an early lead in adoption 
enjoys four types of increasing returns: scale economies, learning effects, 
adaptive expectations and network economies. 
 
 
Research and development efforts in the field of high-voltage technology had been 
conducted in China since 1986 and supported by the seventh, eighth, and tenth Five- 
Year Plans (Ke et al, 2017). The commercial usage of UHV was novel, and the SGCC 
used this idea to react to the unbundling requirements of Document No. 5, as explained 
in Chapter 3. The SGCC’s approach to UVH can be traced back to the early 2000s, 
and it was Liu Zhenya in his new position as CEO who endorsed the technology and 
mobilised efforts to come up with a national plan in 2004, target a nationally unified 
UHV-AC grid, and subsequently have it endorsed by the NDRC director Ma Kai 
(SAMPSON, 2016). As the SGCC had to garner political support for the endeavour, it 
had to make UHV one of the government’s political priorities. In 2004, management 
decided to take on the UHV projects as central issues and followed a series of 
measures, including the establishment of a special working unit for UHV feasibility, and 
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project-related aspects including the scientific and financial viability. A vision was 
brought to life with an action plan at its core to be followed through on in order to 
convince the NDRC to provide approval for the endeavour. Without any doubt, the 
SGCC’s structure, with thousands of employees working in different research arms of 
the company, as well as university-affiliated institutions, were vital for quickly speeding 
up the vision at a technical level. 
 
As seen in Chapter 3, the actors within the electricity sector have several different tasks 
to fulfil within the broader state-party structure. The participation of the SGCC itself 
should be understood in the context of the reforms of the 2002 regional market building 
agenda and the mid-2000s when marketization reforms had slowed down and the 
SGCC proposed the development of an integrated, non-competitive, nationally unified 
electricity supply system, which differed from the State Council’s reform plan built 
around asset breakup and regionalised competition. The SGCC decided to focus on 
large-scale infrastructure developments in the form of a UHV transmission grid. In 2006, 
the first demonstration project was started and SGCC proceeded to anchor UHV 
demonstration projects in the Project List of the National Energy Work Outline (2005 - 
2006). 
 
Similarly, SGCC anchored the strategy to the 2006 ‘National Outline for Medium- and 
Long-Term Science and Technology Development (2006-2020)’ issued by the State 
Council attributes the following role to indigenous innovation, which encouraged 
companies to mature research and development capabilities similar to those of MNCs 
from developed economies: 
 
The guiding principles for our S&T undertakings over the next 15 years are: 
‘indigenous innovation, leapfrogging in priority fields, enabling development, 
and leading the future’. Indigenous innovation refers to enhancing original 
innovation, integrated innovation, and re-innovation based on assimilation and 
absorption of imported technology, in order to improve our national innovation 
capability. Leapfrogging in priority fields is to select and concentrate efforts in 
those key areas of relative strength and advantage linked to the national 
economy and people’s livelihood as well as national security, to strive for 
breakthroughs and realize leaping developments. (National Outline, II. Guiding 
Principles, Development Goals, and General Deployment 1. Guiding Principles) 
 
Indigenous innovation is one of the main efforts of economic reforms and contains a 
notion of self-reliant/home-grown innovation, with a strong sense of domestic 
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companies making improvements to imported technologies and leaping technology 
with the business sector as the driver to reduce dependency on foreign technology. 
 
 
Figure 5.9 - Development of indigenous innovation over time 
Retrieved from: State Grid, 2016 
 
 
The SGCC’s Liu Zhenya was quick to follow up on the plan, publicly appreciate the 
support given by the government, and forge political legitimacy for the company’s 
endeavours: 
 
The Chinese government attaches great importance to and actively supports 
UHV work,and integrates UHV transmission technology research and 
equipment development into the 2006-2010 national economic and social 
development plan, the national medium- and long-term science and technology 
development plan, and the state. Revitalize the key work of the equipment 
manufacturing industry (PEOPLE DAILY, 2015). 
 
 
Given the wider panorama of the institutional environment the SGCC was moving in, 
the company moved to garner support for UHV as indigenous innovation and a method 
of increasing engagement abroad as a competitive and profitable actor. At the same 
time, the company drew on the ideational level of the Chinese economy (global 
competitiveness and guiding instructions of the party state) to develop its own 
discourse on how it would feed into the urgent needs of the development and 
expansion of the Chinese economy. To embark on this UHV journey meant technical 
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specialisation and working from the technological frontier. For this, the SGCC 
developed all of the necessary structures to company the capabilities needed to reach 
this frontier. 
 
In 2005, the SGCC proceeded to convince authorities.31 To do so, the company not only 
embarked on a media campaign but also guaranteed that it received endorsement of 
former senior officials and high-ranking industry and government members whose 
policy advice enabled the SGCC to open doors and publicly advocate for the 
technology. It must also be said that UHV technology, and therefore the SGCC’s 
visionary plan to install cross-national grids, faced strong resistance in China, with 
several industry experts warning against the creation of an even larger industry 
monopoly. In 2006, the official discourse on energy issues shifted from focusing on 
energy shortages to the pollution-causing coal-driven energy strategy and green 
development, which was subsequently added to the reasons that investment in UHV 
would contribute to the country’s most central priorities by focusing on energy transition. 
 
As trial UHV projects proved successful, it was easier for the company to win 
governmental support. The SGCC issued further plans for expanding and following 
through with the UHV in both AC and DC transmission while embarking on and aligning 
its political discourse with the government’s priorities. The SGCC’s ability to skilfully 
navigate a more pluralised decision-making environment in the post-2000 reforms, its 
unique position in the party-state system, and its R&D power due to the availability of 
large numbers of staff and research institutes have enabled it to develop its idea of a 
UHV network into a vision to reinforce the discourse of a climate-saving, green China. 
 
The same year the demonstration projects were initiated. The debate between UHV 
technologies (ultrahigh-voltage direct current - UHVDC and ultra-high-voltage 
alternating current - UHVAC) and the existing, competing extra-high voltage (EHV) 
technologies further augmented. The argument reinforced by SGCC was that UHVAC 
was particularly suitable for China as it was supporting China’s development vision, 
would bring technological progress and contribute to the growth of the electric 




31 Interview with SGCC representative, 2016. 
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implementation of China’s strong and smart power grid would be divided into three 
development phases: 
 
Table 5.3 - Phases of Grid Development 
 
2009–2010 Initial planning and pilot phase, where the master plan for smart grid construction 
should be made and selected pilot projects should be carried out 
2011–2015 Comprehensive construction phase, where major breakthroughs in key technology 
and equipment for smart grid should be achieved to subsequently enable extensive 
application; 
2016–2020 Upgrading and enhancing phase, where a strong and smart power grid in an all- 
round way will be built to significantly enhance and optimize grid performance with 
respect to resource allocation, security level, operation efficiency, and interplay 
among power grid, power generation, and power customers. 
Retrieved from: Xu et al, 2014 
 
 
In its own five-ear plan32, SGCC further progressed its ambitious grid plans with the 
announcement of the constriction of further transmission corridors in 2011, which 
resulted in the expansion of SGCC and the constriction of seven UHV projects in 2014, 
of which three used the DC and two projects used the AC technology. In 2015, SGCC 
announced the construction of another fourteen projects (SGCC, 2016). In his 
research, Sampson (2016) assesses the counterarguments made concerning the UHV 
agenda driven by SGCC – they all questioned the affirmations made by SGCC 
regarding UHV transmission. Overall, the arguments against the monopoly established 
by SGCC, its market power and reach into the policy-making environment were 
repeated throughout the years. SGCC was both admired and criticized and 
demonstrated the ability to choose from a wide range of strategic political menus to 


















32 It is common for Chinese SOEs to follow the overall planning logics of the state systems, including 
the long and mid-term planning documents. 
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Table 5.4 - UHV Counterarguments 
 
Economic • Use of state loans to finance regional transfers caused by UHV 
supergrid: Conventional technology capable of sustaining the expected 
increases in regional transfers while referring to UHV infrastructure with 
its much higher investment necessities – which were to be funded to a 
large extent via state bank loans – as a huge waste of state funds. 
• Economic impact of new technologies vs. coal based: Long-distance 
electricity transmission via UHV might end up costing three times as much 
as further developing the conventional rail-based system of transporting 
coal to power plants located near urban hubs. 
Grid Security • Grid synchronization: UHV-AC based synchronisation of the Central, 
East and North China regional grids was an unnecessary – and even 
dangerous – intervention in China’s grid structure, as it created the risk 
that an accident in one regional grid could cause frequency or voltage 
problems that would immediately spread to all the others 
• Advantages of multi-layered and decentralized regional grid 
structure: Most devastating blackouts across the world in the past 
decades had almost exclusively occurred in large and regionally 
interconnected AC-network structures and that China had not witnessed 
a single such incident in the past thirty years precisely because of its multi- 
layered and decentralised structure of distinct regional grids. 
Environmental • Energy generation: SGCC’s plans to construct large hydropower, 
nuclear and renewable energy bases were heavily criticised 
• Health related impacts of the transmission lines and related 
technology 
Retrieved from: Sampson, 2016, p.122-128 
 
 
While the debates concerning the centralization or decentralization efforts of energy 
transmission had similar nuances as the one occurring in Brazil, the costs planned for 
UHV lines were high - of roughly $1 million/mile of UHV lines, and each of the 
company’s planned trunk lines would cost billions of dollars (Paulson Institute, 2015). 
But apart from the criticism concerning the financial, security and environmental impact 
of the technologies, criticism was directed against the business politics of SGCC itself 
as the it aggressively pushed for its industry agenda over the years in meetings and in 
the scientific development of studies and assessment of UHV, as Sampson (2016, 
p.130) analyses: 
 
The grid company had banned all critical debate on the UHV plan within its own 
company realm while pressuring industry publications (such as the China Power News 
Network ( (⃯ێ   which had a long pre-reform affiliation with SGCC’s 
organisational predecessor) to report in a supportive fashion. 
 
Another part refers to the grid equipment-manufacturing segment. Although being 
formally bound to the reform agenda and the entities of the state and industry 
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structures, the SGCC pursued its own understanding of business development, 
particularly when it came to expanding in the area of grid manufacturing. These 
takeovers were not without outcries, as illustrated by the 2009 takeovers of China 
Electric Power Research Institute (CEPRI, ێ ) and the equipment 
manufacturers Pinggao ṛ by State Grid Equipment Co. ( ⃯ ), Xuji (
), which were both SGCC subsidiaries acting as holding companies. 
 
The China Machinery Industry Federation voiced its concerns regarding unfair 
competition for the national equipment industry. In an attempt to safeguard its interest, 
the association sought dialogue with the State Council and issued various appeals, 
accusing the SGCC of violating the goals of the power system reform (WANG, 2010). 
The SGCC’s move also caused disagreement with major sectorial entities. For 
example, former Director of the NEA Zhang Guobao said, 
 
State Grid Corporation later acquired Xuji Group and Pinggao Group. I did not 
agree. I did not sign. I have also done work. I said why do you need to do this? 
This is contrary to the separation of the original power reform ideas network and 
the main and auxiliary. If Pinggao Group and Xuji Group are acquired, other 
companies will feel that you are unfair in the future. But when they saw that I 
didn’t approve it, they approved it through other ministries (CHINA 
WEEKLY,2013). 
 
Overall, the SGCC’s move was a step against the policies guiding the electricity sector, 
demonstrating a diverging picture of an SOE capable of pursuing its interests within 
the state-party system. As explored later on, the development of UHV and the 
equipment manufacturing expansion had initially been relevant for SGCC to circumvent 
the regionalisation and unbundling efforts foreseen by the government, but these 
sectors were eventually highly profitable in the long run and provided the company with 
high market shares. 
 
In this context, with China’s increasing R&D strength, companies such as the SGCC 
no longer only adopt technology, but have increasingly engaged in the aforementioned 
indigenous innovation process.33 Over the past decade, SGCC’s monopoly position 
has facilitated their UHV transmission agenda and technological development plans. 
 
 
33 Interview with energy policy researcher, 2016. 
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The firm benefited from the protective industry agenda, including a local content 
requirement, which profits local firms. More specifically, due to the vertical integration 
of China’s Transmission and Distribution segment, the SGCC’s subsidiaries are in the 
most favourable positions, as State Grid bought equipment companies such as 
Pinggao Group, Nari and XJ Group. This can create issues in the bidding process, 
when SOE subsidiaries obtain privileged access. 
 
The engagement of SGCC in this segment and its increased dominance in the 
commissions of the State Council and other sectorial entities focuses on 
standardisation. Such attempts have not encountered favourable opinions only, as the 
following criticism by Prof. Lu Feng shows: 
 
In order to achieve profitability, the company will certainly use its own resources 
to lobby the government, influence the formulation of policies, and make it 
develop in a direction that is beneficial to them. This is not a problem in itself, 
but the administrative monopoly group itself has many functions of policy 
drafting and formulation, industrial planning and standard setting because of its 
public power. Moreover, these central enterprises are in charge of various huge 
resources, and they have the ability and strength to control the right to speak, 
publicly express opinions, and influence the direction of the policy…. from the 
current reverse operation of the State Grid, there is such a tendency 
(BUSINESS WATCH MAGAZINE, 2010). 
 
SGCC has impacted on the entire value chain of China’s UHV transmission 
development, such as the formulation of national plans and industrial standards, R&D, 
including the piloting testing of new technologies The SGCC advocated for making 
Chinese grid technology an international standard, which the company framed as 
entering a domain fully dominated by Western companies, as demonstrated by Yinbao 
Shu: 
 
As an innovative enterprise, SGCC develops new technologies to advance the 
electrical power industry. During the past years, SGCC has become a cutting 
edge global research organization in areas such as ultra-high voltage DC 
transfer, Smart Grid, large scale renewable energy integration, and electric 
vehicle charging networks. Through our R&D work, many national standards 
and corporate standards were established…. SGCC adopted lots of IEC 
International Standards in the past, but during the last ten years, along with the 
rapid development of Chinese technology, more and more of our technical 
standards have been adopted as IEC International Standards (SHU, 2016). 
 
 
This also meant SGCC’s participation in international standardisation organizations, 
which offered new markets and access to market trends and made it possible for the 
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SGCC to influence standardisation processes and participate in the committees. The 
SGCC entered the global standardisation scene in 2012 as a serving member of the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA) 
corporate Advisory Group and the IEEE-SA Board of Governors. 
 
Another part refers to the grid equipment engagement in IEC technical committee 
activities by holding committee chairmanship and the election of SGCC’s executive 
vice president Shu Yinbiao as the IEC’s vice chairman. Furthermore, the SGCC was 
active in CIGRE’s technical committees and held positions on various working groups 
and task forces. Overall, the SGCC’s search for international markets in which to apply 
its UHV systems has paved the way to invest in countries such as Brazil where market- 
based electricity price guarantees a return three times higher than would be possible 
in China, making the country an important actor in standard setting, while the SGCC 
has been engaging in international coordination processes as it aims to impact its 




5.3 The SGCC’s global footprint: formal and informal coordination 
 
Multinational corporations are able to adopt global strategies to take advantage of the 
value-creating network beyond their home country while strategically embedding 
themselves in the subsidiary’s country or region (HEIDENREICH, 2012). Given the 
SGCC’s monopoly position in the home market and domination of the technology chain 
related to goods and services of the transmission and distribution segment, it had an 
abundant portfolio of projects and presence in China. Coupled with access to finances 
- SGCC is the majority owner of the Yingda International Trust's investment fund and thus 
had extensive investment capacity - its growth forged its position in the technology 
market. 
 
In the context of the company internationalisation, both the strategy and engagement 
of SGCC were found to be characterised by contentious direct and indirect interactions 
between the company and the party-state structure. One of business political strategies 
was to draw on macro-policy orientations and anchor them to its business strategy. 
 
 
34 Interview with former employee, NDRC Department of Foreign Investment, 2017. 
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As the State Council’s ‘Going Global’/‘Going Out’ ( ᩳ ) strategy was embodied 
by the state institutions, building up a stimulating environment for company 
globalisation, the main feature of the SGCC’s ‘Going Global’ strategy was to rely on 
independent innovation and export the transmission technology despite the fact the 
there was no international market for UHV technology and equipment. In public 
statements, SGCC continuously referred to the ‘Going Global’ strategy and used the 
State Council’s ‘Grow large and strong’ ( य़ 强) approach, which was launched in 
the context of encouraging SOEs to increase their competitiveness. 
 
The first batch of SOE internationalisation in China’s energy sector had been driven by 
the oil and gas sector in the late 1990s, when investments abroad was still seen with 
caution by the government. In the case of the oil industry, SOEs advocated for support 
for overseas projects, arguing the increased need for oil was a strategic issue for 
China’s energy security and that the experience of joint-ventures with foreign MNCs in 
China had given them the necessary initial expertise for engaging in overseas 
acquisitions. SGCC benefitted from the experience of these companies, especially with 
increased adjustment of the business environment for overseas acquisitions, but also 
the experience of these countries in managing assets abroad. 
 
Meidan (2016) describes that despite the increased activity of O&G SOEs abroad and 
the advocacy in company headquarters for simplification of approval procedures and 
favourable tax treatment to foreign projects, central government was still hesitant to 
provide companies with greater autonomy for its ventures abroad. The author analyses 
the case of CNPC’s foreign E&P campaign which omitted the company’s own central 
management and closed deals independently, as company staff had the necessary 
connections to domestic industry and ensured a great augment of autonomy to the 
subsidiary (MEIDAN, 2016). Overall, SGCC learnt important lessons from previous 
internationalisation experiences of other SOEs concerning the autonomy of 
subsidiaries, financial autonomy for investment, the need for greater decision-making 




In the mid-2000s, SGCC first started its first internationalisation efforts and what it 
needed was to guarantee central government support. A meeting with MOFCOM 
resulted in the internationalisation endorsement, and other meetings with the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) secured support from the relevant approval entities (Xu, 
2016, Sampson, 2016). Since 2008, international business is developed under State 
Grid International Development (SGID), which was founded when SGCC entered the 
market in the Philippines and incorporated in Hong Kong. This is to ensure a 
centralized decision-making authority within the parent company. The subsidiaries are 
viewed as important divisions and lucrative assets, specifically when investing abroad. 
 
SGID aims ‘actively participate in international cooperation in the field of energy and 
power, enhance global resource integration capabilities, and gradually gain influence 
and voice in the international energy field’, as voiced SGID CEO Zhu Guangchao ( 
), and divides its international business into four larger fields: (1) overseas asset 
investment operations; (2) international capacity cooperation; (3) grid interconnection 
and international energy cooperation; and (4) international standards. Benefitting from 
the controlled electricity pricing system in China and its expanding monopolistic 
position, the access to global markets contributed to the SGCC’s position as an 
important domestic player because international success promised high returns on 
investment that were unobtainable in the domestic market (STATE GRID, 2013), 
 
One of the main lessons of the overseas acquisitions of O&G SOEs was to maintain 
strict internal and international discipline while engaging abroad. As explained in the 
previous chapters, SGCC had to follow a series of policy measures if it wanted to 
develop business abroad. The company had to obey the central government’s policy 
guidance on overseas investments, as for example in the case of SASAC’s 2012 
Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Overseas Investment by 
Central Enterprises (SASAC, 2012), formally noting the companies to: 
 
(1) Comply with the national economic and social development plan and the 
industrial policy for overseas investment; 
 




(3) Conform to the enterprise development strategy and international business 
strategy Highlighting the main business is conducive to improving the 
international competitiveness of enterprises; 
 
(4) The scale of investment is compatible with the scale of business assets, the 
level of assets and liabilities, the actual fund-raising capacity and financial 
affordability; 
 
(5) Compliance with the laws of the country (region) where the investment is 
made And policies that respect local customs. 
 
Apart from the adherence to policy guidance at state level, SGCC also ensured State 
Grid International Development (SGID), SGCC’s subsidiary and centralized authority 
mechanisms for overseas project evaluation, negotiations, and expansion, was 
integrated in the duality of the party-state logic while operating abroad, issuing of 
guidance for overseas party branches, as emphasized by SGID party secretary is Li 
Haixiang ( ) (SGCC, 2016). This demonstrates that even in the 
internationalisation context, the informal connections between the different company 
units, subsidiary-headquarter relations are extended overseas and are an important 
element of the firm’s inner political capital and maintenance of political leverage with 
the home country political institutions, while they do not assume any relevant 
dimension in the political setting of the host country.35 
 
The choices of where the SGCC would invest would be based on where it could build 
on its experience, and best use its competitive political and economic advantages, 
including financing, technology and domestic and diplomatic support. Following its 
internationalisation approach, the company engaged in international agreements and 
benchmarking to further improve the management, which becomes evident in its 2011 













35 Political ranks of Chinese staff overseas, specifically in management positions are usually not 
displayed by the companies. 
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Figure 5.10 - Globalization strategy 
Business globalization. Push forward six business categories, including overseas power investment 
and operation, international cooperation on energy resources, electrical equipment manufacturing, 
international power projects, international power technology and management consulting, and 
international exchange and cooperation. Forge four platforms for investment and capital operation, 
electrical equipment, international power projects and international power consulting. 
 
Management benchmarking globalization. Carry out industrial benchmarking with international 
strategic partners, exchange experience in grid management, operation and maintenance, and reach 
a consensus on important issues regarding very large grid operation and technical innovation. 
 
Resource allocation globalization. SGCC has integrated all kinds of international business 
resources in aspects of personnel, finance, material, R&D, and project consulting services. It has 
optimized the all-level coordination mechanism in the Headquarters, regional branches, provincial 
companies, subsidiaries, and overseas offices, and enhanced its support for international business. 
The company has established a selection and incentive mechanism for international talents and set 
up an overseas training system for senior management. 
Retrieved from: State Grid, 2011 
 
In terms of economic leverage, SGCC was eager to be recognized as global leader in 
the development of ultra-high-voltage (UHV) power transmission and transformation 
technology. More than that, Chairman Liu Zhenya emphasized the global energy 
market as strategic arenas of competition, as consolidating global standards will 
increase competition between energy companies equipment manufacturers to ‘go 
global’ (LIU, 2013). In other words, strengthening China’s input in international 
standard setting would result in status quo, recognition and legitimacy. 
 
SGCC understood one of the forms to achieve such recognition, was in the field of 
international energy cooperation. For example, the 2009 International Conference on 
UHV (Ultra High Voltage) Transmission held in Beijing was attended by representatives 
from governments, industry, power utilities, R&D institutes, academia and financial 
organizations from 21 countries and regions. The SGCC guaranteed its voice heard 
and received the high-level endorsement of the Chinese Premier emphasizing the 
need to develop ultra-high-voltage (UHV) power transmission technology as part of 
China's energy distribution strategy (SGCC, 2011). 
 
Less than ten years later, in 2017, with the celebration of the Belo Monte transmission 
lines with the ±800 kilovolt (kV) UHV DC transmission technology SGCC chairman Shu 
Yinbao celebrated the company as successful ‘going out’ of China’s UHV transmission 
technology, meaning that China’s UHV transmission technology, specifications, and 
standards had officially entered the global application stage. In other words, as the 
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National Energy Administration (2018) framed it, UHV had become a Chinese 
‘namecard’ (  ’ ’). 36 
 
Figure 5.11 - The SGCC’s overseas presence 
Retrieved from: State Grid, 2017 
 
 
When considering overseas assets, SGCC took into consideration if the project would 
enhance both experience and advantages of its national grid system, 
internationalisation electric equipment, power engineering, and technical consulting 
would be maximized. The context of SGCC internationalisation is different from studies 
of for e.g. private firm internationalisation and the discussions when the government 
intervened in national companies’ firm business. As a national champion and huge 
business group, SGCC had particular advantages as had an internal market in the form 
of horizontal and vertical linkages among group affiliates as well as institutional support 
from the government (Yiu,2011). This provided the company with advantages in terms 
of R&D capacity, value chain and reach. 
 
In the case of SGCC, the government aligned SGCC’s discourse to its foreign policy 
discourse in 2011, although even before SGCC had been mentioned in state 
documents related to foreign policy and at bilateral visits presidents or ministers of 
foreign countries, where firm participation was included as a deliverable of the visit with 
 
36 Interview with representative of SGCC, 2016. 
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the signature of cooperation agreements, for example. The table below shows the 
gradual expansion strategy of the company, as it strived to develop into a golden 
business card ( ). According to the Deputy Director of the SGCC’s International 
Department, Lu Shirong ( ) as a consequence of national market differences, 
different investment strategies were adopted, which continuously optimized the 
overseas business layout. While Europe, America and Oceania have a good market 
environment and stable income, which allow equity investment mergers and 
acquisitions; South America and Africa are rich in energy resources and have great 
development potential. In the case of the developing countries with a lack of technology 
and funding, greenfield and contracting were the preferred firm strategies (PEOPLE’S 
NETWORK, 2017). 
 
Table 5.5 –The SGCC’s overseas expansion 
 
2009 SGCC's first overseas push starts with the purchase of a 40% stake in a grid operator in 
the Philippines 
2010 SGCC acquires 100% stakes of seven Brazilian transmission companies with concessional 
rights of 30 years. It is the first independently operated grid asset overseas for SGID. 
2012 SGCC purchases a 25% stake in Portuguese state power company Redes Energeticas 
Nacional and became a de facto member of the European Transport Network organization 
(ENTSO-E). 
2012 SGCC buys 80% of shares of U.S. AES Corporation's wind power business. 
2013 Purchase of a 60 % stake in SPI (Australia) Assets Pty Limited (SPIAA), as well as a 19.9 
% stake in its sister company SP AusNet. 
2014 SGCC as main financier of the Regional Development Project for Energy Transmission 
between the Centre and South (Cesul) in Mozambique. 
2014 In Italy, SGCC partners with the Italian state in buying 35% of the CDP Reti fund from the 
Italian Cassa dei Depositi. This way, SGCC obtains a blocking minority over the activities 
of SNAM (gas network operator) and Terna (electricity transmission network operator). 
2016 SGCC buys a 14% stake in Eandis, a leading Belgian power grid operator. 
2016 SGCC agrees with the Russian power grid company Rosseti to set up a joint venture in 
China. 
2017 SGCC buys a 24% stake of Public Power Corp. (ADMIE) and a 75% stake of the private 
group Copelouzos, becoming a key player in transport and distribution in Greece. Part of 
the Mediterranean grid, ADMIE has a connected grid with countries in the region. 
2017 CPFL Energia to 54.6%, adding to the 23.6% interest it bought for some 5.8 billion real 
($1.82 billion) in September. CPFL controls 14% of the domestic market, operating grids 
in Sao Paulo and other states. 
Retrieved from: SGCC, 2013 and 2018 
 
The summarized table of SGCC’s investment abroad reinforces how fast the firm 
internationalized and became an important international business actor. The first 
decade of the 2000s with lack of public financing in energy sectors globally and the 
financial crisis was an ideal moment for the SOE to go global and enter the international 
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policy arena. By selectively focusing on the ‘strategic value’ of its domestic capacity in 
China, SGCC gradually adjusted to the increasing economic and political momentum 
of China’s growth as international player to its internationalisation agenda. 
 
The effectiveness of MNCs in foreign countries depends on a variety of factors. With 
regard to business politics, the use of diplomacy implied certain comparative 
advantages, as it is immediately available in the embassies and predictable in terms of 
results, implied less costs and was politically acceptable. In the case of SGCC, for 
example, the prestigious Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in charge of diplomacy and 
interaction with foreign governments, but with limited resources and little jurisdiction is 
only one of the actors to support the company abroad. 
 
While embassies can aid with crucial information-gathering, they can also provide entry 
points for companies and provide a network structure for future business development. 
In the case of Brazilian investment in Brazil, the Chinese embassy guaranteed its 
political support to SGCC in the context of the diplomatic machinery of government. In 
the case of investments abroad, there are differences in the support for example 
provided by the home country, such as e.g. commercial diplomacy or other government 
services, including investment promotion. In China, commercial diplomacy is driven by 
the powerful Ministry of Commerce, in charge of domestic and international commerce 
supervision, investment and aid. As already illustrated, SGCC depends on MOFCOM’s 
approval for its overseas business and has substantial nominal involvement with the 
local authorities for business purposes. 
 
At the same time, the successful internationalisation of major Chinese SOEs also 
demonstrate that foreign policy and diplomacy are no longer the sole preserve of 
government, but that companies can be important stakeholders in representing the 
wider interests of a country, going beyond the economic realm. SGCC does not only 
maintain a network with local elites across countries but also has to maintain good 
relations with a series of local actors, ranging from cities, state-level and federal actors. 
In addition, it participates in the most diverse events in the countries of its activities, 
ranging from official ceremonial events, policy-driven workshops, government and 
public-sector activities, etc. As a result, the company has a deep understanding of the 
bilateral state-to state relations and business environment. Abroad, SGCC’s business 
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politics materialize mostly outside the shells of the Chinese states, even though the 
country continues to be confined to the party-state system. 
 
One consideration has to be made concerning the role of states in business 
development. The way governments relate to companies, national or foreign 
enterprises, vary. This can be seen in the cases of SGCC’s investments in the different 
countries, where governments either sought to attract Chinese investment or rejected 
the company’s presence in the national grid. To exemplify the different outcomes of 
SGCC’s business politics in the process of internationalisation, we briefly assess the 
cases of SGCC’s presence in the Philippines, in Portugal and in Germany. The 
following section shows that for example the experience in instable political 
environments can contribute to a higher political risk awareness and better crisis 
management. Also, the consequence of the extensive internationalisation of a 
developing country company might induce states to develop antagonistic positions 
towards company presence.  
 
The SGCC’s first step on the path to ‘Going Global’ occurred in Southeast Asia when 
the SGCC acquired 40% of the shares of the Philippines’ national grid with concession 
rights. The Philippines had been trying to privatise the management of the National 
Transmission Corp (Transco) since 2003 in order to boost state finances and 
modernise its energy sector. After a lengthy bidding process, the consortium between 
Monte Oro Grid Resources Corporation, Calaca High Power Corporation and the 
SGCC gained the right to operate the Philippine power grid with a $3.95 billion bid in 
what would be the largest privatisation in the Philippines’ history. Overall, the case of 
SGCC in the Philippines is a case about how different institutional characteristics shape 
interests, and strategy. 
 
Experiencing and navigating not only the interests inside but also the powerful interests 
outside of the government were key in SGCC’s market approach in the early years of 
the investment in order to mitigate political constraints. Camba (2017) suggests that 
SGCC’s approach in the country was successful due to the firm’s coalition with major 
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Philippine economic elites as partners37 guaranteeing the distribution of economic 
return and ‘exerted structural material power onto SGCC’s economic and political 
opponents, attenuated contention and political mobilization’. Such assertiveness vis- 
à-vis domestic business elites could create entry points for the company, when it had 
increasing difficulties in the host context. This points to the role of different types of 
elites in the internationalisation process, not only in the home but also in the host 
context as an important factor in determining business success of MNC: the presence 
of countervailing actors or conflictual topics can impact strongly on firm performance 
and needs to be foreseen or remedied. If not navigated well, the company itself could 
turn into a topic of high political salience. 
 
This was the case in the deteriorating bilateral relations in the beginning of 2013 
between the China and the Philippines. As a SOE, SGCC faced strong headwinds 
when voices in the Philippines raised national security concerns over the major role 
SGCC had occupied in the national electricity market. The technical operation of the 
grid has been negotiated since 2013, and in 2014 the Philippine decided against 
renewing the visas of 18 Chinese national working at NGCP in the Philippines. In 2013, 
the government had informed the Chinese government regarding the security of foreign 
companies access to the national power grids. As the case of the Philippines and the 
German case shows, governments, with national security and foreign policy objectives 
that exceed efficiency concerns, have the power to intervene in private transactions. In 
the case of the Philippines, SGCC management took long to acknowledge this 
constraint and act to turn the unfavourable bilateral climate to their favour. Once the 
poster child of SGCC overseas activities, the company’s activities with NGCP were 
strongly impacted by the turbulent political environment. While regulatory contexts for 
evaluating incoming FDI differ, as well the awareness of Chinese FDI is constructed in 
parallel to China’s relative power. Authors recognize the different societal interests 
behind such perceptions: ‘While relatively few deals have been blocked by a negative... 
finding or a recommendation not to apply, almost all major deals were subject to 




37 The business partners of SGCC, Calaca High Power Corporation and Monte Oro Grid Resources 
Corporation, were initially controlled by Enrique Razon and subsequently acquired by Henry Sy, both 
belonging to the Philippines' economic elite (CAMBA, 2017) 
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security community, domestic industry incumbents’ (ROSEN AND HANEMANN, 2011, 
p. 62). 
 
After its first move in the Philippines, SGCC continued its gradual move abroad. When 
with reforms in Brazil new assets became available, the SGCC made its move into the 
Brazilian market, pursuing an aggressive strategy of buying stakes in local 
concessionaries and participating in transmission auctions, of which the Belo Monte 
transmission lines would be the most important ones, because they would enable the 
export of UHV technology. The SGCC’s goal was to utilise UHV-DC technology to 
connect it with distant load centres.38 
 
After pressure from the European Union and global financial institutions, such as the 
International Monetary Fund to mitigate the impact of the global financial crisis on 
Portugual, in 2012, the government of Portugal began its privatisation programme and 
officially allowed SGCC to buy a 25% stake in Redes Energeticas Nacionais (REN), the 
Portuguese national energy network company via a public privatisation programme. The 
case of REN’s privatization, however, did not remain uncontested in the domestic 
environment. The Portuguese Court of Auditors (TRIBUNAL DE CONTAS, 2015) 
evaluated that the bank Banco Espirito Santo de Investimento, which had been involved 
in assessing the possible privatization of REN and provided financial advisory to SGCC, 
committed a conflict of interest due to possible insider information in the bidding 
process. 
 
As the concession holder of the two main Portuguese energy infrastructure the 
networks, the Rede Nacional de Transporte (RNT) and the Rede Nacional de 
Transporte de Gas Natural (RNTGN), REN has been an interesting target for SGCC. 
According to the agreement with the Portuguese government, the SGCC would send 
a senior management team to take part in the strategic development of REN. The 
SGCC’s role was that of a strategic investor and promote a long-term, stable 
cooperation with the company’s other stakeholders, promoting the efficiency and 
stability of Portugal’s national grid with its expertise in grid planning, construction, 




38 SGCC’s business politics in Brazil will be analysed in the following chapter. 
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would provide 1 billion euros financing to meet REN refinancing needs and complete 
new investment plans. 
 
In turn, REN would provide valuable knowledge in terms of technical cooperation for 
the development of renewable energy. The cooperation received high-level 
endorsement. SGCC CEO Liu Zhenya met with Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro 
Passos Coelho to discuss extending the cooperation in the field of electricity and power 
and with other minister of the government, including the Minister of Finance, Foreign 
Relations Minister and the Minister of Economy. The diplomatic efforts embedded in 
the meeting were enormous, the company wanted to guarantee the positive reception 
of the acquisition by the government and guarantee a smooth market entry and 
operation. 
 
The high-level ties proved necessary to further address the strategic business interests 
of SGCC in the country and reduce regulatory burdens. In 2013, the Portuguese 
government announced the draft state budget for 2014 proposing the creation of an 
extra contribution applicable to economic operators in the energy sector that develop 
the following activities, directly affecting REN and consequently the return of its 
Chinese investors. SGCC together with other Chinese companies in the sector lobbied 
against the tax with the help of the Chinese embassy (21st Century Business Herald, 
2015). The success of this appeal against the tax is to be confirmed. REN appealed to 
the arbitration tribunals of the tax administration to challenge the tax, and later 
appealed to the Portuguese Constitutional Court. Different than other sector 
companies, which refused to pay the tax, REN fulfilled the contributions while disputing 
them legally (REN, 2018). 
 
In Australia, SGCC’s market entry experienced close regulatory and public scrutiny, 
when State Grid became a major shareholder of the non-listed Australian company 
ElectraNet, which is responsible for operating the South Australian electricity 
transmission. It took minority shares in the company with an initial purchase of 41%, 
increasing the stake to 46% in 2013. Later, SGID and Singapore Power Limited (SP) 
completed the equity settlement in Australia. Chinese Consul General in Melbourne 
Song Yumin, SGCC EVP Du Zhigang and SP CEO Wong Kim Yin attended the 
ceremony, expressing the high-level importance given to the acquisition. SGCC signed 
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an agreement with SP to buy 60% stake in SPIAA and 19.9% stake in SP AusNet, both 
of which are Singapore Power’s Australian assets. This was a major move in SGCC 
market endeavours and meant a key step in its business politics of internationalisation, 
as it was the first time the company invested both in overseas electricity and gas 
distribution assets. 39 In 2016, when SGCC and Hong Kong-listed Cheung Kong 
Infrastructure were bidding for a 99-year lease of Ausgrid, a power supplier power in 
New South Wales, the Federal Treasurer temporarily blocked the sale to the bidders 
(ABC, 2016). SGCC’s attempted bidding faced strong headwinds from national 
industry actors, including a union campaign (ABC, 2015). The bids were formally 
rejected in August of the same year on the grounds of national security concerns. 
 
Other market ventures into the South, East and Central European markets have 
followed and promoted SGCC’s consolidation in the grid segment by promoting the 
lucrative grid equipment segment. The expansion and renovation project of the 
Kozienice substation in Poland, constructed by SGCC subsidiary Pinggao Group Co., 
Ltd., was completed in Poland and is the first power transmission and transmission 
general contracting project completed by a Chinese company in the European Union. 
In 2014 already, the Pinggao Group and Poland's national transmission system 
operator Polskie Sieci Elektronergetyczne SA (PSE) signed a contract for the 
expansion and renovation project of the Kozienice substation with a value of 252 million 
yuan. Since Pinggao Group entered the Polish market, it has signed and carried out six 
general contracting projects of PSE. The group plans to start from Poland and bring 
Chinese equipment to other EU countries (SGCC, 2016). In this context, the role of the 
Belt and Road Initiative also has been a major way to anchor SGCC not only to Chinese 
foreign policy and economic engagement abroad, but also to promote the relevance of 
SGCC as an economic actor for the Chinese government itself. 
 
In the case of Chinese firms, the larger they are, the more likely they are to attract the 
attention of national governments, regulators and other interest groups. The SGCC’s 
attempts to step into the German market have been met with resistance. In 2018, the 
SGCC planned to acquire a stake in a major German grid operator, 50Hertz, which is 
 
39 The assets were considered lucrative, with the companies primarly operating in the Victoria, 
Queensland, New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory. While SPIAA is active in the power 
distribution, transmission and distribution segments, as well as infrastructure services, SP AusNet, 
provides similar energy services in the state of Victoria. 
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one of Germany’s four high-voltage power network operators. The Australian 
infrastructure fund Industry Funds Management (IFM Global Infrastructure Fund) had 
previously announced its intention to part with half of its 40% participation in Eurogrid 
International, the sole owner of the transmission system operator 50Hertz 
Transmission via Eurogrid GmbH. In March of that year, the takeover attempt by SGCC 
failed, as the majority shareholder of Eurogrid International, the Belgian electricity 
network operator Elia System Operator S.A. made use of its right of first refusal and 
thus increased its stake from 60 to 80 percent. In late May, IFM announced its aim to 
sell its remaining 20% stake in Eurogrid International (BMWI, 2018). 
 
The attempt of SGCC’s German market entry showed how difficult firm participation 
and the development of institutional capacities vital to enhance its pursuit of 
preferences can be. Although SGCC achieved to mobilize embassy support in 
Germany, in late July, two German ministries, the Federal Ministry of Finance and the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy announced they had acquired the 
share and justified this measure with security reasons concerning the protection of 
critical energy infrastructures and the role of investors with significant state participation 
from third countries outside the European Union. In return, SGCC and the Chinese 
diplomats evaluated this as a protectionist move, contrary to opening of until- now 
protected sectors of the Chinese economy (BMWI, 2018). At the same time, the move 
of the German government was welcomed in the European Union, where the suspicion 
concerning increasing Chinese investment into strategic economic sectors had grown 
and turned into a politicum. More than a market challenge, or a in terms of competition, 
countries had started to see SGCC as a challenge to its technological capabilities. 
 
This also calls attention to the role of decisional-power of investment deals and 
screening for understanding national business politics of MNCs. In the US and Canada, 
the role of Chinese influence groups trying to impact on investment decision-making 
structures is very consolidated and institutionalized. For example, in the US Congress, 
the Congressional China Caucus and the US-China Working Group are two groups with 
sceptical opinions concerning China. Consequently, for advocacy support concerning 
investment deals, bigger companies do not necessarily depend on individuals of the 
national elite to get their business done, rather they could engage 
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with the pro-China support groups, for example. At the sub-national level interest such 
as regional, export or sectorial issues could be potential helpful factors for mobilizing 
and enabling national environment. 
 
When in 2013 the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) gained momentum, Chinese SOEs 
strategically adapted their business strategy and policy narrative to the BRI. In the case 
of SCGG, ‘Electricity infrastructure construction has become one of the most active 
sectors to promote the Belt and Road Initiative’ (CHINA DAILY, 2018). According to 
SASAC, forty-two central SOEs have participated in in nearly 1,700 BRI projects by 
establishing joint ventures, making direct investments or becoming shareholders. In 
the case of the energy sector, the 13th Five-Year Plan for Electricity Power 
Development encourages companies explicitly to implement the initiative and actively 
promote international cooperation in power equipment, technology, standards, and 
engineering services. Overall, the Belt and Road Initiative provided companies such 
as SGCC a somewhat standardized set narrative of international discourse, regardless 
the variation in implementation. It brought the possibility of both coherence and 
autonomy of both private and public business actors in China. Just as in the case as 
Sampson (2016) analysed the ‘synchronization’ mode of SGCC in domestic politics, 
the same logic applies for its activities abroad. 
 
While the efficiency of Chinese diplomatic support in favour Chinese business interests 
abroad requires further study, the Chinese state has been increasingly empowering the 
SOES to become more efficient and better use market dynamics to their advantage. 
While the government and approval agencies of the state do not determine where to 
make the investments, the modes of interaction between government and company 
evolved also alongside the increased international engagement of China. Beyond the 
commercial acquisitions, SGCC has also approached the institutionalized international 
cooperation mechanisms, such as the ‘international capacity cooperation’, thereby 
helping the company to expand its strategic alignment with China’s economic policy 
objectives overseas. In 2019, SGCC celebrated the Borosus-Samanoud and 
Samanoud-Banha transmission lines of Egypt's EETC 500 kV power transmission 
project as first international productive capacity cooperation project between China and 
Egypt with a contracted value of $ 758 million (SGCC, 2018). Therefore, SGCC 
engaged with the overall Chinese policy mechanisms and instruments available for 
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diplomatic support outlined in Chapter 1, including anchoring its business to 
established strategic partnerships; economic cooperation (infrastructure cooperation) 
and diplomacy in soft-power domains (e.g. corporate social responsibility initiatives to 
the broader interest of Chinese cultural diplomacy). 
 
One of the most important factors impacting on SGCC business politics is the least 
well expressed – the politization of its presence as Chinese SOE abroad resulting in 
part from fears of the erosions of state sovereignty either to foreign actors. In terms of 
political engagement, what impacts on the SGCC business abroad is the increasing 
politization of grid security when it comes to the participation of foreign and mostly 
Chinese-origin companies. Short-term, the mechanisms of influence of the firm to 
increase its market opportunities and mitigate reputational risk particularly in developed 
economies remains relatively limited. Mostly importantly, the shifts in domestic politics 
(e.g. change of party or president in the administration). 
 
Long-term, SGCC’s determination to occupy key spaces in international policy, 
international cooperation and by driving its own initiative (GEICO) will gradually 
progress its standing abroad. Its embeddedness in the domestic sector in China as the 
major actor for sectoral policy strongly differs from its position abroad. The 
circumstances under which SGCC matured as a company and its financial disposition 
for internationalisation may be unique but show the adaptiveness of companies and 
their ability to drive policy-relevant changes, as demonstrated by the smart grid agenda. 
 
Firms decide to take business issue to the multilateral level and create arenas of 
interaction where private sector, politicians and diplomats meet and mingle. Apart from 
its business abroad, the SGCC also stepped up its presence in the international policy 
arena. As early as 2006, Liu Zhenya proposed the establishment of a transnational 
mechanism to debate transmission technology: 
 
Here, I propose to establish an international UHV transmission technology 
communication mechanism, share experience and knowledge, promote the 
research and application of UHV transmission technology in various countries, 
and jointly meet the challenges of sustainable development of the power 
industry in the new century (CHINA DAILY, 2006). 
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Such strategy proved particularly helpful as it enabled SGCC to feed into agenda- 
setting, as well as engage with different types of elites of the energy sector, both policy 
but also political elites. This is strategic as it both advances the immediate business 
interests and the market environment. 
 
It seems only natural therefore, that the SGCC’s proactive involvement at the policy 
level has raised attention. The SGCC has entered the global stage as more than just 
a company with multiple interests across different continents. One of its ambitious 
ideas is the Global Energy Interconnection (GEI) initiative, ‘a globally interconnected 
power system, supported by Smart Grid infrastructure, and making optimal use of UHV 
technology to transmit power over great distances’ (GEI, 2018), driven by the SGCC’s 
chairman Liu Zhenya. The ambitious goal was to connect electricity systems of nations 
and brand them as transcontinental ‘supergrids’ with the capacity of exchanging energy 
across borders and oceans. The final purpose of the vision of ‘interconnectivity’, 
promoted as ‘clean energy transition’ is both as a sales instrument for the transmission 
lines over long distances, as well as technology provider for the lines. 
 
SGCC recognized that technical information was an asset to influence the 
policymakers across national environments. The Global Energy Interconnection 
Development and Cooperation Organisation (GEIDCO) was launched as a joint effort 
of dozens of equipment manufacturers, energy corporations, business associations, 
and civil society groups. 
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Figure 5.12 - Membership structure of GEIDCO 
Retrieved from: GEIDCO Website, 2018 
 
In this regard, the membership structure transcended not only geographical levels but 
also sectoral boundaries across different manufacturing needs. According to the 
GEIDCO, it has 312 members across 42 countries in 5 continents and different offices 
globally. 
 
Figure 5.13 - GEIDCO offices worldwide in 2017 
Retrieved from: GEIDCO, 2017 
 
It is no coincidence that this initiative has developed in the global arena. The Chinese 
government has adopted GEI as part of a national strategy to push forward renewable 
energy development. Internationally, President Xi Jinping introduced GEI at the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2015. In this regard, the national 
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level alone provides only a partial understanding of companies’ larger picture and the 
extent of their projected development. The understanding of the SGCC as a relevant 
policy actor with its own network is one of these examples. 
 
In the same month of President Xi’s visit, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki 
Moon met with Liu Zhenya at UN headquarters, where he said that the UN would help 
to facilitate this vision and the establishment of new arenas and policy spaces. In the 
case of Brazil, in 2017, the Minister of Mines and Energy visited the GEIDCO and 
signed a joint declaration of technical cooperation intent. The initiative is thereby 
presented as a practical solution to complex global issues and challenges, such as 
climate change and energy matrix diversification: ‘The Global Energy Interconnection 
is ‘Smart Grid + UHV Grid + Clean Energy’; it is an infrastructure platform on which 
clean energy can be developed, transmitted, and used massively worldwide’ (GEICO, 
2017). Scholarship such as Schneider (2009) understands that lobbying is too costly 
for the average firm to undertake individually. But SGCC is not the average firm: it has 
the necessary funding and long-term vision to pool both interests and resources to 
political outputs. 
 
Business politics of the multinational company are not purely the product of internal 
corporate dynamics. The web below summarizes the functionally differentiated 
elements of a well networked internationalisation approach within the powerful 
relationships that constitute the social, political, and economic relations of SGCC. 
Taken together, the organizational and substantive international engagement provides 
a glance into the complex structure of norms and relations guiding the company in the 
policy arena. Its push towards collective action in the international policy arena, the 
use of UHV as a vehicle for consolidating its market share and the thirst for event 




Figure 5.14 - internationalisation ambitions 
 
 
Retrieved from: SGCC 2011 CSR Report 
 
 
The analysis of SGCC business politics in the context of internationalisation is selective 
by focusing on the federal level. Until the end of 2017, SGCC had successfully 
achieved to establish its 2011 launched objectives for its corporate internationalisation. 
The company had fruitfully invested and operated national and regional backbone 
energy networks in the Philippines, Brazil, Portugal, Australia, Italy and Greece with a 
high volume of overseas assets. It had achieved to spearhead international 
cooperation on energy cooperation, undertook trainings of energy staff and experts 
across different countries (capacity cooperation) and had turned into a major 
stakeholder in the electrical equipment manufacturing. With all its efforts, the firm had 
not only improved its asset portfolio, but also globalized it. 
 
SGCC used its market power to impact on standardization and anchored Chinese 
national standards in UHV into the international system. As a state-owned company, 
SGCC also brought positive return to the institutional standing of Chinese state actors, 
including SASAC and the National Development and Reform Commission, in the 
context of the Foreign Investment Department. In terms of foreign policy exposure, 
successful projects abroad were anchored to the Chinese foreign agenda and image 
projection of the country abroad. Similarly, the standardization allowed the leapfrogging 
and the increase of China’s image and credibility in the electricity and grid equipment 
manufacturing sector, as the company provided expertise and knowledge. In terms of 
international capacity cooperation, SGCC allowed China to be situated as 
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a knowledge-broker by bringing foreign personal to China for training and industry- 
related qualification. 
 
When businesses perceive long-term challenges or regular obstacles, political action 
may become critical. However, what can be noted from this chapter is that in the 
context of MNCs, the privileged access does not always guarantee returns from 
politically sensitive assets, as the case of the utility sector shows. While this 
dissertation follows the overall understanding of Schneider’s portfolio analysis of 
business investment in politics, what weighs in the case of SGCC business politics in 
China are less the role of elections and campaign contributions, but ‘policy’ lobbying, 
personal and policy networks and business associations. In the case of its presence 
as MNC abroad, factors such as institutional and sectorial determinants in the host 
context, including personal and policy networks and business associations, but also 




6 BUSINESS POLITICS IN BRAZIL’S ENERGY SECTOR: THE CASE OF SGCC 
 
 
The energy sector has been the main target of investments by Chinese companies in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. This chapter analyses the processes underlying the 
market entry and consolidation of the SGCC in Brazil. While in China, the SGCC was 
able to pursue its industrial and internationalisation agenda with relative autonomy, 
while confined to the state-business system. The company possessed the expertise 
and technology and turned them internationally competitive by building a brand name 
and set standards in the industry. In Brazil, where its institutional embeddedness is 
weaker, it relied on a comparative economic advantage, such as a low-cost bidding 
strategy, knowledge exchange, on-time delivery and diplomatic support. This chapter 
shows how the firm was able to incrementally build on existing strengths and industrial 
capabilities to participate in the Brazilian energy sector. It concludes that SGCC’s 
business politics in Brazil were business-oriented, contradicting studies claiming state- 
driven and political motivations. 
 
 
6.1 Market entry 
 
In the general panorama of blossoming Brazil-China relations, with Brazil’s trade 
integration with China deepening significantly in the 2000s, the two countries had 
grown to become closer partners in bilateral and multilateral dialogues, including 
BRICS. According to Hiratuka (2018) the volume of Chinese investments announced 
in infrastructure is around US$ 16.6 billion between 2010 and 2015, with great 
fluctuations over the years. The highest volume peaked in the year of 2015 (almost 
US$ 7 billion), with the participation of the announced investments reaching 
approximately 80% due to the investments of energy SOEs, including the SGCC. 
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Figure 6.1 - Chinese infrastructure investments announced in Brazil. Value of 
transactions in US $ million  
 
 
Retrieved from: Hiratuka, 2018 
 
 
The increasing willingness of the Brazilian government to engage with its economic 
partner contributed to the quality of relations and a political willingness to facilitate 
bilateral interactions and feed into the increasing business, investment, and economic 
cooperation. In other words, the window of opportunity was wide open. This became 
evident when former President Lula visited China in 2009 and emphasized Brazil 
wanted ‘China to buy from the Brazilian market, on the basis of quality and value 
aggregation…Brazil would invest a lot in the production of high technology goods’ 
(CHINA DAILY, 2009). Other, similar high-level statements matched the increasing 
willingness of Chinese companies to ‘go global’ just like the SGCC. From the 
perspective of the Brazilian government, the diversification of foreign capital was 
viewed as necessary and the government actively courted foreign direct investment as 
an instrument for development. 
 
The connecting thread between the SGCC and Brazil was the overall outlook of the 
Brazilian energy sector. As outlined in the previous chapters, the first decade of the 
2000s, Brazil’s energy sector suffered a lack of resources and was eager to attract 
foreign capital to be invested. At that time, Brazil’s electric power sector was dominated 
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by state companies and their privatization implied the availability of new assets for 
those interested to enter the market. Drawing on federal changes to the regulatory 
structure of the electric power sector in the 1990s, public auctions permitted the entry 
of foreign companies into the transmission segment, including companies from Spain, 
Italy, and Colombia. Overall, this guaranteed a profitable outlook for companies 
investing in the sector. The first technical exchanges at the working level between 
Brazilian and Chinese energy sector staff suggested the possibility of developing 
projects and channelling investments. 
 
In the overall context of Brazil-China relations, the bilateral state-business relations 
were influenced by mutually reinforcing interests. State Grid was looking into long-term 
investments abroad, and the territorial extension of Brazil shares similarities with China 
in terms of electric power transmission. Most energy in Brazil is supplied by hydropower 
plants, which require high-power transmission infrastructure to guarantee energy 
supplies and loss. While the government had worked continuously to expand the 
segment to keep pace with the expansion of the generation segment (ANEEL, 2013), 
investment opportunities not only with the expansion but also with expiring concessions 
of existing transmission lines offered an attractive market for companies. 
 
At the same time, the Brazilian government had started to look into ways to 
technologically upgrade the energy sector. In 2010, the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and 
Energy created a Working Group to analyze and identify actions necessary to 
subsidize the establishment of public policies for the implementation of a Brazilian 
Smart Grid Program, seeking to evaluate the state of the art of smart grid programs in 
Brazil and other countries; proposal to adapt the regulations and general rules of public 
electricity distribution services; sources of funds for financing and incentives for the 
production of equipment in the country; and the regulation of new possibilities of market 
access (MME, 2010). 
 
As SGCC became more prominent as actor with policy-input in China, it simultaneously 
expanded its role in multilateral for a and international cooperation to use and build its 
influence. Its attractiveness to interested partners abroad were based on its ability to 
have made the UHV feasible, demonstration and operating projects in China and 
abroad (e.g. Philippines) and the ability to overcome the operational difficulties of 
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operating large grid structures with long distances. It possessed significant knowledge 
in terms of the technological process,40 relevant regulatory aspects and had been 
active in standard-setting abroad. 
 
With its overseas investments, the SGCC was not just following in the footsteps of other 
major companies in going global. From the SGCC’s headquarters’ perspective, 
investment in Brazil’s transmission sector would allow the company to further mature 
its UHV technologies by coupling the investments with the technological advantages 
SGCC could provide. This was advantageous because it allowed the company to 
combine State Council R&D guidelines, international competitiveness, and the 
possibility of developing the domestic industry. The SGCC had seized the opportunity 
to align its corporate interests with the government’s macro-economic agenda41. In 
other words, exporting its technological development strategy already applied at a 
national level would create an opportunity for the company to ‘go global’, building on its 
experience in the Philippines while seeking a stronger market position in China itself. 
With the opportunity for technological development, technology transfer via bringing 
equipment and engineering technology, knowledge, and skills was anchored to the 







40 The company’s research structure had consolidated a vast portfolio of technologies and solutions 
ranging from commercially feasible UHV technology; smart grids and the electric mobility segment. 
41 The alignment of corporate discourse and macro-economic and industrial policy agenda happens both 
with HQ and the subsidiaries. This is evident in the speech of a senior Xuji manager during the Industrial 
Internet Industry Alliance event in 2017, when she explicitly relates the subsidiary’s goals to the overall 
industry plan: ‘Our Xuji Group is an important unit in the national grid electrical equipment sector. The 
electrical equipment sector is also a very important equipment sector in China Manufacturing 2025. Our 
goal is to build a complete industrial chain with innovative power by 2020.’ (CHINA INTERNET ALLIANCE, 
2017). In the context of the China Manufacturing 2025, considerable attention has been paid to the Belt 
and Road Initiative as an opportunity for the power equipment manufacturing industry to ‘going out’, 
based on infrastructure and capacity cooperation in the field of energy. Interviewees of China’s energy 
sector associated SGCC’s activities in Brazil with the energy cooperation in the Belt and Road. While this 
does not represent an official version or foreign policy narrative of the Chinese state, it demonstrates 
the reproduction of state-guided ideas and an unifying ideology, as well as a source of legitimacy of 
corporate goals. While this applies particularly applies to SOEs, such as the SGCC, it should be 
understood that private companies of Chinese origin equally interact with the economic values and 
concept developed by the Chinese state. This in turn can help to the companies to justify their investment 
drive, technology or market choice. 
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Overall, State Grid is included in the group of Chinese companies that took advantage 
of a conjuncture based on two convergent aspects: on the one hand, China’s 
government’s policy to promote the internationalisation of the economy coinciding with 
the period of privatisation in Brazil, and on the other hand, the interest and strategies 
of the main companies in beginning the internationalisation process. The SGCC 
pursued its internationalisation with the same speed with which it engaged with its 
consolidation in China’s energy sector. When pursuing an ambitious agenda, however, 
it was well aware of the challenges it may face. As one Chinese official described: 
 
What works in China, does not necessarily work in the approach to Latin 
America. The way Chinese firms approach the Brazilian market is not only 
adding on their domestic knowledge in China, but also being shaped by the 
political system in Brazil (Interview with official of the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2016). 
 
Unlike in other countries it invested in, State Grid arrived in Brazil already stronger and 
better organised, because it incorporated in 2010 as State Grid Brazil Holding S.A. 
(SGBH), which is a privately held company incorporated on April 28, 2010 with the 
main objective of participation in other companies. This company is a subsidiary of Top 
View Grid Investment Limited with a 0.0001% interest and International Grid Holdings 
Limited (IGHL) with a 99.99% interest. These companies are subsidiaries of the SGCC. 
Overall, this investment was the first outside Asia, and it differed from the SGCC’s 
other investments abroad, such as in the Philippines, Australia, and Portugal, where 
the country bought stakes in the electricity grid. 
 
Although SGBH acts as a private company in Brazil, it is bound to its Chinese SOE 
headquarters, and in terms of organisational structure, the company is bound to the 
control mechanisms of the Chinese state. For example, this implies reporting measures 
for central SOEs abroad. From an organisational point of view, State Grid brought the 
management organisation to the Chinese culture of organisational culture and 
conditioned indirectly by the state-party structure and its mechanisms in terms of 
control of corporate activities abroad. This has been affirmed by authors such as 
Warner et al (2004) who understand that in the case of SOEs, headquarters control 




This must be seen in the wider context of the difficulties of assessing the organisational 
context of Chinese companies abroad, because there is little knowledge of the firm- 
specific processes underlining the firm’s political strategy (SHAFFER AND HILLMAN, 
2000). This was also confirmed by CEO Cai Hongxian in a media interview in 2013, in 
which he admitted the lack of proximity with the Brazilian market environment. SGCC 
would bring a small number of Chinese employees to ‘adapt Chinese culture to the 
Brazilian way of business’ (ENERGY BOARD ROOM, 2013). This observation goes in 
line with sociological studies debating headquarter-subsidiary relations and the degree 
of independence when it comes to internalizing ideas and practices from the 
headquarters (KOSTOVA AND ROTH 2002, p. 230). 
 
The Chinese characteristics are taken into the corporate governance, including 
aspects of the corporate party organisation. As observed in other studies, such as 
Schüler and Schüller-Zhou (2013), who refer to the institutional environment of the 
Chinese companies, specific cultural patterns and aspects of behaviour and ideas, 
such as hierarchy and authority central to China’s traditional culture, influenced by 
Confucian ideology, advocating obedience to authority and hierarchy for the overall 
aim of harmony. In the case of SGCC, it is found that the firm promotes Chinese values 
and cultural characteristics, as expressed in its corporate responsibility programmes. 
As a consequence, the corporate interests and state interests show correlations in 
terms of soft power and projected image. 
 
In general, the relations between the SOE and the subsidiary are shaped by control 
from the headquarters. 42 From a business point of view, SGCC brings with it the whole 
strategy of the Chinese government. The definition of the strategy goes through the 
definition of the Chinese government, with a comparatively clear understanding of 
seeking strategic assets and opportunities (e.g., mature technologies and managerial 
skills). This means that the corporate environment is also more susceptible to political 
and economic pressures resulting from the diversified actor in China and bilaterally. 
Furthermore, perceived obstacles reveal that the initial ‘administration and operation 
of the company spent a difficult time to adapt to Brazilian policy. Only the assessment 
 
 
42 A series of studies look into the relations between subsidiary and Chinese parent company from an 
institutional perspective, including Marchand, 2017 and Schüler-Zhou & Schüller, 2013. 
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of the environmental license took more than a year and a half and labor and tax policies 
are very different from China’ (CHINA DAILY, 2015). 
 
In terms of decision-making concerning investments and acquisitions, all decisions are 
made at Chinese headquarters: 
 
Cai explained that all acquisition operations in Brazil are conducted and decided 
by a special team at the group's headquarters in Beijing. The Brazilian holding 
only assists in providing information to the holding company (VALOR, 
10.10.2016). 
 
In terms of high-ranking Chinese staff, regardless of the formal separation of 
government and enterprise functions, central SOEs such as the SGCC have retained 
vice-ministerial ranks as remnants of their institutional history as industrial ministries 
under central planning, thereby enabling their management to engage on an equal 
level with some of the government bodies that supervise them in China’s domestic 
context (SAMPSON, 2016, p. 66). 
 
For the company’s operations, this implies that even though there may be a private 
business logic in terms of operational strategy, there is a strong formal link to the 
bureaucratic structure of the Chinese state. Such domestic positioning gives the 
company a comparative advantage since it can not only assess administrative and 
government structures, but also easily assess the foreign policy and diplomacy support 
structures, increasing the resources available to the company and becoming a facilitating 
factor in providing privileged access in the host government and decision- makers 
through targeted bilateral encounters and high-level political support. However, this does 
not entail that the support comes automatically, nor that the company represents 
Chinese foreign policy. 
 
Additionally, the transmission sector in Brazil is a highly regulated one: the power to 
shape outcomes of policies, as well legislative dynamics concerning immediate firm 
interest, is rather limited. The statement above reflects the fact that the political agency 
of a company cannot be understood without understanding what different levels and 
forms of engagement make themselves available. The following figure lists a range of 
options the company may engage in including formal and informal contact with 
stakeholders, different timing and momentum for cooperation and institution building, 
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reactive or proactive behaviour, an issue-by-issue-based engagement or a more long- 
term agenda. 
 
Figure 6.2 - Engagement opportunities for companies 
Retrieved from: Own elaboration 
 
 
Despite the obstacles foreign companies may face in Brazil, the SGCC understood the 
opportunities afforded by the Brazilian power market with its market-based electricity 
price policies and more liberal outlook. In other words, it opened the opportunity for the 
SGCC to have a higher return of investment while similarly gaining experience with a 
complex transmission system like Brazil’s, which still demonstrated some geographical 
similarity with the domestic environment the SGCC was familiar with and held a 
monopoly position in. 
 
When the director of the ANEEL returned from a trip to China in late 2010 where he 
had participated in the Shanghai Expo, he pointed to the increasing dialogue with State 
Grid: ‘The group is already talking with national [Brazilian] companies. And they can 
have market entry though the production of equipment (O TEMPO, 2010). Also in 2010, 
SGBH undertook its first investment in Brazil by acquiring seven indebted energy 
transmission companies that belonged to the Spanish group Actividades de 
Construcción y Serviços and another company from the Plena Transmissora group for 
$989 million USD, resulting in the increased capitalization and investment ability of the 
firms. Since its beginning, the SGCC has been clear about its long-term intentions in 
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Brazil. Plena was controlled by a group of Spanish companies, namely Isolux, Elecnor, 
Abengoa, and Cobra. 
 
These companies were eager to sell their assets, because they had been suffering 
from the financial crisis and SGCC had the advantage of financial ability. In this case, 
the SGCC demonstrated that the company has both political capital and drive to ensure 
its interests, positively impacting its operations abroad where the company lacked 
market and institutional experience. Beginning in 2010, the company has grown 
through acquisitions and participation in auctions and today, with 21 concessionaries 
in its Brazilian portfolio, the company into an influential player in the market. The 
gradual expansion of SGCC in the transmission segment by participating in ANEEL 
auctions and greenfield projects in the field. Today, the SGCC has a vast structure in 
Brazil, as shown in Figure 6.2: 
 
Figure 6.3 - State Grid Brazil Holding S.A.’s structure in Brazil 
 




In the decade of its presence in Brazil, SGCC engaged in several public auctions. 
Auctions are won by the company bidding the lowest annual remuneration. Revenues 
of the transmission sector usually long as the projects last several decades. To offer a 
bid, financial resources for suppliers, EPC companies and other pre-auction related 
issues are required. One of the SGCC’s effectiveness relies on the presence of deep- 
pocketed access to state funding (Xu, 2016). 
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Figure 6.4 - State Grid Brazil Holding S.A.’s business strategy in Brazil 
 
Retrieved from: SGBH corporate presentation, 2017 
 
 
Overall, following its market entry, SGHB engaged in the following businesses: 
 
 
Table 6.1 - Key corporate developments of SGBH 
 
Date Subsidiary Stake Local Partner Seller Entry mode 
06/21/2010 SGBH-E 100% - - - 
06/21/2010 SGBH-T 100% - - - 
12/15/2010 ETEE 100% - Plena acquisition 
12/15/2010 ETIM 100% - Plena acquisition 
12/15/2010 ITE 100% - Plena acquisition 
12/15/2010 RPTE 100% - Plena acquisition 
12/15/2010 CPTE 100% - Plena acquisition 
12/15/2010 SMTE 100% - Plena acquisition 
12/15/2010 SPTE 100% -  acquisition 
12/14/2012 Araraquara 100%  CYMI, Lintran acquisition 
12/14/2012 Catxere 100% - CYMI, Lintran acquisition 
12/14/2012 PPTE 100% - CYMI, Lintran acquisition 
12/14/2012 Itahim 100% - CYMI, Lintran acquisition 
12/14/2012 Iracema 100% - CYMI, Lintran acquisition 
11/18/2013 MRTE 100% - Public auction greenfield 
07/01/2015 ACTE 100% - CME, Tecneira acquisition 
07/01/2015 LTMC 100% - Cobra acquisition 
08/07/2015 XRTE 100% - Public auction greenfield 
04/27/2016 CNTE 100% - Public auction greenfield 
04/27/2016 PRTE 100% -- Public auction greenfield 
09/29/2011 Luziania 51% Furnas Public auction greenfield 
03/14/2012 Guaraciba 51% Copel Public auction greenfield 
03/14/2012 Matrincha 51% Copel Public auction greenfield 
12/21/2012 Paranaiba 51% Furnas Copel Public auction greenfield 
03/20/2014 Belo Monte 51% Furnas Eletronorte Public auction greenfield 
12/07/2015 Montes Claros 100% - Cobra acquisition 
12/07/2015 Atlantica 100% - Pro-CME acquisition 
12/07/2015 Belo Monte II 100% - Public Auction greenfield 
24/04/2016 Lotes C&O in the 
auction 013/2015 
100% - Public Auction greenfield 
Retrieved from: State Grid corporate presentation, 2017 
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As the above table states, SGCC focused on both greenfield and acquisitions with a 
controlling majority of shares. SGCC also integrated the processes in the sector (power 
generation, transmission and distribution). In 2011, the SGCC also debuted in the 
transmission auctions. Resulting from the approval of the Luziânia-Niquelândia 
Consortium in the ANEEL Transmission Auction 06/2011, held in 2011, Luziânia- 
Niquelândia Transmissora SA is the concessionaire responsible for implementing the 
Luziânia 500/230 kV and Niquelândia 230/69 kV, which are both located in the State 
of Goiás. The Consortium was formed between State Grid and Furnas, a Brazilian 
mixed economy company subsidiary of Eletrobras operating in the high and extra-high 
voltage energy generation and transmission segment. This success was celebrated by 
both partners: ‘We have had the opportunity to win the auction, which is extremely 
symbolic because it is the premise of a very important partnership for Brazil and China 
and can serve for enterprises here and abroad’ (BRACIER, 2011). 
 
As described in Chapter 3, the Brazilian energy sector underwent institutional changes 
that culminated in changes in the regulatory framework in 2004, with privatisations 
impacting the federal and state operators in the power market (Vianna, 2004). Several 
challenges had to be met by SGHB: services offered by State Grid had to be cheaper 
and fit the specifics of the Brazilian electrical system. In the Brazilian context, 
companies such as the SGCC are confronted by a set of decisions: for example, if and 
how to exert influence – direct or indirectly, reactively or proactively, formally or 
informally. The choice of tool in terms of business politics is directly related to the ends 
the tool has to meet, because different choices can, for example, generate technical 
and political support, including for complex policy issues, as well as the possibilities for 
obtaining better access and shortcuts. Interviews with industry experts revealed the 
different reasons for stepping into business politics. For example, 
 
For technical matters, it is easiest to work on working-level, where technical expertise 
is being generated. It is important to create a base to support future business activities. 
It is not about lobbying a certain technology or technical requirement in or not, rather it 
is about how to create an environment that is open to change and that understands the 
potential of generating a competitive advantage and better technological efficiency 
(INTERVIEW, SGCC employee, 2016). 
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Another form of engagement refers to the relationship to class entities, covering wide- 
ranging topics of the affiliated entities.43 In this regard, they can have impact at the 
executive and legislative levels. SGBH is member of the Brazilian Association of 
Infrastructure and Base Industries (Associação Brasileira da Infraestrutura e Indústrias 
de Base - ABDIB) at the Brazilian Association of Transmission Companies of Electric 
Power (ABRATE). The participation in business associations brings access to strategic 
information for companies (e.g., influence on laws, regulations, and decrees; incentive 
mechanisms; credit lines; technical standardisation; opportunity for market 
development; identification of business opportunities; risks of opportunities; market 
studies and trends; and networking) and also implies the level of access the company 
generates through its representation, as confirmed by a SGCC employee: 
 
We look into the associations mainly with the understanding that there are different 
positions in the associations that are strategic, including the presence in different 
working groups or technical commissions. It is here where we can advance strategic 
areas to business development. 
 
 
Other forms of specific engagement in the context of interest group with a policy 
objective, may refer also to broader topics, including Chinese investment or the overall 
climate of bilateral relations. By analysing the interaction between MNCs and multiple 
government institutions we develop an understanding about how firms target their 
political strategies at different branches of government when seeking more favourable 
solutions. The SGCC targets its resources at the institution that is key in the policy- 
making process. This process in the case of SGCC in Brazil, however, is very discrete. 
 
In guiding and non-obligatory documents by the Chinese state, such as MOFCOM, 
Chinese firms are encouraged to develop and consolidate their relations with the 
government in Brazil. The table below presents selected extracts of the orienting 
guidelines concerning government relations, media relations and Chinese culture. 
Most importantly, it affirms that political connections matter for firms, but that the home 






43 Interview with interview expert, 2018. 
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6.1 Dealing with the relationship between the 
government and the parliament. At present, the 
economic departments related to the federal 
government mainly include the Ministry of Finance, 
the Ministry  of Planning   and  Budget and 
Management, the Ministry of Development Industry 
and  Foreign   Trade, the  Export Investment 
Promotion Bureau, and the Central Bank. Chinese 
companies should pay attention to establishing 
good relations with local governments. Direct 
contact based on business to establish business 
relationships and information channels. It is 
necessary to treat people with courtesy, be honest 
and keep promises, and win the credibility and 
respect of the officials. On the other hand, Chinese 
companies must make an appointment in advance 
when   they are working with the Brazilian 
government, so that they are fully prepared to avoid 
unnecessary troubles, resulting in delays in time 
and economic losses. At the same time, the 
Brazilian parliament has played an important role in 
national legislation and economic and social 
development planning. Chinese companies must 
learn to communicate with the parliament, seek the 
understanding of parliamentarians, and try to get 












6.7 Understand the Dealing with the Media The 
Brazilian media is now generally affirming the 
achievements of China's economic construction. 
However, it lacks an understanding of the social and 
political changes and progress brought about by 
China's reform and opening up, and has little 
knowledge of some of China's basic policies. 
Therefore, Chinese companies should adopt 
attitudes and skills in dealing with local mainstream 
media: (1) Should be low-key, and do not take the 
initiative to approach the local  mainstream media. 
(2) If the local media has misrepresented China and 
has adversely affected Chinese companies, the 
responsible person of the relevant department 
should be asked to clarify the facts and seek justice, 
and save the impact, but don't take it for granted. 
(3) If the Chinese enterprises do something wrong, 
the local media should expose this. China should 
actively communicate and exchange as soon as 
possible to resolve conflicts in advance so as not to 
expand the adverse effects. (4) If the media 
interviews Chinese enterprises in order to positively 
promote China-Brazil cooperation, Chinese 
enterprises should introduce the facts of China- 
Brazil cooperation and mutual benefit and common 
development and the broad areas of cooperation 













6.9 Dissemination of Chinese Traditional Culture 
After the State Grid Corporation entered the 
Brazilian market, it actively carried out social 





 to form cultural trips - slum symphony orchestras, 
and holding "CMB Cultural Month" and other 
cultural activities, giving back to the community. At 
the same time, the spread of Chinese culture has 
also enhanced the image of Chinese-funded 
enterprises in the local area, which has not only won 
the title of the best enterprise in the Brazilian power 
industry, but also won the “Best Practice Award for 
Social Responsibility Management” of the United 
Nations Compact Organization. The 
comprehensive strength in Brazil and the respect 








Retrieved from: MOFCOM, 2017 
 
The analysis of business politics helps draw attention to the difficulties in assessing the 
ways firms relate to home and host governments and how the choices of political 
strategies are developed. Other than commonly assumed, political participation does 
not necessarily occur in the political processes of parliaments and law-making 
mechanisms. Rather, it can be developed through the consolidation of an agenda such 
as technology and topics related to social responsibility, thereby exercising an effect 
on the building of public opinion concerning the company and its market activities. 
 
2012 marked an important year in SGBH’s corporate history. The company bought 
electricity transmission assets in Brazil from Spain’s ACS for $531 million and assumed 
debt of $411 million, taking over high-voltage electricity transmission assets from the 
company. With this deal, SGBH confirmed the aggressive strategy it chose to pursue 
in its market entry. While many had welcomed SGBH’s market entry, the public 
perception of the SGCC as a Chinese state-owned company was scrutinized by public 
opinion in terms of the intentions behind the company’s strategy. 44 The ability to 
leverage funds and access to funds via drawing on headquarters, banks, and financial 
markets gave SGHB a competitive edge. With its market entry in Brazil, State Grid had 
to develop its image and build a strong network centred on its business structure. Since 
the beginning, SGBH has sought to consolidate the positive impact of its business 
practices.45 This is dates back for for CSR guidelines provided by SASAC in 2008 to 
further encourage Chinese companies to address shortcomings both domestically and 
abroad. The guiding vision behind SGBH CSR practices in Brazil is outlined in both 
 
 
44 Interview with employee of the Brazilian National Confederation of Industries, 2015 
45 Interview with SGCC representative, 2016. 
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annual CSR Report. According to the 2014 CSR Report, SGCC is committed to the 
following guidelines in Brazil: 
 
 
Figure 6.5 - CSR commitments of SGCC in Brazil 
Retrieved from: SGCC 2014 CSR Report 
 
In this case study, the way SGCC understands CSR, shows the company`s ability to 
comprehend and respond both to headquarter expectations, media and institutional 
pressure in the host context, as well as potential risks associated with projects and 
ongoing operations in the context of its activities in the transmission sector. 
 
A map of SGBH major institutional CSR stakeholders in Brazil focus on state entities, 
which require reporting or assessment, as for example in the case of IBAMA and 
environmental assessment procedures of infrastructure projects. In this regard, CSR 
becomes an inherent part of business politics as it immediately impacts on the public 
perception of the company both by society, government and wider politics. This has 
also been perceived by senior SGBH staff publicly reemphasizes the commitment 
undertaken by the company to stay in Brazil and act as a responsible actor as part of 
its non-market strategy. 
• Stick to sustainable and harmonious development: SGBH complies with local laws and 
regulations, respects local religious practices and national culture taking long-term localized 
development as its strategic objective. It’s oriented to people and strives to build  an international 
team with mutual integration, complementation and promotion among Chinese and Brazilian 
personnel. The company also protects employees’ interests, cares for their development and has 
completed the construction of production office building and the second phase of integrated 
control center. 
• Boost cooperation among stakeholders: The company has strengthened the exchanges of 
visits with senior officials from the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy, ANEEL, ONS, and 
EPE. The company has also promoted technical communication and cooperation with industrial 
counterparts and participated in the bidding and construction of the transmission greenfield 
concession projects to take root in Brazil and stick to long-term development. 
• Participate in social welfare undertaking: The company actively participates in social welfare 
activities and fulfils its social responsibility. Relying on the ‘tax incentives’ policy, SGCC invested 
BRI3.4 million to sponsor social responsibility programs. The company serves the local 
community by organizing social welfare activities, including ‘Cultural Exploration- Symphony of 
Male’ program, Rio Tour of International Youth Table Tennis, ‘Sino-Brazil Culture Month’, ‘Rio de 
Janeiro Four Seasons Long-distance Race’ and so on 
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Figure 6.5 - CSR actors 
 
Retrieved from: Own elaboration, SGBH Sustainability Report, 2017 
 
Lastly, CSR and the social commitment the company undertakes demonstrates the 
ability of the company to bridge cultural differences between headquarters and 
subsidiary. Size and ownership form of SGCC make CSR a compulsory element, while 
the sectoral characteristics of the power sector add on to potential environmental and 
social risks. Both the political and economic system in Brazil, where a comprehensive 
legislation on CSR-relevant aspects (social, labour and environment) protects and 
requires company reporting. As one former employee noted: ‘The SGCC brings 
patents, human capital, patents, technologies, intellectual property rights, brands and 
a consolidated reputation as experienced operator in China. Reputation in Brazil is key, 





From the beginning, SGBH demonstrated strong interest in disputing the concession 
to build the line that would transmit the 11,223 megawatts (MW) of power that would 
be generated by the Belo Monte hydroelectric plant for the rest of Brazil and was a 
greenfield investment. In its corporate discourse, technology and its development are 
building blocks of the SGCC’s corporate culture and while the market was awaiting the 
announcement of EPE on the design and other technical details of this line – to be 
auctioned in 2012 and still in the design phase – State Grid sought partnerships with 
Brazilian (state and private) and international companies for generation projects of any 
source, be it hydroelectric, wind, biomass, or solar. Such strategic alliances were 
decisive for the company’s success in Brazil. 
 
The search for partners involved projects in both Brazil and other Latin American 
countries, including Copel, AES, Cemig, Alupar, Eletronorte, and the Rede group. With 
Eletrobras, an MoU was signed to develop joint projects. With the ONS, a 
memorandum provided for technology exchange and the working philosophy of State 
Grid. 
 
However, the search for partners was not without resistance. Challenges from industry 
actors were present in the public discourse, voicing fears of a ‘denationalisation’ of the 
Brazilian equipment industry. MNCs in Brazil face a business sector divided between 
an outward-looking approach (e.g. agrobusiness and companies related to foreign 
capital) and the a more-domestic focused (e.g. national industry benefitting from local 
content requirements). This applied to SGCC when having to navigate its reputation 
and overall image in the media. For State Grid, however, the major complexity lay in 
the large number of operators, which made it difficult to coordinate and verify the entire 
system interconnected by the ONS. It is necessary to always renew equipment that 
sometimes belongs to different operators. In addition to the natural complexity of 
operating a large interconnected system, the existence of several companies may lead 
older equipment to conflict with newer machinery. 
 
Moreover, the import of equipment from China would lose its competitiveness due to 
the high cost of freight, customs duties, and taxes (VALOR ECONOMICO, 2011b). The 
same concerns raised by powerful industry actors concerning national content 
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requirements of equipment also appeared in terms of the workforce, whereby the 
company was quick to affirm that Chinese employees would only be hired for specific 
technological knowledge owned by the firm. In terms of equipment manufacturing, the 
company made publicly clear that it would use different suppliers, including local 
companies and other MNCs and not engage in unfair competition. 
 
In the case of the transmission line of Belo Monte, the company affirmed that only 
those products that are not produced in Brazil will be imported: by negotiation with the 
suppliers, all necessary equipment and that are manufactured in Brazil, will be 
purchased from the Brazilian industry. According to Eletrobras, the equipment that is 
not yet entirely manufactured in Brazil, ‘will have more than 60% of degree of 
nationalization’ (DCI, 2014). The fact that SGCC held the majority in its project had the 
advantage that it was able to select the suppliers and slowly introduce its equipment 
to the Brazilian market. 
 
The case of Neoenergia demonstrates that not all business intentions turn out 
successfully. In 2012, the Spanish company Iberdrola was negotiating with State Grid 
to sell its stake in the Neonergia holding company, which controls three electricity 
distributors and a generator park in Brazil. The Brazilian government was against 
‘denationalising’ Neoenergia (VALOR ECONOMICO, 2012f). Facing strong resistance 
from the Brazilian government concerning the sale of the 39% stake that Iberdrola has 
in Neoenergia to the SGCC, State Grid has decided to ‘re-evaluate’ its intention to 
acquire the stake. 
 
The company said in a note that the decision was made with the parent company in 
China and ‘does not represent a change in the company’s long-term investment plans 
in Brazil.’ The note continued, ‘State Grid continues to act as a Brazilian company, 
respecting the country’s culture and laws, acting transparently, flexibly and reinforcing 
its commitment to work in partnership with other companies and with the government.’ 
The Neoenergia case included negotiations between the Brazilian and Spanish 
governments, with their respective ministers of industry and foreign trade of negotiating 
to achieve a result that was beneficial for both sides (VALOR ECONOMICO, 2012g). 
Shortly after, Iberdrola confirmed that it was not considering the sale of its stake; the 
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Chinese side had made many informal proposals, but no formal proposals were closed 
(VALOR ECONOMICO, 2012h). 
 
When Copel sought new business partners, SGHB reached out with several proposals 
(VALOR ECONOMICO, 2012c). The 2012 consortium signed by Copel and SGHB 
initiated their entry in the transmission segment, with an initial offering of R$126 million 
for the construction and operation of Lot A, negotiated in auction nº 02 of 2012, referring 
to the following high-voltage projects: SE 500 kV Paranaite; SE Claudia 500 kV; SE 
Paranatinga 500 kV; Lot500 kV Paranaíta – Cláudia, CD; Lot 500 kV Cláudia 
– Paranatinga, CD; and LT Paranatinga – Ribeirãozinho 500kV, CD (Aneel, 2012), as 
well as R$73 million for Lot B, including the following projects: SE Marimbondo II 500 
kV; Lot 500 kV Ribeirãozinho – Rio Verde Norte, C3, CS; and LT 500 kV North Green 
River – Marimbondo II, CD (Aneel, 2012). 
 
These projects focused on the regions of the states Mato Grosso, Goiás, and Minas 
Gerais, and on substations of 500 kV capacity and high-voltage capacity of 500 kV 
(Aneel, 2012). This partnership with Copel meant a new step towards consolidating its 
presence in the Brazilian market. In a third venture, auction no. 07/2012 – Lot G was 
acquired in a consortium with Copel Geração de Energia S.A. and Furnas Centrais 
Elétricas S.A., with a proposal of R$100 million targeting the transmission lines 500 kV 
Barreiras II – Rio das Éguas, Rio das Éguas – Luziânia, and Luziânia – Pirapora 2 
(Aneel, 2012). 
 
In March 2012, the ANEEL announced transmission auctions. In total, eight 
transmission lines were offered comprising a total of 1,709 kilometres and seven 
substations with 1,710 megavolt-amperes (MVA) of power. The groups enabled for the 
auction were Teles Pires Transmission Consortium (Eletronorte, Chesf, Cteep, and 
Taesa), Guaraciaba (Copel and State Grid), Marimbondo (Alupar, Furnas, and 
Eletrosul), Paranaita (Bimetal and Engeglobal), Sino-Copelian (Copel, State Grid), and 
Sudoeste Goiano Transmissora (Celg and FR Incorporadora). 
 
The following six states received reinforcement in their transmission networks: 
Amazonas, Bahia, Mato Grosso, Goiás, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro. The total 
amount of RAP, defined by the ANEEL for all lots, was limited to R$363.9 million. This 
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amount was reduced as the dispute between companies increased VALOR 
ECONOMICO, 2012a). 
 
In the Guaraciaba consortium, Copel and State Grid took Lot B of the auction with a 
discount of 36.96% in relation to the maximum annual revenue allowed by the 
government in the project (R$115.93 million). As a result, the consortium was awarded 
a substation and two 600-km transmission lines that will pass through cities in the 
states of Mato Grosso, Goiás, and Minas Gerais. The purpose of these lines is to drain 
the energy generated by the Teles Pires and Colider mills (VALOR ECONOMICO, 
2012b). 
 
The success of the consortium between SGBH and Copel was stirred up by national 
industry worries, specifically the alarm of Brazilian aluminium manufacturers that the 
two stretches of Sections A and B of the Teles Pires line would demand about 50,000 
tons of aluminium cables, which is equivalent to about 30% of the current market in 
Brazil. There was no national content requirement, so strong competition from imported 
products could threaten the national plants (VALOR, 2012). This was expressed 
directly by an industry representative: ‘If the Chinese state-owned company imports 
cables from China, it will seriously affect domestic production (VALOR, 2012). SGBH 
sought to downplay this statement in its public statements, emphasising the role of local 
equipment manufacturing: ‘We do not worry about importing material from China. We 
want to encourage the local market and work with state-of-the-art technology projects’ 
(VALOR ECONOMICO, 2012e). 
 
In other words, in China’s portfolio in Brazil, in terms of both projects and strategic 
cooperation areas, State Grid has become an important player whose performance not 
only impacts policymaking in Brazil, but also exercises strong impact on public 
discourse concerning the energy sector, which is one of Brazil’s most strategic 
economic and high politicised sectors with different political arenas. The energy sector 
is a potential determining factor in political elections (e.g.in the year 2001 when the 
country suffered energy shortcuts). 
 
It seems only natural that SGBH works from the premise of engaging in political 
discourse and media only when necessary. This shows similarities to the study by 
Hansen and Mitchel (2002) which confirmed that foreign-owned firms are less likely to 
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engage in public lobbing and seek to maintain a low profile. This thus was confirmed 
by a company employee: ‘A company is seldom a direct political actor, and we seek in 
no way to be exposed.’ Rather, the ingredient for business success in the country is 
‘discretion and right positioning’. 
 
This shows the differences in the firm behaviour in different institutional settings 
(JACKSON AND DEEG, 2008), as also confirmed by the employee: ‘Our headquarters 
have their standing in China, but here we act as a private company. This means that 
we are bound to normal compliance and ethical behaviour. It is not interesting for us to 
be directly involved in politics.46 The company is dependent on good relations with 
policymakers and regulators: ‘Foreigners and new players need regulatory stability, 
and we have an agency that will trade (almost) whole in a year, and in the election year 
(EXAME, 2018). 
 
Governmental agencies other than the privatization agency can influence via formal 
institutions, in the case of SGCC, ANEEL was a fundamental actor when it came to 
guarantee regulatory stability. Informal institutions, on the other hand, such as media 
can exert an impact on public opinion and general business climate and perception of 
the firm in the country. SGCC had already learned from its internationalisation in the 
Philippines that public and political opinion had to be carefully managed to avoid 
business risks. In the context of the formal and informal conversations with the 
company employees and industry experts, the following motivations for engaging in 
political agency were identified: 
 
Figure 6.6 - Reasons for stepping into business politics 
 
Retrieved from: Own elaboration 
 





While the figure above specifically looked into the relevant factors for SGCC and 
Chinese firms in general, the reasons also apply for other foreign MNCs in Brazil. 
Needing to engage with industry-level policy, companies such as SGCC can define the 
quality to which they engage and whether their engagement is proactive or as a 
reaction to the sectoral or general policy environment. What positions the SGCC as a 
legitimate actor is its vast experience in successfully operating 800 kV DC systems, 
including construction and maintenance under difficult conditions. 
 
The lessons of having corporatised in Brazil in 2010 and expanding substantially in the 
transmission segment has granted SGHB the ability and cultural understanding 
necessary to navigate its strategic environment. The steps of its expansion in the 
Brazilian market were closely coordinated by the domestic and overseas teams of the 
company's international business ‘units to monitor market dynamics, conduct in-depth 
competition analysis, accurately build financial models, and scientifically formulate 
bidding strategies’ (CHINA SECURITIES NETWORK, 2016). 
 
As for the company’s political involvement, the benefits of such engagement always 
vary. While for the U.S. context Schuler and Rehbein have affirmed that a firm needs 
both the ‘will and ability to become politically involved’ (1997, p. 126), this is also true 
in the context of Chinese central SOEs. One SGBH employee also confirmed this: ‘As 
a company, we have an array of opportunities, but that doesn’t mean we employ the 
means. In the last years, the Operation Carwash (Lava Jato) increased the level of 
scrutiny on companies and we choose very carefully on how to proceed.’ 
 
The partnership with Furnas further consolidated SGBH’s presence in the Brazilian 
market. In August 2012, Furnas considered embarking with Chinese companies on the 
due transmission auctions (VALOR ECONOMICO, 2012i). This was specifically 
relevant for SGBH`s planned participation in the auctions of the transmission lines that 
will start from the Belo Monte Dam. With the first auction of the Belo Monte lines – 
which offered those scheduled to connect with the northeast – scheduled for 2012, and 
the second auction of the north-southeast interconnection expected to take place in 
2013, the partnerships were at stake for a successful bidding of the project. 
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In 2012, SGBH’s business development was at full speed, focusing on large projects 
as well as new technologies, and intending to participate in solar and wind energy 
projects (VALOR ECONOMICO, 2012e). While the market had been awaiting EPE`s 
publication of the design and other technical details of this line, which was to be 
auctioned in 2012 and was still in the design phase, State Grid sought partnerships in 
the local market to consolidate its business (VALOR ECONOMICO, 2013). For the 
auction, State Grid studied partnerships with the Eletrobras group, with whom it already 
had an agreement to exchange experiences, as well as with other state-owned 
companies. In its public discourse, State Grid emphasised a possible increase of 
investments in Brazil: larger than the initially promised $5 billion, but it all depended on 
the bidding process. One SGBH employee said, ‘The Brazilian government has asked 
us for a plan and we have come up with an idea, but that number is not fixed’ (VALOR 
ECONOMICO, 2012j). 
 
The company bid 38% below the ceiling for the Belo Monte transmission contract and 
40% below the ceiling in the Teles Pires River auction. The biggest success was when 
State Grid won the auction to build the Belo Monte line, the nation’s largest 
transmission line. Part of the work was to be done by the Chinese, along with the 
Brazilian companies Furnas and Eletronorte. As mentioned before, teaming up with 
local companies leverages benefits for State Grid, because it improves its knowledge 
of the local market, regulations, and other issues, and may result in the expansion of 
firm influence and network. Such learning processes are invaluable for the survival of 
the company in the local market. 
 
The consortium called Belo Monte Transmissão de Energia (BMTE), formed by SGBH 
(51%) and Brazilian companies Furnas Central Electric S.A. (24.5%) and the North 
Central Electric S.A. Brazil (Eletronorte) (24.5%), bid with a proposal that was 38% 
lower than the government ceiling (Alvarenga, 2014). The contenders did not match 
such a competitive offering. The consortium was to construct a transmission line of 
approximately 2,100 km for the energy generated by the Belo Monte Dam in the state 
of Para. 
 
When it was announced in 2011 that Brazil would adopt the company’s UHV-DC 
technology to transmit electricity from the Belo Monte Dam in the Amazon River Basin 
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over 2,500 km to Rio de Janeiro in a project jointly conducted between the SGCC and 
Eletrobras, it was clear that State Grid had initiated a process of convincing the 
Brazilian government of the viability of UHV-DC technology as an important leverage 
point for optimising the electricity system. This points to several issues. 
 
It has to be remembered that at the time of SGCC’s market entry in Brazil, the 
international market for UHV equipment was relatively small. This implies that the 
market building also had to work on a technical level by introducing technological 
development and benefits into the Brazilian context. First, tactically speaking, State 
Grid had to convince Brazilian sectoral authorities to adopt the UHV technology as one 
of the requirements in the transmission auctions to come. The EPE had to be 
convinced that this technology would be advantageous to Brazil and contribute to the 
optimisation of the Brazilian system. On a technical level, State Grid had to introduce 
change and opportunities at a working level that was still far from the political level in 
order to generate a perceived demand. 
 
The EPE maintained a productive relationship with SGCC throughout the years in 
seminars and technical exchanges in China with the state-funded electrical research 
institution CEPEL. This was also confirmed by SGBH staff: 
 
State Grid maintained contact with the research institutions in Brazil and exchanged information, 
facilitated research visit of Brazilian staff to China and drawing on the experiences and 




Given the company’s knowledge base and the technological and organisational 
trajectories that had been built and followed over time, its added value was the 
application of state-of-the-art transmission technology, and this was used as a 
differential factor in the negotiation with Brazilian government authorities. To establish 
an enabling environment through contacts, meetings, or conferences gives a firm the 
opportunity to browse for relevant technological knowledge without mobilising 
substantial human or financial resources. 
 
Moreover, informal technology transfer enables firms to access tacit knowledge 
surrounding formalised technological knowledge that may actually be needed in order 
to integrate scientific knowledge into the firm’s business intentions. Moreover, such 
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interactions may facilitate the attraction of talented researchers from academia who 
may both contribute to the quality of internal research efforts and act as ‘gatekeepers’ 
to bridge the firm’s research activities with academic science (ROSENKOPF AND 
NERKAR, 2001). 
 
Targeted business politics are used to establish unique intangible assets (i.e., firm- 
specific technology and knowledge) held by the firm and consolidate its competitive 
advantage in the country. Adaption of the firm is not uniform itself, however, and even 
by drawing on internationally and locally available resources, it may experience 
difficulties in dealing with different national actors. In this case, the argument that UHV 
transmission lines and other technological solutions could improve Brazil’s 
transmission segment was used in tandem with the SGCC’s general business interests 
in Brazil, which are useful for coalition building with relevant industry actors, as well as 
public relations. 
 
This has also been confirmed by interviews conducted during the research. The 
statement below shows what actions the company took to further consolidate itself: 
 
We used expertise and technological exchange, as we possess all the expertise, 
specifically in the field of engineering technology, which is in constant contact and 
exchange with China, has personnel coming to Brazil to provide consultancy and 
training. Thus we drew on our equipment technology that was developed in China, 
meaning equipment, software, technological solutions that we brought to the country, 
imported or brought the knowledge on how this could be developed in Brazil. The 
Brazilian equipment manufacturers also have their Chinese affiliates, so they make this 
import what has been developed in China. 
 
In other words, business politics courting technology development can help to anchor 
specific technological capabilities and knowledge in favour of business. 
 
In 2013, SGHB submitted its first project alone with an initial offering of R$11 million 
for the concession of construction bids of the Marechal Rondon substation between 
the States of São Paulo and Mato Grosso do Sul with a capacity between 440 and 138 
kV (ANEEL, 2013). Later in 2013, State Grid also evaluated distributor acquisition 
opportunities. Hongxian, however, has claimed that the Rede group and the Eletrobras 
distributors are not the most interesting assets for the company. The company is still 
in the process of learning in Brazil and does not want to take large risks. The ideal is 
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to acquire distributors with balanced financial economic situations and good levels of 
service quality (VALOR ECONOMICO, 2013). 
 
State Grid has also supported the coming of other Chinese conglomerate companies 
to Brazil. The establishment of the transmission technology requires complementary 
actors in the supply chain for equipment and engineering services. This is in keeping 
with the wish of China’s highest political institutions to not only create but also export 
indigenous innovation. 
 
The SGCC’s subsidiary Nari Group Corporation, which produces smart grid equipment, 
opened a factory in Brazil that provides solutions for the transmission industry.47 Nari is 
the largest wholesale supplier of electric power equipment in China and is an active 
player in the global power industry dedicated to providing technologies, products, 
services, and solutions for customers in other infrastructure-related fields such as 
industrial control, energy, railway transportation. Nari owns overs 36 branches in China 
and is active in over 300 overseas. In 2014, it had over 20,000 employees and RMB 
$48 billion in assets, in 2014. The company’s facility in Sao Paulo State, in a city named 
Sorocaba, from which it distributes its equipment across Brazil and into other Latin 
American countries. Another subsidiary is Xuji Group, which acquired 51% of energy 
metermaker Nansen and will invest another $20 million in its Minas Gerais plant 
(VALOR ECONOMICO, 2013). 
 
Beginning in 2013, the Chinese government has publicly declared its support of SGBH 
in Brazil and its efforts to develop one goal: to contribute to a more competitive and 
efficient energy sector. Senior leaders of both Chinese and Brazilian governments 
have noted the benefits State Grid can bring to Brazil on several occasions. At the third 
meeting of the COSBAN held in Canton on November 6, 2013 and attended by 
Brazilian Vice President Michel Temer, and Chinese Deputy Prime Minister of the State 
Council Wang Yang, the minutes gave the SGCC high-level exposure: 
 
46. Brazil and China agreed to promote the exchange of technology for the transmission 
of large blocks of electricity, especially in ultra-high voltage, bearing in mind that Brazil 
is preparing a bid for the Belo Monte mill and that China has the most advanced 
technology in the world in this field. The Brazilian side reiterated that the Electrical 
Research Center, CEPEL, is implanting an ultra-voltage laboratory. This, in addition to 
the prospect that the electric market in Brazil will double in 15 years, could serve as an 
 
47 Interview with researcher from NARI, 2016. 
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additional incentive for investments of more Chinese companies in hydroelectric plants, 
based on the successful example of the State Grid (Brazil-China High-Level 
Commission for Coordination and Cooperation, 2013). 48 
 
To efficiently anchor SOE investment in the host context, state-state level is the preferred 
playing field, but it presents its challenges. In the course of its corporate history in Brazil, 
SGHB has received high-level support by agencies and entities of the Chinese 
government, as well as working and technical level exchanges. This, however, does not 
necessarily present unique feature of SGCC or Chinese foreign policy, as many 
countries provide support in aid to their companies abroad. 49 
 
The company grew to use its entire network to generate competitive advantage. In July 
2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Brazilian counterpart, Dilma Rousseff, 
witnessed the signing between Chinese and Brazilian companies. Thus, State Grid 
found its way into the Joint Statement between the Federative Republic of Brazil and 
the People’s Republic of China on the State Visit of President Xi Jinping to Brazil and 
the Deepening of the Brazil-China Global Strategic Partnership – Brasilia, July 17, 
2014: 
 
17. The two Heads of State highlighted the great potential for cooperation in the 
areas of energy and mining. They reaffirmed the importance attached to the 
presence of the Chinese companies China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in the consortium 
responsible for the development of the Libra oilfield and positively welcomed 
State Grid Corporation’s investments in the construction and operation of 
transmission lines in Brazil. 
 
 
On that same occasion, a cooperation agreement between Eletrobras and SGCC was 
signed, reinforcing the overall opportunities on cooperation regarding ‘Smart Grids’. 
 
In May 2014, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang and Brazilian President Dilma 
Rousseff launched the cornerstone of the project, which is one of the largest works in 
Brazil to expand and strengthen the national electricity system. With the Belo Monte 
pipeline, Brazil will have the first transmission line in Latin America in DC at the ultra- 
high voltage level. This high voltage only has precedents in China, where State Grid 
 
 
48 Brazil-China High-Level Commission for Coordination and Cooperation, 2013. 
49 Further research could be conducted on the differences between how host-governments relate to their 
own MNCs and their subsidiaries abroad. Differences in state-support, in terms of commercial diplomacy 
and advocacy support. 
181 
 
lines already exist in 800 kV UAT (Ultra High Voltage). Given China’s ability to draw on 
its experience in its own large domestic market with diverging local conditions, this 
project offered State Grid credibility as well as market share. High-level attention 
further reinforced that this project would have to perform satisfactorily. In 2015, SGBH 
bought the operational transmission lines of Montes Claros from the Spanish company 
Cobra and the Atlantic line of the Portuguese company Pro-CME. In May of that same 
year, China’s Prime Minister Li Keqiang signed a $53 billion investment package and 
over 35 bilateral agreements (SGCC, 2015).  
He spoke with SGCC leaders on his tour to Brazil, highlighting the company's strong 
links and formal policy support from high-level government officials. For instance, the 
2015 inauguration celebration of Brazil's showcase UHV transmission project, Belo 
Monte Hydropower, was attended both by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and the then 
Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. The inauguration was also seen by SGCC 
Chairman Liu Zhenya and the Eletrobras CEO (SGCC, 2015). 
 
As SGCC’s first overseas UHV DC transmission project, gained momentum so did its 
‘Going Global’ strategy for its UHV technologies, turning into a cornerstone of Chinese-
Brazilian electric power cooperation. Winning this auction of the so-called second Belo 
Monte bipolar will provide energy from the Xingu River in the state of Pará to the 
southeast region of the municipality of Nova Iguaçu of the state of Rio de Janeiro. The 
tender involved a single batch of 2,550 km of transmission lines and 7,800 MW of 
installed capacity in two substations. Upon winning this auction, an SGCC executive 
stated, 
 
Thus, Brazil began to implement this technology here in Brazil in partnership 
with established local companies, together with Furnas and Eletrobrás. To 
make this feasible and not create commercial, cultural and organizational 
barriers, State Grid worked with companies of Brazil. Already in the second 
moment, with the technology almost consolidated, State Grid showed its ability 
to master the technology, entered the second auction alone and won. 
 
That same year the company was awarded a contract to build and operate a second 
transmission line as part of Brazil’s massive Belo Monte hydroelectric power complex. 
State Grid’s goal had been to also build the second line in partnership with Brazilian 
companies, but the company was unable to sign an agreement with any partners until 
the July auction. The project was to use ultra-high-voltage technology to transmitboth 
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AC and DC circuits of 800 kV. The Belo Monte case affirms the relevance of diplomatic 
intervention and technical support constituting soft policy instruments to promote 
inward and outward investment. 
 
 
6.3 Between Brazil and China: The company as a local and a global actor 
 
State Grid’s degree of political standing provides it with the chance to access 
coordinated political support outside of China’s domestic control structures. 
Furthermore, it is able to engage in collective national business representation through 
the Chinese Embassy, where issues with companies are articulated (CHINESE 
EMBASSY, 2011). Home government and contact with other national companies can 
create a strong platform for interest representation (diplomatic pressure, piggybacking 
on further collective actor pressures). But apart from the structure provided by the 
Chinese state, Chinese companies, including SOEs, are competitors, as the case of 
the bid of China Three Gorges (CTG) bid against SGCC for the hydro-electric plant 
Sao Manuel in Para State demonstrates. CTG won the and was joined by EDP Brazil 
and Furnas for the construction of the hydroelectric power plant, which will have an 
installed capacity of 700 MW (BRASIL DE FATO, 2017). 
 
This shows that it is possible to draw upon a network-based support framework, which 
may focus on certain issues or difficulties, and also create an enabling environment in 
which relations can be conducted and facilitated by developing shared approaches and 
strategies. Such strategies might be particularly relevant in the case of host countries 
with strong state intervention in markets, as is the case in Brazil. In the end, the case 
of the SGCC shows how important the home state is in providing influential support to 
guarantee a continuous, smooth investment climate. 
 
It is worth noting that the SGCC has bid below the government-set ceiling in auctions 
for large transmission contracts. As described in Chapter 3, the government auctions 
require a substantial financial commitment and risk predisposition. According to 
Whately (2018), to engage big-scale projects, the firm requires the ability to mobilize 
sums in a short time frame and engage in different forms of risk mitigation. With its 
large corporate structure, the SGCC has the power to mobilise large sums rather 
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quickly. Such financial and political buffer provides the SGCC with a competitive 
advantage compared to other state-owned and private enterprises. In such projects, 
revenues may only return a significant amount of time later. While bidding below the 
ceiling, the return of the project is also subject to the avoidance of social and 
environmental risks that can easily impact the project’s profitability. This makes the 
need for risk mitigation and political support for such investments even higher. 
 
While FDI and MNCs have always been subject to populist rhetoric and diverging political 
opinions, both in home and host countries, the SGCC has successfully navigated this 
terrain. It further aimed at consolidated a vertical market integration, expanding into the 
generation segment. Diversifying its assets, in January 2017 the SGCC completed the 
acquisition of a 54.64% stake in the largest private utility, CPFL Energia S.A., with 23.6% 
from Camargo Correa SA, 29.4% from the pension fund Previ, and 15.1% from Bonaire 
Participacoes (pension funds Fundacao CESP, Sabesprev, Sistel, and Petros). At the 
time of the acquisition, CPFL Energia held 14.3% in the distribution segment and an 
installed capacity of 3,192 MW. Just as in the case of the acquisition of the Spanish 
companies, the control holders of CPFL lacked financial capacity and had to engage in 
debt reduction. 
 
When State Grid decided to invest in CPFL, it also decided to establish two holdings 
and two lines of action: one would be exclusively for the transmission segment, and 
the other would be exclusively for distribution and renewable energy, which is CPFL- 
renewable. After that, two companies were organised, one being State Grid Holding 
based in Rio de Janeiro, and the other being State Grid Brazil Power with headquarters 
in Campinas and responsible for distribution (CPFL) and renewables. 
 
Up to 2018, the SGCC has been at the forefront of the Chinese enterprises in Brazil in 
terms of volume of investment, asset acquisition, and public exposure. Burdens, 
benefits, and risks all had to be redistributed and carefully negotiated during the nearly 
nine years of the company’s presence in Brazil. As a foreign investor, the SGCC was 
initially in strong position vis-à-vis Brazil before investing, because Brazil was actively 
seeking to attract inward FDI. Conversely, as an SOE, the SGCC has been less 
vulnerable since the investment was made, and Brazil guaranteed reliable business 
and regulatory environment. 
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With this diverse set of engagement in Brazil, the company can shape the content and 
direction of foreign policy in the energy area via critical information and expertise, 
facilitate policymaking input, and encourage cooperation at different levels. A major 
issue of contention in the debate is the notion that companies have become significant 
in international relations. This is certainly the case for SGCC: ‘Internationally speaking, 
we have been engaging even at UN-Level. This feeds directly into our role and position 
in Brazil, provides us with legitimacy and credibility to share our mission and values. 
We relate to a wide range of institutions.’ 
 
Finally, it is also possible to anchor both the role of Brazil and UHV within a larger 
picture. The SGCC launched GEI, which has already been anchored to the wider 
actions of the Brazilian MOFA, as well as the wider context of BRICS’ engagement. 
Furthermore, the GEICO initiative has been anchored into bilateral as well multilateral 
policy agendas such as BRICS’. In the case of China’s foreign policy support, apart 
from the Chinese embassy in the country, a handful of government agencies have lent 
a helping hand to the State Grid’s business activities abroad. 
 
In the end, this indicates that national institutions in both home and host countries 
strongly impact the way firms navigate their market strategies. The SGCC has acted 
as a resourceful policy entrepreneur by deploying risk, using agenda setting, and 
strategically using different negotiating tactics (diplomatic, bilateral) in order to 
consolidate its market position. Briefly comparing the SGCC’s presence in China to its 
presence in Brazil allows for the generation of a more detailed approach when it comes 
to the firm’s political engagement. 
 
There are multiple reasons for companies to engage in business politics, some of 
which are driven by business opportunities, but some of which are not. The following 
table summarizes the institutional settings impacting on SGCC and its subsidiary 
SGBH in our study: 
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Table 6.3 - Institutional settings impacting on SGCC 
 
 Brazil China 
State-business 
relations 
State-business relations are shaped 
by federal government. For foreign 
MNCs, relations are rather formal. 
State-business relations are shaped 
by strong party - state presence at 
provincial and central level. Relations 
are rather informal. 
Sector 
characteristics 
impacting on SGCC 
Strongly regulated, with presence of 
strong state. 
Energy sector is strongly regulated. 
Central government’s guidance over 
this specific industry as a strategically 
important sector of the country’s 
economy is subject to substantial 
interference by central state firms 
Business – market 
interaction 
impacting on SGCC 
Country protects its domestic 
markets in order to make sure that 
the national industry benefits from 
increasing demand. 
Firm has CSR framework in place; 
alliances with local companies to 
avoid risk. 
Key player in the market. The clout of 
central SOEs extends deep into the 
national economy. 
Business Traditional mechanisms of Nomenklatura: relationship between 
government governmental relations and formal government and business 
interaction of political relations with formal organisations; political connections 
SGCCC government agencies and (executive and legislative 
 institutions are of high relevance for connections); networks and 
 private actors. Business association appointments to government 
 relevant actors due to lack of positions, parties, and regulatory 
 company’s local knowledge and agencies; and participation in 
 network. policymaking due to governments’ 
  strong reliance on firm expertise in a 
  specific area. 
internationalisation 
context of SGCC 
SGCC present in bilateral state- 
state relations, receives diplomatic 
attention both by home and host 
context. Diplomatic support for key 
projects (e.g. Belo Monte) with high- 
level participation. 
The company developed the ability to 
pursue its industrial and 
internationalisation agenda with 
relative autonomy, albeit confined to 
the state-business relations. 
 
In Brazil, where its institutional 
embeddedness was weak, it 
depended on comparative economic 
advantage, such as low-cost 
bidding, technology knowledge 
transfer, and comparative political 
advantage, such as diplomatic 
support. 
Overall, a pro-business development 
approach and policy support that is 
aimed at internationalisation pursue 
the overall objective of moving up the 
value chain. Within this dynamic of 
domestic and international 
arrangements, domestic policy 
support for outward FDI draws on 
competitive political advantage, 
comparative economic advantage, 
and a comparative symbolic and 
economic diplomacy advantage, as 
Alden and Hughes (2009) has 
demonstrated. 
Overall features of Provision of empirical evidence and Mainly pressuring through conflict 
business politics of expert knowledge (Quiet politics expansion and increasing the 
SGCC approach by Keller, 2018); High- salience (Noisy politics approach by 
 level endorsement of home country; Keller, 2018). 
 low-bidding strategy.  






Benefitting from strong state support, even though the SGCC’s position may be unique, 
the chapter demonstrates that SOEs are able to develop their economic importance 
and are willed to invest resources to ensure their interests are best represented and 
make informed strategic decisions. As the SGCC’s case shows, the company operates 
as a global and local actor, adopts global strategies for value creation, and 
simultaneously engages in local interest representation by maintaining strategic 
engagement relevant to the subsidiary interests with local institutions, associations, 
and relevant actors. While in the host context, the company is embedded in the formal 
regulatory and sector relations, it relies on its informal embeddedness in the Chinese 
state system to advance its business interests. As a result, the case study shows that 
the firm is able to incrementally build on existing institutional strengths and industrial 
capabilities to participate in the Brazilian energy sector, while simultaneously 





This concluding chapter pulls together all the insights from the dissertation to 
understand how business politics are used by state-owned companies in the context 
of internationalisation. The changing character of business-state relations is important 
to an understanding of the international political economy. As Vogel (1996, p.158) 
observes, ‘business does enjoy substantial political influence in every capitalist society; 
however, the variations in its influence—both over time and across different 
countries—are equally important.’ 
 
This dissertation is concerned with the internationalisation processes between ‘state- 
permeated economies’ (Noelke, 2014), and particularly the role of state-owned 
multinationals. The main objective of the dissertation is to analyse the political logic of 
state-business relations in the internationalisation process of a Chinese central-level 
SOE (i.e., the SGCC) to Brazil. The case of State Grid in Brazil enables the 
understanding of the role of political resources in the home context and in entering and 
operating in a local market. The case is also theoretically relevant, because it provides 
the analysis of the resources employed by the company at three levels: the domestic 
and host countries, the sectoral, and the organisational level. These three levels cover 
much of the company’s policy range and enable interaction between the three levels 
within the context of internationalisation. 
 
Emerging countries’ SOEs are increasingly internationalising and have expanded their 
global presence (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014), impacting the organisational structure, 
business endeavours, and scope of firms. In this dissertation, I elaborate on an 
approach of indirect business politics based on SOEs’ engagement in terms of 
advocacy relevant to their business interests. In this regard, throughout the dissertation, 
business politics are understood as a way of directly or indirectly leveraging interests. 
Since internationalisation was focused on as a process across home and host contexts, 
two specific arenas of potential corporate political action were scrutinised: the electricity 
industry and the internationalisation policy, and the related state-driven support 
structures. 
 
The case shows differences and similarities in the way economic coordination impacts 
on state-business relations. As Verbeke and Kano (2015, p.15) note, `institutions do 
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matter in internalization theory; they can affect additional costs of doing business 
abroad, and they determine individual firms’ historical paths of capability development. 
Different from other countries where business politics would focus on parliament and 
congresses, in the case of SGCC`s presence in both Brazil and China, the political 
systems of both countries result on different ways the firm choose to build its 
relationships with key decision-makers. In the case of China, the fragmented relations 
between central and provincial state, as well as party - state structures, give room for 
a system of sophisticated inter-personal relations, where the high-ranking SOE staff is 
able to secure resources, knowledge and preferential treatment, as well as provides 
sectorial expert knowledge. In the case of Brazil, the SGBH as the SGCC subsidiary 
has to navigate within a country politically characterized by the pre-dominance of the 




7.1 Summary of findings 
 
Empirically, this dissertation contributes to understandings of the interaction between 
markets and state and regulatory bodies in Brazil and China. In particular, there are 
very few empirical studies of Chinese company internationalisation to Latin America 
and the role of the different policy environments relevant to the firm. When it comes to 
the significance of political connectedness for SOE internationalisation, the political 
dimension of SOE internationalisation is more implied than outspoken: the 
unchallenged role of the state in determining investments is often presumed by the 
literature and portrays a one-sided and homogenous understanding of the state and 
its actors. One of the key conceptual contributions of this study is to place the idea of 
business politics, by focusing on a single case study rather than on macro studies of 
different SOE typologies. While this can be a potential limitation for further 
comparability, it makes it possible to capture the specific features of the case. Given 
these provisions, six main conclusions can be drawn. 
 
First, the relations between China and Brazil move within a window of complexity and 
are overall state-driven. The Chinese state follows certain ideas and ideologies that 
help the short-term/long-term economic interests through foreign policy and diplomacy, 
including incentives for internationalisation, global competitiveness, and industrial 
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cooperation. According to the same logic, diplomatic relations to Brazil are embedded 
in strategic interests and in ideational concepts. For Brazil, China became a relevant 
partner in the beginning of the 2000s, and ever since, both countries have engaged in 
bilateral relations that provide a vital entry path and favourable environment for 
Chinese companies with interest in the country. 
 
This highlights the importance of market craft for shaping the business environment, 
including networking, negotiations, and bilateral activities such as trade and investment 
promotion, S&T cooperation, and advocacy for domestic business. Several activities 
developed by public actors between home and host countries can be encouraging 
factors for facilitating and promoting business. As seen in the course of the study, both 
Brazil and China make use of commercial diplomacy and, likewise, firms navigate and 
profit from these engagements. 
 
Second, at an organisational level, the political logics a company adopts may vary 
distinctively. The choices of which tools and mechanisms and direct or indirect 
approaches the company chooses are not only consequential, but they reflect the 
different institutional and national systems. The institutional conditions impact the 
business politics, because they are sources of legitimacy, authority, and identity. In 
certain circumstances, therefore, companies may choose direct access to 
legislature/parliament, whereas in other cases business associations may be more 
effective in driving interests forward. 
 
When engaging in the regulatory process, MNCs face two related decisions: whether 
to engage reactively or proactively, and how to exert influence on decision-making 
processes. In this context, business politics can be understood by examining company 
development, changes in the market and ownership structure and situation, the political 
environment, and how these issues together contribute to the development of the 
decision-making processes. Thus, this study goes beyond the negotiations of MNC 
entry in a foreign country to examine the consolidation of the company as a process. 
This is also necessary as according to Verbeke and Kano (2015), institutions do not 
function in isolation but in a multi-layered system with interacting microlevel actions, 
firm-level strategies, and macrolevel policies coexist and interact. 
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Third, the 2001 blackout of Brazil’s electricity network led to the government 
introducing new investment opportunities and opening doors for foreign enterprises. 
With the PT government entering administration in the following year, further reforms 
were introduced targeting the improvement of the transmission and generation 
segments. This allowed foreign companies to enter the market, among them Spanish 
MNCs. In the case of China, corporatist state-business with the domain of the state 
and the proximity to the state-driven business (SOES or mixed ownership forms), an 
authoritarian and interdependent decentralised governance structure between local 
and central governments, market control, and businesses’ need to main intimate 
relationships to the state explain how firms navigate the electricity sector. 
 
Thus, differences in the logic of state-business systems function may explain why 
companies choose different paths to navigate their interests. For example, the 
embeddedness of industrial capabilities in China implies that central government 
policies encourage the emulation of advanced R&D capabilities belonging to foreign 
enterprises by applying technology transfer, targeted research, development, and 
available funding. In terms of technology transfer, it should be also mentioned that 
market access in the energy sector is a distinctive feature between China and Brazil, 
because in China market access for foreign companies in certain sectors is bound to 
joint development agreements of firm products (technology transfer) and is more 
regulated than in Brazil. Firms such as the SGCC have benefitted from such policies, 
enabling them to participate less than a decade after their creation. 
 
Building up such engineering capabilities is vital for firms in the energy sector, as 
shown by the case of the SGCC in Chapter 5. Companies such as the SGCC were 
able to operate very quickly from the technological frontier and could therefore speed 
up their competitiveness and industrial upgrading in the industry supply sector. While 
the industrial upgrading was encouraged by authorities, fierce competition within China 
demonstrated the firm’s need to develop political logics and foresight. Such knowledge 
may be helpful for understanding the dynamics of other Chinese companies in Brazil. 
Energy firms tend to have highly specific assets and are therefore more likely to lobby 
along industry lines (Alt et al. 1999). 
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In the case of the present study, the tools of industrial policy (regulatory policy, 
subsidies, funding for R&D, etc.) were all disputed by the energy firms in China’s 
domestic environment. Energy firms are also capital-intensive and highly technical, 
meaning that their size and expertise provide them with informational resources and 
the ability to articulate their interests. This is also relevant when energy sector firms in 
Brazil engage in the class entity associations relevant to their sectorial activities and 
develop close ties to state entities. 
 
Fourth, this dissertation makes a contribution to comparative understandings of 
Chinese state industry by demonstrating the policy process that Chinese SOEs engage 
in, showing that state ownership and SOE autonomy are related but not synonymous 
(XU, 2016). The SGCC is bound to the structures of the Chinese state with state 
ministries and companies competing against each other and with hierarchy being a 
central element crossing formal and informal structures. The regulatory strength and 
policy gridlock are further fuelled by SOEs’ autonomous internationalisation efforts, and 
in practice, these efforts are translated by the SGCC’s drive to break into international 
markets by relying both on formal institutional behaviour and informal practices that 
actively govern state- market interactions, particularly in the context of the 
internationalisation of SOEs. 
 
The internationalisation of China’s most strategic sectors, particularly in the energy 
field, is rooted domestically in the interplay of deliberate central government guidance 
and by large, central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) based on motives that are not 
necessarily aligned with those of the central government (Sampson, 2016). The 
interplay of the domestic institutional actors; the role of individual relations, including 
the high administrative rank; excellent political connections; and increasing political 
and financial autonomy all determine SOEs’ embeddedness in China’s state-business 
relations inside and outside the country. However, the degree to which the state’s 
administrative entities and public sector interlock varies largely. 
 
Fifth, the business politics employed by the SOE in this case study vary across 
contexts. Firm internationalisation involves different layers of interest and power 
between political actors, whether in the domestic or external spheres of a state. With 
firm-specific advantages differing from the standard analysis of ownership advantages 
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applied to western firms, MNCs from emerging economies challenge conventional 
international business and political economy approaches (Ramamurti, 2009). 
 
Ongoing debates are intended to understand the aspects of emerging multinational 
corporations` strategies. The SGCC, successor to both the integrated power sector 
monopolist SPCC and its governmental predecessor MEP, was founded on 29 
December 2002. Since its emergence, State Grid has been closely interrelated with 
the state and party structures of China and should be particularly well-suited for the 
purpose of examining business politics in the internationalisation process. 
 
Similarities with other cases of SOE internationalisation can be drawn, as for example 
in Meidan (2016) in his case study on the Chinese oil industry. While the oil SOEs have 
become major investors in the global upstream and established a presence in global 
refining and oil trading, the oil sector is state-dominated. The relation between state 
and SOE balances between the majority stake of the state, and intervention such as 
price setting, provision of diplomatic support and influence over commercial decisions, 
while on the other hand, the company holds technical expertise and market insights 
valuable for policy-making (Meidan, 2016). This case proves true for SGCC. 
 
As seen throughout the dissertation, SGCC is a conglomerate firm with multiple 
subsidiaries, business units, and different specialisations. This allowed the firm to 
develop and quickly advance research and engineering capabilities within its own 
company. It possessed the financial backing as well as the human and technical capital 
necessary to establish the required capabilities to bring forward the firm vision and 
navigate the opportunities and constraints of the party state. The SGCC expanded its 
organisational boundaries and developed the resources to maintain its status quo and 
establish itself beyond the set boundaries of the industrial plan established by the 
central government. 
 
The research shows that while the SGCC acts with a commercial logic abroad, the 
vision, ideas, and domestic ideology of China’s party state guide its long-term interests. 
For example, the SGCC has not just entered the global stage as a company with 
multiple interests across different continents. One of its ambitious ideas is the GEI 
initiative, ‘a globally interconnected power system, supported by Smart Grid 
infrastructure, and making optimal use of UHV technology to transmit power over great 
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distances’ (GEI, 2018), which is being driven by SGCC Chairman Liu Zhenya. In this 
context the GEIDCO was launched via the cooperation of dozens of equipment 
manufacturers, energy corporations, business associations, and civil society groups. 
 
Overall, such company engagement follows the logic of occupying the windows of 
opportunities in the global economy and building on the networked strength of Chinese 
industrial actors and state resources. Similar efforts can be seen in the context of 
standardisation in that since 2012 the company has also further stepped up its 
engagement in the international associations (leading posts, including chairs as (vice) 
presidents, and leaders of working groups) relevant to firm advocacy. Such 
engagement steps in the place where traditionally industrialised companies ensure 
their dominance in standardisation to keep international standard development closely 
aligned with domestic priorities. It has to be kept in mind that certification bodies 
function as nongovernmental organizations of private governance matters with a strong 
impact on national economies. Here, SGCC engaged in institutionalized mechanisms 
of corporate interaction with the possibility to impact the rules of product development 
and the market behaviour of other economic actors. 
 
Sixth, when it comes to the consolidation of the SGCC through its subsidiary in Brazil, 
political bargaining mainly takes place on two stages, namely the economic diplomacy 
stage and the technological level. The diplomacy stage encompasses economic 
diplomacy efforts involving the efforts of formal state players and other stakeholders 
responsible for promoting or attracting FDI. This calls for the specific importance of 
state-level bargaining and bureaucratic impact on firm internationalisation and 
presence in markets abroad. 
 
This is evident in the state support given to the SGCC during government visits to Brazil 
and in consultations and policy documents, demonstrating that the state- business 
relationships of the SGCC in China externalise as the company becomes a 
multinational operating company and draws on state support to open new opportunities. 
In general, while direct interest politics may be a more straightforward approach, MNCs 
may be able to amplify their influence more discreetly by asking interest groups and 
home governments for help. Rather than assuming implicit lobbying activity targeting 
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specific bills in Senate or Congress, the ways in which a company can negotiate its 
activities is more diverse. 
 
On the technical level, the comparative advantage the SGCC generated itself in the 
Chinese domestic market provides it with the right capabilities to engage with the needs 
of the Brazilian transmission segment. Like other MNCs in the country, SGBH 
maintains a low profile and publicly stresses its long-term interests in Brazil. Generally, 
the more technical the issue, the less relevant and observable it will be to the public. 
In Brazil, the technical discussions relevant to regulatory issues are mostly had in 
technical committees or working groups of associations. State Grid Brazil Holding S.A. 
is a member of those industry associations and participates in the available fora. What 
differs from SGBH’s commercial goals in Brazil is that in China the SGCC assumes a 
higher bargaining power due its industry position. In Brazil, it has also successfully 
employed UHV rhetoric as an additional benefit of having the SGCC operate the 
transmission lines. 
 
In the end, it is the combination of political and technological vanguard which 
positioned the SGCC, reacting to regulatory activity by explaining the company’s 
position, providing seminars and other presentations, responding to requests for 
information, displaying technical expertise, and participating in interest groups (a 
normal activity for companies in the sector). For example, sharing technical expertise 
with the EPE and other institutions created a playing field at the working level by 
partnering with CEPEL, the ONS, and the EPE on smart metering and high-voltage 
technology. The strong interests of the company in the transmission assets became 
evident when the company bid far below the ceiling at the Belo Monte auctions. 
 
With such large-scale contracts, the company publicly re-emphasised its commitment 
to improving the Brazilian transmission sector. It also reflects the fact that Chinese 
investment in the energy infrastructure does not go without tension, because the 
ideological and geopolitical concerns concerning Chinese investment have been 
raised several times by national industry, as well as by political and legislative actors. 
 
In Brazil, the company acts as a private actor but can build on competitive advantages 
provided by state support offered by the Chinese government as well as investment 
attraction as promoted by the Brazilian government. While this does not guarantee 
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SGBH privileged treatment at auctions for transmission, the Chinese state’s backing, 
for example, can provide a better starting position. However, SGBH’s investment 
intentions have not always been favoured by the Brazilian state. 
 
It is widely presumed that companies pay attention to non-market issues such as the 
political sphere because this can benefit business procedures (e.g., benefitting from 
certain opportunities or leveraging resources to the company’s advantage) or involve 
reactions to government-related threats. In addition, there are normative presumptions 
that business interests may or may not be in the direct public interest; businesses 
spend high resources to have political leverage, and that political leverage is in their 
direct favour. 
 
In summary, the research for this dissertation focused on two middle-income countries 
that have both experienced significant changes throughout the past two decades. The 
example of this case study is neither representative of all SOEs nor of all emerging 
MNCs, which face different issues and have different support structures. That said, the 
study only provides a specific case of how MNCs engage in internationalisation in both 
the home and host environments. 
 
The empirical observations challenge the theoretical propositions on the formation of 
business preferences and business interest representation at a fundamental level: 
SOEs can be actors with their own specific agendas while acting within the home state 
policy and political structures and feeling the systemic pressures of the domestic policy 
environment. In this regard, similarities to empirical research on other cases of SOE i 
internationalisation can be drawn. 
 
For example, Högselius (2009) in the case of the Swedish Vattenfall suggests that 
internationalisation requires both institutional and entrepreneurial capabilities. The 
company had to develop the ability to push for corporatization and adjust 
organizationally to international norms. Similar to SGCC, the strength of Vattenfall in 
its internationalisation efforts were its technology and R& D capabilities, less the 
business ability. To strengthen its embeddedness in the host context, Vattenfall had to 
reinforce its entrepreneurial abilities and develop new competencies to be competitive 
in the host country environment. 
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7.2 Contribution of study 
 
Dynamics of corporate politics are multifaceted. This dissertation gave the reader a 
better understanding of how emerging SOEs operate across countries and the 
challenges and choices they face. It portrayed SOEs as actors in the state-business 
relations, which act with a certain degree of autonomy while confined to the boundaries 
of the state. This study brings the studies on business politics and political firm activity 
in the context of the internationalisation of larger businesses. In both home and host 
context, companies engage in strategic environments, including relations to the 
government, regulatory stakeholders, CSR and others, which require a thoughtful 
approach for long term organizational success. However, how companies play their 
game in these strategic environments may significantly differ. 
 
Business politics involves capital, knowledge, ideas and value systems. The study 
contributed to assessing the embeddedness of emerging MNCs in two different 
institutional settings and political systems. It enabled to understand that companies 
learn fast and able to adapt their embeddedness for the purpose of better 
organizational success. It showed how interests can be pursued despite divergent 
industrial legacies and governmental resource. 
 
Under the conditions of globalization, emerging MNCs are catching up fast. This study 
further contributes to understanding political origins of corporate decisions and 
industrial upgrading in emerging economies through the lenses of technology 
innovation and international competition. It emphasises that internationalisation may 
not suffice to become a global leader in the power supply industry. Rather, 
standardization and influencing global standards by actively joining international 
associations as well as occupying strategic positions in these organizations shows the 
sophisticated business politics approach behind the firm activities. 
 
Empirically, this study contributes to a rich literature on Chinese investment abroad. 
As a topic, China has attracted the attention of both research and policymaking for a 
series of reasons. The increase of Chinese engagement abroad had risen over the 
past two decades and since then, a series of issues have emerged, including Chinese 
interest in natural resources, economic dependency, heavy subsidiaries of Chinese 
export and products, etc. A closer look at the outward Chinese development 
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framework puts its geographical outreach into perspective. The under Chinese 
President Xi Jinping 2014 announced Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) takes an 
unprecedented stance at outlining a development initiative spanning up to 70 countries 
across Asia, Africa and Europe, promoting trade and investment, particularly in 
infrastructure. Bilateral cooperation mechanisms include Memorandum of 
Understandings (MoU), implementation plans and roadmaps. In this and other regional 
formal or informal cooperation initiatives, China has particularly channelled 
cooperation towards the infrastructure sector. 
 
Studies on Latin America are less prevalent, this study fills this gap by contributing to 
understanding Brazil-China relations. In the case of Latin America, traditional 
challenges concerning infrastructure investment, mainly commitment of massive 
resources, long term planning and capital allocation, or the need for a clear regulatory 
framework (VALDERREY& MONTOYA, 2015), call for firm-level studies to understand 




7.3 Avenues for future research 
 
Concerning future avenues of research, as Keller (2018) has demonstrated, business 
impact needs to be studied in its institutional and issue-specific context. Under the 
conditions of globalisation, the business politics of the present case study of China and 
Brazil points to the national systemic characteristics impacting MNCs within these 
systems, including a variety of capitalism, legislation, and regulation of the electricity 
industry, as well as the political environment. 
 
Business politics – a way of directly or indirectly leveraging corporate interests – were 
the enabling non-market and non-economic components that made the SGCC’s 
market entry possible by drawing on commercial diplomacy, the promotion of technical 
knowledge, partnerships with local companies as suppliers of local knowledge, and an 
indirect approach in the Brazilian institutional environment. This differs fundamentally 
from the SGCC’s positioning in China and demonstrates the learning process the 
company is undergoing as it becomes established in Brazil. 
198 
 
In the end, it is relevant to ask, consonant with Strange (1996), if the case of the SGCC 
in Brazil offers an analysis of state-state or state-business relations. Dynamics of state- 
owned enterprise internationalisation are tied to the interplay between business politics 
and state in both recipient and home countries, pointing to the need for SOEs to best 
exploit and build their institutional comparative and competitive advantages across 
multiple environments and public actors. 
 
As an institutional actor, the SGCC is entangled in the complex structure of state 
ownership administration, incentive structures, sectorial policy regulations, and 
internationalisation procedures, while simultaneously pursuing its own agenda and 
policy preferences. As a private actor, the company follows the market rules in Brazil 
and is able to draw on competitive advantages from home. 
 
Lastly, given the characteristics of state-business relations in both Brazil and China, 
one of the remaining questions is: how predictable is firm behaviour in different 
institutional settings? This points to the need for further studies to understand why firms 
adopt certain political and non-market behaviour. The internationalisation context adds 
a rich theoretical and empirical starting point for such studies and enables to 
understand the different economic, cognitive or organizational elements impacting on 
the way and on the reason business politics are pursued by firms. As the institutional 
frameworks provided by the state to support companies abroad tend to grow, state- 
business relations in internationalisation offer a puzzling picture as to how a company 
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2016 Interview with official at the National Energy Administration China 
2016 Interview with official of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs China 
2016 Interview with representative of SGCC China 
2016 Interview with official at the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission 
China 
2017 Interview with China-Latin America expert, Peking University China 
2017 Interview with China-Latin America expert, Chinese Academy of 
Social Science 
China 
2017 Interview with former employee, NDRC Department of Foreign 
Investment 
China 
2017 Interview with investment lawyer – overseas expansion China 
2017 Interview with energy strategy expert China 
2018 Interview with China-LAC expert, Sichuan International Studies 
University 
China 
2018 Interview with former employee of Chinese Embassy to Brazil China 
 
    Brazil 
 
2015 Interview with a smart grid researcher at the State Grid Energy Research 
Institute. 
Brazil 
2015 Interview with China-Brazil expert Brazil 
2015 Interview with representative of the Presidency of the Republic Brazil 
2015 Interview with National Confederation of Industry Representative Brazil 
2017 Interview with member of Brazilian congress, member of China Working 
Group 
Brazil 
2017 Interview with a transmission expert, University of Sao Paulo Brazil 
2017 Interview with representative of Brazilian Ministry of Industry Brazil 
2018 Interview with representative of Brazilian Ministry of Science, Technology 
and Innovation 
Brazil 
2018 Interview with representative of Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Brazil 
2018 Interview with former Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Brazil 
2018 Interview with ANEEL employee Brazil 
2018 Interview with former Brazilian ambassador to China Brazil 
2018 Interview with employee of China-Brazil Business Council Brazil 
2018 Interview with industry expert Brazil 
2018 Interview with representative of Brazilian Embassy to China Brazil 
2018 Interview with former employee of Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy Brazil 
2018 Interview with representative of Brazilian Export Promotion Agency APEX Brazil 
2018 Interview with representative of Brazilian Ministry of Planning Brazil 
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APPENDIX II - Major policies and regulations guiding and governing the overseas development of Chinese companies 
 
 
Date Issuer Title 
2002 Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(MFTEC) 
Comprehensive Evaluation Measures for the Performance of Overseas Investments 
(Trial) 
2002 MFTEC, State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) Interim Measures for Joint Annual Inspection of Overseas Investment 
2004 Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) Measures for the Administration of Training of Workers Dispatched Overseas 
2004 MOFCOM Reporting System for Investment and Operation Obstacles in Foreign Countries 
2005 MOFCOM Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Regarding Adjustment to the 
Administration of Financing Guarantee from Domestic Banks for Enterprises with 
Foreign Investment 
2005 State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS), Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), MOFCOM, State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
Notice of the State Administration of Work Safety, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry 
of Commerce, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission on 
Improving Work Safety Supervision of Overseas Chinese Enterprises 
2005 General Office of the State Council Opinions on Strengthening the Security and Protection of Overseas Chinese 
Enterprises and Staff 
2007 MOFCOM, Ministry of Finance, People’s Bank of China, 
All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) 
Opinions of the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Finance, the People’s Bank of 
China and All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce on Encouraging and 
Guiding Overseas Investment and Cooperation by Private Enterprises 
2007 State Forestry Administration (SFA), MOFCOM Guidelines on Sustainable Forest Cultivation for Chinese Enterprises Overseas 
2008 MOFCOM, MFA, SASAC Notice of the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission on Further Regulating Overseas 
Investment and Cooperation of Chinese Enterprises 




2009 SFA, MOFCOM Guidelines on Sustainable Operation and Utilization of Overseas Forests by Chinese 
Enterprises 
2009 MOFCOM, Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development (MOHURD) 
Measures for the Administration of Overseas Contracting Qualification 
2009 MOFCOM, China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation Notice on Strengthening Risk Prevention in Overseas Economic and Trade 
Cooperation Zones 
2010 MOFCOM, MFA, National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Public Security (MPS), 
SASAC, SAWS, ACFIC 
Provisions on the Security Management of Overseas Chinese Institutions and Staff 
2010 MOFCOM Overseas Security Risk Warning and Information Notification System in Overseas 
Investment and Cooperation 
2011 MOFCOM, MFA, SASAC, ACFIC Guidelines on Security Management of Overseas Chinese Enterprises (Institutions) 
and Staff 
2011 SASAC Interim Measures for the Administration of Overseas Stateowned Property Rights of 
Central Enterprises 
2012 SASAC Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Overseas Assets of 
Central Enterprises 
2012 China Banking Regulatory Commission Green Credit Policy 
2012 MOFCOM, International Communication Office of the CPC 
Central Committee, MFA, NDRC, SASAC, National 
Bureau of Corruption Prevention, ACFIC 
Opinions on Corporate Culture Development of Chinese Enterprises Overseas 
2012 SASAC Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Overseas Investment of 
Central Enterprises 
2013 MOFCOM, SAWS, MFA, NDRC, MOHURD, SASAC Notice of the Ministry of Commerce, State Administration of Work Safety, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Housing 




  Commission on General Inspection of Work Safety Governance of Chinese 
Enterprises Overseas 
2013 MOFCOM, Ministry of Environmental Protection Guidelines on Environmental Protection in Overseas Investment and Cooperation 
2013 SASAC Interim Measures for Emergency Management of Central Enterprises 
2013 MOFCOM, MFA, MOHURD, National Health and Family 
Planning Commission, SASAC, SAWS 
Provisions on Responding to and Addressing Security Incidents in Overseas 
Investment and Cooperation 
2013 MOFCOM, MFA, MPS, MOHURD, General Administration 
of Customs, State Administration of Taxation, State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine, SAFE 
Trial Measures for Negative Credit Record in Overseas Investment, Cooperation and 
Foreign Trade 
2013 MOFCOM Notice of the Ministry of Commerce on Strengthening the Categorized Administration 
of Chinese Personnel Dispatched Overseas for Overseas Investment and Cooperation 
2014 MOFCOM Guidelines on Intellectual Property Right of Overseas Enterprises 
2014 MOFCOM Measures for the Administration of Overseas Investment 
2015 NDRC, MFA, MOFCOM Vision and Proposed Actions Outlined on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road 
 
